Concept
State-Law Effects of Presumptions
State law governing the effect of a presumption (Rule 302)
State-Law Effects of Presumptions
Rule 302 gives state law control over “the effect of a presumption” whenever the presumption concerns a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.1 The earlier sections of this chapter asked when that command applies. This section asks what it requires once it does, and the answer lies in a single word: effect. A federal court that takes a state’s presumption must also take what the state makes of that presumption at trial.
That effect shows itself at three points, and the subsections below follow them in order. The presumption may decide who loses when the jurors cannot decide. It may set what the opponent must do to answer it and what becomes of it afterward. And it reaches the jurors through the judge’s instruction. At each point the commentary treats Rule 302 as an application of the Erie doctrine, and it limits the deference to presumed facts that are elements of a claim or defense. Presumptions of lesser impact stay under the Thayer approach of Rule 301, which puts only the burden of producing evidence on the opponent, even in diversity cases.2
Burden-Shifting Presumptions
Rule 301 asks little of a presumption’s opponent. The opponent must produce evidence to rebut the presumption, but the burden of persuasion “remains on the party who had it originally.”3 Commentators read that rule as most likely adopting the “bursting bubble” theory, under which the presumption disappears once it is rebutted.4 Rule 302 lets a state ask for more. When state law supplies the rule of decision for an element and treats the presumption as shifting the burden of persuasion, the federal court applies that treatment, so a state that follows the Morgan-McCormick view of presumptions will see that view carried out in its diversity cases.5
The difference matters when the jurors find the evidence evenly balanced. The party who carries the burden of persuasion loses a tie. Under Rule 301 the tie goes against the party who held the burden from the start; under a burden-shifting presumption it goes against the opponent. Such a presumption therefore changes the result only in the case the jurors cannot decide, but in that case it changes the result entirely.
States do not agree about this question. In one federal opinion, what “was sharply at issue” was the effect of the “presumption against suicide” on the plaintiff’s burdens, and Pennsylvania and New York law “diverge dramatically” on it.6 Some presumptions carry heavy effects for reasons of policy. McCormick observes that social policy sometimes requires a departure from the preponderance standard: the presumption of legitimacy for a child born during a marriage can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence, to spare the child the stigma of the parents’ conduct.7 A state that attaches a standard like that is making a judgment about the claim itself, and Rule 302 carries that judgment into federal court.
The judge changed no rule of evidence between the two courtrooms. In each, the judge gave the presumption the effect that the governing law gave it, and the only variable was the source of the rule of decision.
Rule 302 does not prefer burden shifting, and treating it as a command to shift is the usual exam error. The rule takes whatever effect the state gives, and that effect is often the bubble, which McCormick describes as the most widely followed theory of presumptions.8 The Uniform Commercial Code, to which a federal court often turns when state law governs, shows both possibilities. It defines “presumption” and “presumed” consistently with Rule 301, and where it means to shift the burden of persuasion it says so with the phrase “burden of establishing,” defined in terms equivalent to the Morgan approach.9 The court must read the state’s language, and it may not assume that deference means shifting.
Production-Only Presumptions
Rule 302 does not ask whether a state presumption is heavy or light; it hands over the effect either way.11 A state presumption that requires the opponent only to come forward with evidence looks like Rule 301, and the resemblance tempts a court to apply Rule 301 and move on. The commentary closes that door for presumed facts that are elements of a claim or defense: the rule defers to state law for those, and only presumptions of lesser impact are governed by the Thayer approach of Rule 301.12 A state presumption on an element therefore operates on the state’s terms, and the state decides what answers it and what follows once it has been answered.
Two decisions show those parts at work. In one nobody answered the presumption, and in the other the court explained what follows when someone does.
In Foradori v. Harris, a diversity case, a Mississippi statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 41-9-119, authorized a rebuttable presumption and prima facie evidence on the plaintiff’s past medical expenses. Foradori’s $1,556,840 in expenses was an element of his claim, and Mississippi law supplied the rule of decision for it. Rule 302 therefore made Mississippi law, not Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 901, govern the effects of the presumption and the prima facie evidence.13 The statute also gave the defendant, Captain D’s, a right to cross-examine Foradori and to introduce rebuttal evidence challenging the expenses, and Captain D’s used neither. The court of appeals found no error in admitting the evidence and no abuse of discretion in denying a new trial or remittitur on the $1,556,840 award.14 The statute’s own scheme, rather than the federal evidence rules, determined what the evidence accomplished, and the defendant’s remedy lay in the rebuttal path the statute offered.
