Concept
The Rule on Direct Examination
Form of questions
The Rule on Direct Examination
Rule 611(c) tells the lawyer who calls a witness not to lead: leading questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to develop the witness’s testimony.1 The prohibition makes sense only against what has already passed between that lawyer and that witness. It rests on three assumptions, two factual and one psychological, and the psychological one depends on the other two.2
The first assumption is that the lawyer has interviewed the witness and concluded that the witness is willing and able to give testimony favorable to the client. The second is that the lawyer has prepared the witness, a practice often called “woodshedding,” so that lawyer and witness both know how the examination will proceed and neither needs leading questions to get there.3 A party chooses its own witnesses, so a friendly witness who knows the route needs no prompting. The only thing a leading question can add is the lawyer’s own wording.
The third assumption concerns the relationship the first two create. A witness who has been interviewed and prepared has a cooperative relationship with the examiner. If the examiner phrases a question in language that implies the desired answer, the witness will tend to give that answer in order to preserve the relationship, even when the examiner’s words differ from the ones the witness would have chosen.4 That is the vice the rule targets: the suggestions of counsel take the place of the witness’s actual testimony.5
The rule cannot cure partisanship. Counsel are partisan and have already had the opportunity to influence the witness during preparation. What the rule does is reduce partisan influence by prohibiting leading questions of witnesses who are neutral or favorable to the questioning party. The correct approach to a witness who is not hostile is therefore to ask non-suggestive questions, especially about matters the parties actually dispute.6
The test is whether the question suggests the answer the examiner wants. Form can make it do so (“Didn’t he * * *?”), and so can detail, emphasis on certain words, tone, or the examiner’s nonverbal conduct.7 A witness to a collision may be asked, “What color was the traffic light when defendant entered the intersection?” but not, “Defendant drove right through the red light, didn’t he?” The first question leaves the color to the witness. The second supplies the color and the driving and ends with a tag that invites agreement, so a cooperative witness need only say yes. Even the neutral version becomes leading if the examiner leans on the word “red” and lifts an eyebrow.
A leading question can still reach the jury, for two reasons. The first is that the opponent may decline to object. The judge will not ordinarily intervene, and opposing counsel may conclude that the harm from a particular question does not justify the interruption, the delay, and the jury impatience an objection can cause. A mildly leading question on a trivial point is the clearest case, because the objection would cost more than the answer could harm. The second reason is that some situations fall outside the general prohibition, and later sections take them up.8
Even a sustained objection accomplishes little. Once the suggestion has reached the witness, the examiner can rephrase and collect the same answer. To do real good, the judge would have to foreclose all further inquiry on the subject, or let counsel return to it only after other matters have dulled the suggestion. Those measures are available, but judges seldom use them. Their rarity invites the conclusion that the rule lacks true substance and merely creates a false sense of spontaneity that the examiner might otherwise destroy by leading.9 The objection also addresses a small part of a larger problem. Before trial the witness has been exposed to far more powerful suggestive influences, and by the time of trial the leading objection seems comparatively trivial.10
In the final analysis the permissibility of leading questions is discretionary, and a judge’s departure from the usual practice will not be reversed unless it contributed to an unfair trial.11 Because so much turns on the trial judge, counsel must know the specific rules of the court in which the case is tried.12 Spotting a leading question on direct examination is therefore only the first step in the analysis. The next is to ask whether a recognized situation made leading necessary to develop the testimony.