Concept
Thayer Versus Morgan
Effect of civil presumptions (Rule 301)
Thayer Versus Morgan
A presumption forces the opponent to respond, and the Thayer and Morgan views disagree about what a response accomplishes. On Thayer’s view, a presumption shifts only the burden of producing evidence, so an opponent who comes forward with enough evidence ends the presumption’s effect.1 On Morgan’s view, a presumption shifts the burden of persuasion, so the opponent must win the factual contest and the presumption stays in the case while the contest is fought.2 Rule 301 sides with Thayer. In a civil case, unless a federal statute or the rules provide otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing evidence to rebut it, and the rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.3
The two views behave alike while the opponent stays silent, because sufficient proof of the basic facts then requires a finding of the presumed fact.4 They part company the moment the opponent offers evidence, and a jury left in doubt then decides the case in opposite directions.5 Burdens are among the slipperiest subjects in procedure and evidence,6 so keep two questions separate throughout this unit: who must come forward with evidence, and who loses if the jury cannot decide?
The Bursting Bubble
Under Thayer’s theory, a presumption does one thing: it shifts to the opponent the burden of producing evidence.7 Until the opponent meets that burden, the presumption is mandatory. Once the proponent offers sufficient proof of the basic facts, the trier must find the presumed fact, whereas an inference is always permissive and the jury may decline to draw it.8 The law of old writings shows the mechanism. A writing is presumed authentic if it is at least thirty years old, its condition raises no suspicion, it was kept where such a writing would likely be kept, and interested persons have generally acted on it as authentic; proof of those facts requires the finding.9
The bubble bursts when the opponent meets the burden. Rule 301 does not say how much rebuttal evidence that takes, but most courts and commentators conclude that the rule adopts Thayer’s approach in its entirety, including his measure: evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier to find that the presumed fact does not exist.10 Thayer jurisdictions can differ on that measure, yet most, the federal rules among them, agree with Thayer that the presumption disappears once such evidence is introduced.11
The rebuttal does not have to be believed. Evidence about the existence of the presumed fact stops the presumption from having any effect, whether or not the jury credits it, and the jury then decides the fact as it decides any other disputed fact, weighing all the evidence to see whether the proponent has established it by a preponderance or by whatever other standard applies.12 One account of this production-only effect describes the opponent’s task modestly: the jury, if satisfied of the facts that trigger the presumption, must find the presumed fact unless the opponent offers evidence to the contrary, and the opponent need produce only “some” contrary evidence rather than “prove” the opposite.13
The proponent can also skip the presumption. A plaintiff who must prove that the addressee received a letter can offer direct evidence, such as an eyewitness who saw the defendant read it. To use the presumption instead, the plaintiff must introduce evidence that could support a finding of the basic fact, that the letter was mailed.14
The burden that never moved decides a close case. If the jury is in doubt, the party who started with the burden, usually the plaintiff, loses in a Rule 301 jurisdiction because the burden of persuasion stays where it began, and wins in a jurisdiction where the presumption shifts persuasion.15 A litigant who fails to carry a burden loses,16 so a burst presumption leaves the proponent where the proponent began: obliged to prove the fact or lose on it.
The bubble’s critics call it all-or-nothing: an unrebutted presumption binds the jury, but any contrary evidence pulls the rug from beneath it.17 Because the evidence need not be believed, a presumption can vanish in front of testimony the jury would reject. Even so, federal courts treat Rule 301 as embodying the bursting bubble theory, as the Third Circuit did in McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust.
A stem that pairs proof of the basic fact with some evidence against the presumed fact is asking whether the presumption has burst. Under Rule 301 it has, and the next question is who bears the burden of persuasion: the party who bore it before the presumption arose.
The Morgan Persuasion Shift
Morgan’s approach gives a presumption a longer life. Where a Morgan presumption operates, proof of the basic fact requires a finding of the presumed fact unless and until the opponent establishes to the satisfaction of the trier that its nonexistence is more probably true than not true.19 Occasionally, for reasons of strong public policy, the opponent must establish nonexistence by clear and convincing evidence. Because the burden of persuasion has shifted, the presumption remains in the case when contrary evidence comes in.20
Rule 301’s second sentence rejects that approach, and only a minority of jurisdictions follow it.21 The difference appears in rebuttal. Evidence that would burst a Thayer presumption does not end a Morgan presumption, because the opponent must persuade rather than merely produce. A jury left in doubt then rules for the proponent.22 A litigant who must carry a burden and fails loses,23 and under Morgan that litigant is the opponent.
Morgan’s argument begins with the reasons for a presumption. When either the probative force of the basic facts or the policy behind the presumption is strong, the considerations that justified assigning the burden in the first place arguably support reallocating persuasion once the basic facts are established.24 Morgan used McIver v. Schwartz to show what the bubble does to such a presumption: the court treated it as destroyed by the defendant’s own testimony, even though the factfinders were assumed to have disbelieved it. A presumption adopted for good reason, Morgan argued, should not disappear before testimony the jury is free to reject.