Rudisill v. Ford Motor Co. shows what follows a rebuttal. The court applied Ohio law to the effect of the presumption, citing Rule 302, and it explained that under Ohio law “the production of evidence disputing or contrary to the presumption causes the presumption to disappear” when that evidence “either counterbalances the presumption or even when it is only sufficient to leave the case in equipoise.” A rebutted presumption drops out, and the case proceeds as though it had never arisen.15 The court added that federal law, not Ohio law, governed the separate procedural question whether summary judgment was appropriate.16 That marks the outer edge of Rule 302. It reaches the presumption’s effect, and federal procedure keeps the question whether a case goes to trial.
Read together, the decisions describe a short life cycle. Unanswered, the presumption stands, as it did for the medical bills. Answered, it disappears in Ohio’s terms, and the party who relied on it must win on the evidence alone. The Ohio result looks just like the bubble that Rule 301 uses, and that resemblance will be common, because the bubble is the most widely followed theory.17 A court that reaches the bubble through state law has still applied Rule 302. The distinction becomes practical when a state varies a detail, such as the quantum of rebuttal evidence that makes the presumption disappear.
An exam stem that describes a state presumption as requiring the opponent only to come forward with evidence invites the answer Rule 301, because the description sounds federal. The better first question is which law supplies the rule of decision for the element. If state law does, Rule 302 applies, and the court asks how the state’s presumption is answered and what follows. The result may match the Rule 301 result, but its authority is state law.
Presumption Jury Instructions
A presumption affects a verdict only as far as the jurors learn of it, and they learn of it from the judge. They do not read statutes or follow case law on their own; they apply the law as the judge states it. When the presumed fact is an element of a claim for which state law supplies the rule of decision, state law governs the presumption’s effect, and the instruction is how that effect reaches the jury.19 A federal-style instruction, or silence, on a presumption that state law controls would drop the state’s treatment at the moment it was meant to take hold.
The federal default shows what the state instruction replaces. Under Rule 301 the presumption does its work when the opponent comes forward with evidence, and then it disappears. The disappearance does not strip the evidence of its probative value, and the natural inference from the basic fact remains to be considered; sometimes that inference alone may support a jury finding. Even so, under the general provisions of Rule 301 a jury should never be instructed in terms of a presumption, though the court may tell the jurors of the natural inference when the interests of justice demand it.20
A state that gives its presumption lasting force has no reason to keep it from the jury, and Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co. shows what the state alternative looks like on the page. The instruction rested on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403 and concerned a tractor-mower. It told the jurors that presumptions “are rules based on experience or public policy and are established in the law to assist the jury in ascertaining the truth.” If they found that the mower was first sold ten or more years before any claimed injury, the law presumed that it was not defective and that its warnings and instructions were proper and adequate. They were to consider the presumption together with all the other evidence, and it “may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.”21 Jurors who heard that charge knew a presumption existed, knew where the law started, and knew the standard against which the opposing evidence would be measured.
The court did not take the rebuttal standard for granted. The 1980 amendments to the pattern instructions on presumptions do not themselves say that a presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. But the court found nothing in the supplemental instructions or the case law to suggest that the 1980 Colorado Jury Instructions misstated prevailing law, and nothing to indicate that the legislature, in creating the presumption, meant to depart from the normal preponderance standard.22 The court learned the standard by reading the state’s own authorities.
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. shows the same feature from the verdict side. Burton offered testimony from an executive of another cigarette manufacturer, Liggett, that it was easy to disseminate additional and more adequate warnings and that Liggett put an addiction warning on all its cigarette packages. The jury, though instructed on the presumption, found Reynolds liable for failure to warn, in effect finding the presumption successfully rebutted.23 The excerpt does not set out the wording of the instruction, so it teaches less than Tafoya about content. It does show that jurors told of a presumption may weigh it against opposing evidence and decide against it.
The two courtrooms differ at one point, the source of the rule of decision. An exam question that sets a state-law claim with a statutory presumption in a federal courtroom and asks what the judge tells the jurors is testing that source. Calling jury instructions procedural does not move the question out of Rule 302, because the rule reaches the presumption’s effect and the instruction is how jurors receive that effect. The limit found earlier still applies, however: the presumed fact must be an element of the claim or defense, and a presumption of lesser impact stays under Rule 301.24