Concept
Discretion to Expand Cross
Scope of examination
Discretion to Expand Cross
The second sentence of Rule 611(b) lets the trial judge depart from the scope-of-direct default: the court “may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”1 The first sentence says cross-examination “should not go beyond” the subject matter of the direct and matters affecting credibility, so those two categories need nobody’s permission and everything else needs the judge’s. Because the word is “may,” the cross-examiner has no right to wider questioning, and a judge who refuses acts as properly as one who grants.2
Two practical facts explain the latitude. The edge of the direct cannot be located with exactness, and trial courts must be able to curb interminable and pointless inquiry. Reviewing courts therefore hesitate to disturb these rulings absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion that resulted in manifest prejudice, and the rule itself is phrased in suggestive rather than mandatory terms.3
Two questions organize what follows: why judges grant additional inquiry, and when a ruling on the point becomes an abuse of discretion. Once a judge grants it, the new matters are treated “as if on direct examination,” so the cross-examiner generally may not lead on them, while the party who called the witness may lead and impeach on them.4 The later section on questioning beyond direct develops those consequences.
When Judges Grant Additional Inquiry
Judges grant additional inquiry when the scope limit would cost more than it protects. The limit exists to foster orderly presentation of the case: each side introduces the evidence it relies on, on matters where it bears the burden of production, during its own turn to present its case in chief.5 A judge can set that sequence aside when following it would impose a real burden for little gain. Three situations recur in the cases: a witness who would otherwise have to testify twice, a marginal witness whom one round of questioning can serve, and new matter so probative and so closely tied to the trial that the detour is worth taking.
Convenience to the witness is the simplest reason. Suppose a neighbor can speak both to liability and to damages. The plaintiff calls the neighbor first, on liability, and the defendant would then call the neighbor again on damages. If that sequence would cause the neighbor great inconvenience, the trial court may let the defendant cross-examine on damages during the plaintiff’s case-in-chief.6 The testimony is the same either way. The judge has decided that the order of proof matters less than the witness’s time and has spared the witness a second trip.
A broader version of the same idea is the one-appearance practice. In the interest of judicial economy and the witness’s convenience, the witness is called only once, and after one side’s direct examination the other side may cross-examine without being confined to the matters the direct covered.7 Judges are most likely to adopt the practice when the witness is of only marginal importance to the case and the wider cross will not substantially lengthen the examination.8 Both conditions track the purpose of the scope limit. A calling party has the least stake in sequence when its witness is peripheral, and a short cross on extra matters delays the trial very little.
Probative value was the reason in United States v. Carter. The government cross-examined a witness named Riggins on matters beyond the scope of her direct. On appeal the defendant argued that the ruling was an abuse of discretion because it let the government present evidence it had chosen not to offer in its case in chief and that would not have been proper rebuttal.9 The court agreed that both assertions were correct and held that they were not enough, because the defendant had to show more than this to establish an abuse. The testimony challenged some of his alibis, namely his contention that he was not at the CNA building on one date and that he was misidentified as the robber on another, and in light of its probative value the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by letting the government exceed the scope of the direct.10 The court also quoted McCormick for the point that, because the management of cross-examination is peculiarly committed to the district court’s discretion, the effect is “to confine the matter largely to the trial level” and to remove it from the area of profitable appellate review.11
The reasoning travels beyond Carter. One court of appeals, reviewing overruled objections to cross that may have exceeded the direct, observed that the second sentence confers discretion on trial judges “to disregard the first sentence of Rule 611(b) and allow cross-examination to extend into areas not explored on direct,” and it cited decisions from the First, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits. It then pointed to two features of the challenged questions: they occupied only a fraction of the cross-examination, and they bore a close relationship to major trial issues. So “whether or not the questions fell within the scope of the direct examination,” it could not find an abuse of discretion.12 The same court contrasted the Third Circuit’s decision in Lis v. Robert Packer Hospital, which confines the discretion to “special circumstances.”13 A cross-examiner in a court that follows Lis should expect to identify such a circumstance, like the witness’s inconvenience, and not rest on relevance alone.
