Concept
Impeaching a Verdict
Roles of judge and jury
Impeaching a Verdict
A party impeaches a verdict by attacking it after the jury returns it, usually with a motion for a new trial alleging that something went wrong in the jury room. Rule 606(b) governs what jurors may say in that proceeding, which the rule calls an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.1 Rule 606(a) addresses a different moment: it bars a juror from testifying as a witness before the other jurors at the trial.2 Subsection (b) applies later, when the jurors have finished and the question is whether their own words may reopen what they decided.
Rule 606(b) answers with a bar and three exceptions.3 The bar keeps jurors from testifying about the deliberations themselves. The exceptions admit proof of three things that can be established without reconstructing those deliberations: extraneous information reaching the jury, an outside influence on a juror, and a mistake in entering the verdict on the form. One question sorts nearly every problem. Would proof of the claim require the court to examine how the jurors argued and reasoned? If so, the bar applies. If the claim describes an event that is clear and easy to establish, an exception probably does.4
The General Bar
Rule 606(b)(1) states the bar in two sentences. The first provides that, during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about three things:5
- any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury's deliberations;
- the effect of anything on that juror's or another juror's vote; and
- any juror's mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment.
The three overlap, because a remark in the room, its effect on a colleague, and the colleague's private reasoning are three views of one deliberation. The second sentence closes the side doors: the court may not receive a juror's affidavit or evidence of a juror's statement on these matters.6 A bar on live testimony alone would fail, because a party could put the same account in an affidavit or have an investigator repeat what a juror said afterward. The rule therefore reaches jurors who attack their verdict directly or indirectly, through affidavits or statements.7
The bar rests on McDonald v. Pless, whose philosophy the rule adopts.8 The Court there feared that jurors “would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict,” and that a private deliberation would become “the constant subject of public investigation to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.”9 Jurors who expected their words to be repeated later would argue less openly, and no verdict would be safe until the losing side stopped looking for a juror with regrets.
In practice the bar blocks a long list of claims. A juror may not attack a verdict as a quotient verdict, because a fellow juror was intoxicated or fell asleep, because the jury misinterpreted its instructions, because the jury drew adverse inferences from the defendant's failure to testify, or because the jury speculated about insurance.10 A quotient verdict is one reached by having each juror propose a figure and then averaging the figures. Internal discussions, arguments, emotional reactions, votes, and even a juror's incorrect statement of specific fact are excluded as well.11 Each of these is an intrinsic influence, one that arose inside the deliberations, and intrinsic influences are not competent to impeach a verdict.12 The seriousness of the misconduct does not change the result. The bar has blocked testimony about widespread drug and alcohol use by jurors, and testimony about a juror's statements during deliberations showing that she had lied on voir dire about her willingness to treat personal injury plaintiffs fairly.13
The same juror could have testified had the affidavit said instead that a newspaper account of the case was read aloud in the jury room, because a juror may testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information such as a newspaper account reached the jury.14 That fact arrived from outside, and proving it requires no look at anyone's reasoning. The averaging scheme arose inside the jurors' own discussion, and proving it would mean reconstructing that discussion. The three exceptions that follow rest on the same distinction between outside events and inside reasoning.
One carve-out lies outside the rule's text. A closely divided Supreme Court declined to apply the bar to testimony about a juror's statements of racial bigotry made during deliberations, because a juror's participation in deliberations while holding such bigotry would violate the defendant's due process rights.15 That decision rests on the Constitution, and the ordinary claims listed above remain barred.
Extraneous Information
Rule 606(b)(2)(A), the first exception, lets a juror testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention.17 Extraneous information is information that reached the jury from outside the trial evidence, as opposed to what the jurors said to one another or concluded for themselves. The standard examples are a television newscast or newspaper account about the case, and an unauthorized view, experiment, or jury investigation, such as a juror who visits the accident scene alone.18
The exception works because proof that outside information reached the jury is clear and easy to establish, and it does not involve an inquiry into how a juror evaluated the arguments in deliberations.19 Whether a juror read a newspaper in the room is a question of what happened, not of what anyone thought. The exception speaks only to whether the information reached the jury. How the information affected any juror's vote remains within the general bar on testimony about the effect of anything on a vote.20
The common error is to treat any wrongful input as extraneous. A juror's report that a colleague misread the burden-of-proof instruction and pressed the mistake until the others gave in describes an argument inside the deliberations, and the court may not receive it. The same is true of a colleague's incorrect statement of specific fact made during deliberations.21 The line is the source of the information: a newspaper entered the room from outside, while a misreading came from the jurors themselves.
Outside Influence
Rule 606(b)(2)(B), the second exception, lets a juror testify about whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.23 An outside influence is pressure that originates with someone beyond the jury, and the standard example is a threat to the safety of a member of a juror's family.24 A bribe offered to a juror is the same kind of intrusion. This exception sits beside the extraneous-information exception but covers different ground. Extraneous information is delivered to the jury, as when a newspaper account supplies facts. An outside influence is done to a juror, as when a threat bends one person's vote regardless of what the jury has learned.
A verdict reached under threat reflects the threat rather than the juror's own judgment, and a rule that sealed the jury room against proof of the threat would shield the result. The exception also costs little. The Rules allow testimony about outside influence on the theory that it describes events that are clear and easy to establish and that require no inquiry into how a juror evaluated arguments during deliberations.25 Whether a stranger telephoned a juror and threatened a child is a question about a phone call, and the court never has to ask what the jurors said to one another.
The line between the exception and the bar follows the source of the pressure. Pressure from beyond the jury falls within the exception, while internal discussions, arguments, and mental and emotional reactions remain excluded.26 The usual exam error is to call any pressure on a juror an outside influence. Pressure applied by colleagues in the jury room arises from the deliberations themselves, however forceful it was.
Verdict Form Mistakes
Rule 606(b)(2)(C), the third and last exception, permits a juror to testify about whether “a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.”28 The verdict form is the written record of what the jury decided, and the court reads and enters it. If the writing departs from the decision, the record misstates the verdict. The standard illustration is a form that says “guilty” although the jury decided “not guilty.”29
The first two exceptions turned on where an influence came from. This one turns on what the testimony asks the court to do. A claim of clerical error asks the court to compare two things, the decision the jury reached and the words on the form. That comparison requires no inquiry into how any juror reasoned, what the jurors said to one another, or what moved a vote, so it leaves the deliberations undisturbed.30 Correcting the form also restores the decision the jury actually made, so the exception protects the verdict instead of threatening it.
The difference between the two trials is whether the form misreports the decision. The foreperson in the first trial says the writing is wrong. The juror in the second says the decision itself was poorly reached. Only the first claims a mistake in entering the verdict. A change of heart, a claimed misunderstanding of the instructions, and a complaint about pressure from colleagues all attack the reasoning behind a verdict that was correctly recorded, and the exception gives no way to reopen that reasoning.