Concept
Reasonable Judicial Control
Control by court
Judicial Control of Trial Procedure
Reasonable Judicial Control
Rule 611(a) gives the trial judge a supervisory power over the way evidence reaches the jury: the court “should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence.”1 Mode is the manner of examination, such as whether a witness narrates or answers specific questions and whether the lawyer may lead. Order is sequence, meaning when each witness is called and when each item of proof comes in. Left to themselves, the attorneys decide when to call witnesses and when to cross-examine them, and Rule 611 lets the judge change that pattern.2 Later subdivisions of the rule apply the same control to particular techniques, including leading questions and the scope of cross-examination, which later sections of this chapter take up.3
The power is discretionary. The whole subject of how witnesses are examined and in what order evidence comes in rests largely in the trial judge’s discretion.4 So long as the judge does not abuse that discretion, the judge may tinker with the order of calling witnesses and with other aspects of presenting evidence.5 A rebuttal ruling shows the power at work. Manville called a hostile witness in her case-in-chief, and on rebuttal the trial court let her present a friendly witness to impeach that hostile witness. The reviewing court found no abuse of discretion, particularly because the hostile witness’s report had been discovered late.6
Control does not always mean prohibition. A number of courts have worried that a witness asked to tell a story in narrative form will mention hearsay or other inadmissible testimony. Careful phrasing of the question by counsel, together with a proper caution from the judge on the adversary’s request, can usually prevent that risk.7 A judge can therefore manage the risks of a technique without forbidding the technique.
The ordinary course of a trial, with voir dire, opening statements, presentation of evidence, and closing argument, helps counsel and the court conduct the trial in an orderly way.8 That pattern assists the court; it does not bind the court. A party who can present its own evidence and meet its opponent’s is scarcely in a position to complain about deviation from the pattern, or about the lack of it. A party may examine an expert during the opponent’s case in chief, for example, or ask to recall a witness for additional examination.9
Reviewing courts defer accordingly. In Elgabri v. Lekas, the court of appeals held that the mode and order of questioning lie in the trial court’s discretion, and it declined to disturb courtroom-management decisions unless they amount to an abuse of discretion that prejudices the appellant’s case.10 The test has two parts: the ruling must be an abuse of discretion, and it must have prejudiced the complaining party.
The facts of Elgabri show both parts at work. The plaintiff, Dr. Elgabri, called defendant Dr. Lekas as part of his case-in-chief. After some examination, the court told him during a recess that “it’s unfair sometimes for a Plaintiff to prove his case through the mouth of the Defendant.”11 The court limited the plaintiff’s examination of the defendants. He argued that Rule 611(c), which allows leading questions of adverse parties on direct examination, required the court to permit direct examination of defendants in his case-in-chief. The court of appeals disagreed. Rule 611(c) imposes no such requirement. It requires only that the court let a plaintiff who calls an adverse party on direct use leading questions, because that witness is presumed hostile.12
The limit was reasonable because it served the rule’s aims and cost the plaintiff nothing he could name. The court held that the limit made the presentation of evidence effective and avoided needless consumption of time. Elgabri did not argue that he failed to obtain any evidence because of the limit. He objected only to the order of presentation, and the court found no reversible error.13 The opinion quotes the rule in its earlier wording, under which the court “shall” exercise control so as to avoid “needless consumption of time.”14 The current text says “should” and “avoid wasting time,” and the court’s reasoning maps directly onto it.15
The judge’s discretion ends where a ruling stops regulating how a party is heard and denies the hearing itself. Abuse of discretion is likely to arise only if a party is completely denied the opportunity to present evidence, to impeach witnesses, to support the credibility of impeached witnesses, or to refute new points raised by the opponent.16 A ruling that reorders or trims a presentation falls on the safe side of that line, and a ruling that closes the door falls on the other.
The contrast with Elgabri carries the lesson. Elgabri never claimed to have lost any evidence and complained only about order, while the defense in the hypothetical loses the evidence itself. Whenever a question asks whether a ruling stayed within Rule 611(a), ask first whether the party still had a full chance to be heard.
The rule does not leave reasonableness to intuition. Its lead-in names three purposes: to make the procedures effective for determining the truth, to avoid wasting time, and to protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.17 Those purposes measure whether a ruling is reasonable, and the next section takes them in turn.