Concept
Judge as Witness
Roles of judge and jury
Judge as Witness
Rule 605 bars the presiding judge from testifying as a witness at the trial and adds that a party need not object to preserve the issue.1 The earlier sections of this chapter gave the judge a set of jobs: ruling on admissibility, deciding preliminary questions, and screening conditional facts, all on evidence that witnesses and exhibits supply. Rule 605 keeps the judge out of the group that supplies it. The bar stands out against Rule 601's pro-competency position on who may testify, because that position does not extend to a judge testifying in the trial he is conducting.2
The law reached the blanket bar by stages. Under the older common-law view, a judge was competent to testify in a trial over which he presided but could decline in his discretion. A second view disqualified him from testifying to material disputed facts while leaving him free to speak to matters that were merely formal and undisputed. Rule 605 adopts the third view, a flat prohibition on testimony by the presiding judge.3 The first view turned on the judge's discretion and the second on whether a fact was disputed. The third turns on nothing except the judge's office.
Testimony by the trial judge would, of necessity, create five practical problems. Jurors may overvalue what the judge says. The judge would have to rule on objections to his own testimony. Cross-examination would be hard to conduct, and impeachment virtually impossible. The trial would then continue before the same judge who had just been a witness in it.4
The rule's second sentence follows from the same structure. A party who objects to testimony ordinarily asks the judge to rule. Here the only person who could sustain the objection is the judge who is violating the rule by testifying, and the rule spares the litigant that futile effort.5 A party's silence therefore waives nothing, and the point remains available on appeal.
United States v. Lewis shows the rule's logic reaching a judge who never took the stand. The trial judge there had to decide whether the defendant's statement to FBI agents was voluntary, and he found that it was not. He relied on his own history: he had come out from under a general anesthetic himself, and others had called what he said afterward "incredible." From that experience he concluded, "You are not accountable for what you do or say for quite a number of hours after you come out of a general anesthetic."6 The record held nothing to support the proposition. No evidence showed when the defendant last used a narcotic, and no evidence showed that a person is unaccountable for what she says for hours after a general anesthetic.7 The only source of that fact was the judge.
The court of appeals measured his reliance against the rules of competency. Rule 602 bars testimony unless evidence supports a finding that the witness has personal knowledge, and nothing showed that the judge knew the defendant's actual condition when she spoke to the agents. Had he been sworn, his testimony would have been incompetent twice over: because he was the presiding judge, and because he lacked percipiency.8 His recovery from surgery told him what happened to him. It told him nothing about what happened to the defendant after a different procedure on a different day.
Judicial notice cannot rescue the ruling. Rule 201(b) reaches facts "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court" or "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." The judge relied on neither. He looked solely to his own reaction to an anesthetic, and the record was silent on the nature of his illness, the surgery, the type and amount of anesthetic given him, and its general effect on a patient. Notice also requires an announcement on the record, because the announcement gives a party the opportunity to be heard on the propriety of the notice and the tenor of the matter noticed under Rule 201(e).9
That last defect shows why the rule exists. Because the judge relied on private experience, the government had no chance to test his view through the usual methods that make adversary proof trustworthy. The prosecutor could not compare the judge's illness with the defendant's abscessed shoulder. He could not ask how much anesthesia each had received. He could not set the statements others called incredible against the defendant's own responses to the agents.10 The court reversed and remanded.
The court contrasted Bey, where a district court took judicial notice of a commonly known health fact, that a person suffering hypertension is susceptible to stroke, heart attack, or other physical ailment. The notice appeared in a written memorandum setting out the basis for a ruling on cross motions for partial summary judgment, so the parties had an opportunity to ask the court to reconsider. The judge in Bey also did not say he was relying on his own experience with hypertension.11 The two decisions differ in three ways: the kind of fact, the source the judge used, and the notice the parties received. Bey involved a widely known fact, stated openly and open to challenge. Lewis involved one judge's memory of one bad recovery, never tested.
Two questions sort most fact patterns on this topic. Is the judge, sworn or not, supplying a fact that no witness has supplied? And if the judge invokes judicial notice, is the fact one that is generally known or readily verifiable from reliable sources, and did the parties have a chance to be heard on it?