The Morgan view carries costs of its own. Its procedural effect on routine presumptions may be greater than desirable.25 It also divides the burden of persuasion on what is essentially one factual issue, with the proponent carrying the basic fact and the opponent carrying the presumed fact, and that division can confuse a jury.26
The confusion shows in the instruction. Where a Morgan presumption operates, the court must instruct the jury on the presumed fact whenever, on the evidence as a whole, the trier may reasonably find either way.27 The instruction works in two steps. If the basic fact is disputed, the jury first decides it with the proponent bearing the burden; if the jury finds the basic fact, it must find the presumed fact unless the opponent has persuaded it otherwise.28 Under Rule 301 the presumption has dropped out by then, and the jury decides the presumed fact as it would any other disputed fact.29
Morgan presumptions still reach federal court, but only through the exceptions Rule 301 preserves, which the next subsection and the later discussion of where Rule 301 yields explain. To tell the systems apart on an exam, ask what the opponent must do once contrary evidence is in the record. If the opponent must persuade the factfinder, the system is Morgan’s. If evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding ends the presumption, the system is Thayer’s, which is Rule 301’s.
Congress's Choice of Thayer
Congress wrote its choice into Rule 301. For civil cases, it made production-only the default and left federal statutes and other rules free to provide otherwise.31 The choice follows James Bradley Thayer, whose writing at the beginning of the twentieth century still strongly influences the rules on presumptions. Thayer noticed that nineteenth-century judges often spoke of facts being “presumed” without saying what they meant, and he saw a presumption as a legal relationship between two facts: the basic fact that gives rise to it and the presumed fact.32
Thayer’s approach has real practical advantages. It is easy to understand and to apply, and it spares the jury a divided burden of persuasion on what is essentially a single factual issue, a division the Morgan view requires.33 It also avoids giving many routine presumptions more procedural effect than they deserve.34
The price is that the approach can undervalue a presumption with strong support. When a presumption rests on both convincing probative force and strong policy, the considerations that guided the original assignment of the burden of persuasion arguably support reassigning it once the basic facts are established. The argument for reassignment can be made, and often is, when either probative force or policy is strong.35
Congress kept a way to correct that price. Because Rule 301 yields to a federal statute, Congress may enact a particular presumption and specify its effect: that it persists until rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, for example, or that it shifts the burden of persuasion.36 And despite Rule 301, federal courts have occasionally upheld the continuing validity of certain presumptions with early statutory or common-law origins that, usually for compelling policy or probative reasons, have consistently been construed as shifting the burden of persuasion.37
A federal civil presumption with no statute or rule of its own therefore follows the default: it shifts only the burden of production. A statute that gives its presumption persuasion-shifting effect displaces the default for that presumption alone.
Hybrid and State Variations
Neither pure rule fits every presumption, and jurisdictions that depart from Rule 301 have devised several ways to match a presumption’s effect to its purpose. Thayer’s approach can seem too weak for a presumption supported by both convincing probative force and strong policy, while Morgan’s can give routine presumptions more procedural effect than they deserve.39 Burdens are slippery,40 and each scheme below is an attempt to manage them.
Some schemes sort presumptions by strength. One shifts the burden of persuasion when the basic facts have a substantial probative relationship to the presumed fact and shifts only the burden of production when they do not. Another, associated with the California Evidence Code, shifts persuasion for presumptions that the legislature or the courts have identified as based on public policy, while presumptions outside that category shift only the burden of producing evidence.41
Another approach settles by rule many questions about the weight of presumptions that the other views leave in limbo. The Uniform Rules of Evidence adopted this theory, and several states have followed. It also avoids the all-or-nothing character of the bursting bubble.42
Other courts keep a rebutted presumption alive without letting it compel a finding. The presumption continues with some force, expressed in some form of jury instruction, but it is no longer mandatory. How much weight the jury gives it beyond ordinary common sense, and how the court explains it, varies widely.43
Between the bubble and Morgan sits the intermediate rule associated with Hinds v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.: the presumption survives counterproof, and the trier must find the presumed fact unless the contrary evidence persuades it that the presumed fact is as likely not to exist as to exist. That asks more of the opponent than Rule 301 does, since evidence that merely permits a contrary finding no longer suffices, and less than Morgan, who demands proof that nonexistence is more probable. Because the burden of persuasion never moved, the proponent still bears the risk of an evenly balanced jury.
A federal court does not always apply Rule 301. Rule 302 provides that state law governs the effect of a presumption regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision, an accommodation that accords with the principles and policy of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.44 The deference reaches only presumed facts that are elements of a claim or defense; presumptions of lesser impact stay under Rule 301 even in diversity cases.45 A federal-law civil claim with no governing statute follows Rule 301 for every presumption, whether it rests on policy or probability, and a state-law claim sends you to the state’s own rule, which may be any of the approaches above. The sections that follow apply Rule 301 itself.