The discretion also works in the other direction. In Jeffries v. Potomac Development Corp., Potomac sought to cross-examine an expert witness, Greene, on an issue beyond his direct, but Potomac had never identified Greene as one of its own expert witnesses, as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) required. The trial judge found that allowing the cross would prejudice the other parties and limited Potomac to matters raised on direct. The court of appeals held that this decision, even if not compelled by Rule 26(b)(4), was certainly not an abuse of discretion.14 Carter and Jeffries reach opposite results under the same sentence, and both rulings stand. In each the judge weighed what the new matter offered against what it cost: probative value against the alibis in Carter, prejudice to the other parties in Jeffries.
The common mistake is to treat a request to expand as something the cross-examiner is owed. The power belongs to the judge, so a refusal like the one in Jeffries is as proper an exercise of the rule as a grant like the one in Carter.
When Expansion Becomes an Abuse of Discretion
A ruling that lets cross range beyond the direct is reversible only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion that resulted in manifest prejudice to a party.23 That standard has two parts, and the complaining party must satisfy both. Even a finding of abuse leaves the judgment standing unless a substantial right is affected, because Rule 103(a) indicates that courts of appeals should not reverse on erroneous evidentiary rulings otherwise.24 Three things move the analysis: how probative the new matter is, whether it reaches the jury through a channel the evidence rules would ordinarily close, and whether the complaining party was actually harmed.
Carter shows the standard working in the ruling’s favor. The defendant established that the government used cross to present evidence it had chosen not to offer in its case in chief and that would not have been proper rebuttal, and he still lost, because those showings did not establish an abuse given the testimony’s probative value against his alibis.25
The cross in Lewis v. Rego Co. went wrong in the way it brought in evidence. The cross-examiner asked Commander Morton for an opinion on the cause of a rupture and, under the guise of asking about the basis for that opinion, put before the jury the opinion contained in Dr. McMahon’s report.26 The court of appeals called this hearsay that would have been improper to admit even in ordinary circumstances, and it found the testimony particularly prejudicial because McMahon had repudiated his opinion on the cause without the witness knowing it. The cross-examiner knew very well that Morton’s opinion rested on a report withdrawn in that respect.27 The lesson is that widening the scope of cross does not suspend the hearsay rule, which still applies to what the new questions bring before the jury.
Irrelevance, not hearsay, produced the finding of abuse in the case involving the witness Munn. Munn was cross-examined about certain aspects of the Jehovah’s Witness faith. The court held that his testimony on those matters “did not tend to prove or disprove any (permissible) material fact” and was therefore irrelevant, so its admission was an abuse of discretion.28 The court then treated relief as a separate question: simply because the judge abused discretion did not entitle Munn to relief unless a substantial right was affected, and the judgment was affirmed.29
Judge Barksdale joined the affirmance but rejected the finding of abuse. He thought the evidence bore on the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which he called the key issue at trial, and that the cross did not violate Rule 611(b) because it was responsive to Munn’s own direct testimony. He also noted that for certain questions Munn did not appear to have made the objection Rule 103(a)(1) requires.30 Two judges read the same cross differently, and that disagreement is the reason for the deferential standard. A cross-examiner who relies on the judge’s discretion does well to tie the new matter to an issue actually being tried.
Read together, the decisions sort expansion rulings by what the new matter did once it reached the jury. In Carter it supplied probative answers to the defendant’s own alibis, and the ruling stood. In Lewis it carried a withdrawn expert opinion to the jury as hearsay, and it was prejudicial. In Munn it was irrelevant, an abuse that nonetheless brought the complaining party no relief.
The usual exam error is to treat the judge’s discretion under the second sentence as a complete answer, when the rule decides only who chooses and the evidence rules still decide what comes in. The opposite error is to treat every cross beyond the direct as reversible, when a ruling like Carter’s stands even though the government used the cross to present evidence it had left out of its own case.