Concept
Two Kinds of Limits
Limited admissibility
Two Kinds of Limits
Rule 105 packs two problems into one sentence and joins them with the word "or." When evidence is admissible against one party or for one purpose, but not against another party or for another purpose, the court admits it and, on timely request, must restrict it to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.1 Limiting instructions exist because evidence is sometimes admissible for only one of several possible purposes or against only one of several possible persons. The judge directs the jury to consider it for that permissible use only.2
The two halves of the rule fence off different things. A limit on purpose fences off an inference: the jury may reason from the item to one conclusion and not to another. A limit on party fences off a litigant: the jury may use the item in deciding the claim against one party and not against another. To diagnose a Rule 105 problem, ask whether the danger lies in what the jury might conclude or in whom the jury might hold responsible. An item can raise both dangers at once, and the instruction must then restrict it on both fronts.
Limits on Purpose
An item of evidence may be logically relevant in several aspects, leading to distinct inferences or bearing on different issues. A purpose, in Rule 105's sense, is one of those inferences: the chain of reasoning that runs from the item to a fact the jurors must decide.3 Some chains are allowed, and others are shut off. When the item is admissible for one purpose but not another, the normal practice is to admit it. The opponent's legitimate interest is protected by a request, made when the item is offered, that the jury consider it only for the allowable purpose, and an objection to admission does not supply that protection. The instruction may not always work, but admission with a limiting instruction is normally the best reconciliation of the competing interests.4
Exclusion would be the worse bargain. Courts more often than not admit evidence that has an unwanted spillover effect and leave the objecting party with a limiting instruction, out of practical necessity: little proof would be admissible if its relevance in the case had to match its competency exactly.5 Excluding the item would sacrifice the proper use to guard against the improper one, and admitting it without restriction would let the jury travel both paths. The instruction keeps the first path open and fences off the second.
Impeachment shows the pattern most clearly. A great deal of evidence is admitted for impeachment even though it cannot properly be considered as proof of the other points it may seem to establish.6
The conviction is the same evidence on either reading, so the instruction sorts the jury's reasoning and leaves the evidence alone. One chain runs through Kowalski's believability as a witness, and the court tells the jury to follow it. The other runs from the conviction to his character and from his character to the burglary, and the court tells the jury to stop there. Rule 105 confines evidence to a use that already exists and cannot create one. Had Kowalski stayed off the stand, the conviction would have had no credibility question to attach to.
A physical exhibit raises the same structure outside impeachment. The authenticating proof an exhibit needs depends on the purpose for which it is offered, and the foundation for an ax offered to show that the defendant owned an ax differs from the foundation for an ax offered for some narrower end.7 Suppose the government offers an ax of the same type as the assault weapon only to show the jury what kind of weapon was used. That purpose asks for no proof tying the ax to the defendant, and the instruction tells the jury that illustration is all the ax is for. The forbidden chain is easy to see. A juror looking at an ax on the clerk's table can drift from "this is what the weapon looked like" to "this is the defendant's ax."
The judge ordinarily gives the instruction when the evidence comes in and often repeats it when charging the jury at the close of all the evidence. The instruction highlights the proper purpose and cautions the jury against misuse.8
Limits on Party
A party limit turns on the litigant and leaves the inference alone. The item supports the same chain of reasoning whichever party it is aimed at, and the law controls whom that reasoning may bind. Subject to the restrictions discussed here, evidence is frequently admissible against one party but not against another. The accepted practice is to admit it and, if requested, to instruct the jurors to consider it only as to the party against whom it is properly admissible.10
The party-opponent statement is the usual source of this problem. Such a statement is admissible only against the party who made it, whether through his own action or the action of his agent or representative. It is inadmissible against parties who are merely aligned with him as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants. If those parties are so closely associated with the speaker that they can be deemed his principals or accomplices, the statement reaches them too. A coconspirator's statement advancing the aim of the conspiracy is admissible against all the conspirators, and an agent's statement about a matter within the scope of his authority is admissible against both the agent and a principal who is a party.11
The limit follows from the reason the exemption exists. Rule 801(d)(2) rests on the adversary system: what a party says is fair game for the opponent. Such statements are admissible for their truth but are in no way conclusive, because the party against whom a statement is offered may rebut it, for example by showing a benign explanation.12 That justification reaches the person who owns the words and those answerable for them. A co-party who is neither has no part in the statement, so that co-party is entitled to an instruction confining the jury's use of it.
The inference is the same for both defendants, that the driver was inattentive, yet the jury may draw it toward only one of them. The scope finding decides the matter. Had the remark concerned a matter within the scope of the driver's authority, it would be admissible against the driver and the company alike, and there would be no party limit to enforce. A student who assumes that every employee's remark binds the employer, or that no such remark ever does, has skipped the question that tells the two situations apart.
Criminal cases with several defendants raise the same issue at higher stakes. Even limiting instructions are insufficient to insure against jury misuse of a non-testifying codefendant's confession when the confession implicates the defendant. The confession is admissible against its maker as an opposing party's statement, but it may be inadmissible against the defendant it names.13
The second statement shows where the party limit strains. Jurors told to disregard evidence may still hold information that points the same way, and there is some likelihood, often disregarded by the law, that they will not be able to obey.14 A confession that implicates a co-defendant is the setting where that likelihood is greatest. The later section on the Bruton problem takes up the consequences. For now, it is enough to see that Rule 105 supplies the remedy of confinement but cannot always make the confinement real.