Concept
State Law in Civil Cases
Competency of witnesses
State Law in Civil Cases
The first sentence of Rule 601 makes every person competent to testify unless the Federal Rules provide otherwise, and the federal limits on witnesses sit inside those rules. Rule 606(b), for example, bars jurors from presenting evidence about jury deliberations.1 The second sentence reaches beyond the Federal Rules. In a civil case, it says, state law governs the witness's competency regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.2 Through that sentence, a competency rule written by a state legislature can keep a witness off the stand in a federal courtroom.
The exception is narrow because it follows the source of the substantive law. A state that limits who may testify on its own claims is deciding how those claims are proved, and a federal court that applies the state's law of the claim takes the state's competency rule along with it. The three subsections below set out the conditions that trigger the exception, the Dead Man's Statutes that are its best-known occupants, and the method for choosing among states when more than one is involved.
When State Law Governs
State competency law displaces the federal presumption only when three conditions are met: the issue arises in a civil action or proceeding, it concerns a claim or defense, and state law supplies the rule of decision for that claim or defense.3 The rule of decision is the substantive law that determines who prevails, so the third condition asks whose law the court is applying to the merits. The usual case that satisfies it is a diversity suit on a state-law claim, in which a federal court applies state substantive law.4
The reason for the exception comes from Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, to which Rule 601 defers: when a federal court applies state substantive law, it should also apply the state rules, procedural ones included, that could significantly affect the outcome of the trial.5 A competency rule meets that test, because a barred witness cannot supply proof, and on many claims the witness is the party. Without the exception, a claim that failed for want of testimony in the state's courts could succeed in federal court on the same facts. The source's own example shows the consequence: if a state makes felons convicted of specified crimes incompetent to testify in designated civil trials, a federal court deciding such a suit under that state's substantive law must apply the state's competency rule.6
The civil requirement removes every criminal case from the exception. The second sentence opens with the words in a civil case, so no state disqualification enters a federal prosecution, and the first sentence's presumption of competence controls there, subject to the other Federal Rules and to the accused's constitutional right to testify, taken up later in this chapter.7 The second and third conditions then separate the civil cases that import state law from those that do not, and a matched pair of scenes shows the line.
The instinct that loses points is to treat any civil case with a state competency statute somewhere in the background as a case in which that statute applies. The statute reaches a federal court only through the third condition, and that condition turns on where the rule of decision comes from.
The forum, the type of proceeding, and the witness's role are identical in the two scenes, and the source of the rule of decision decides the outcome. For a claim on which federal law supplies the rule of decision, Rule 601 eliminates every ground of incompetency except those the Federal Rules specifically recognize, and connection with the litigation as a party or interested person is not among those grounds.8 The text also ties the question to a particular claim or defense, so a complaint that joins a state-law claim with a federal-law claim requires the test to be run separately for each.9
The deference in the second sentence reaches competency, and competency asks who may take the stand, while most evidence rules ask what a competent witness may say.10 By its terms, then, the second sentence defers to state law on the who question. A state rule that restricts only what a witness may say finds no entry through it.
How often the exception matters depends on what the states have kept. Some states retain old limits: the Ohio version of Rule 601, for example, makes incompetent those of unsound mind, and children under ten, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts or of relating them truly.11 Not every state that copied the Federal Rules abandoned the old disqualification, and where one survives it can come into play in federal court.12 Most states, though, have modernized their competency rules, so a witness who is competent under the federal approach is rarely disabled by a contrary state rule.13 The best-known survivor is the Dead Man's statute, taken up next.
Dead Man's Statutes
A Dead Man's Statute makes a party incompetent to testify about a conversation or other transaction with a person who has since died when the testimony is offered against the decedent's estate.15 The statutes vary in content, but they generally exclude an interested witness's testimony about a conversation or event involving the decedent.16 The bar is a relic of the old disqualification of interested persons. Interest has been discarded as a ground of incompetence in civil cases, except for the survivors' evidence statutes.17
The statutes answer a specific risk in suits against estates. The living claimant can describe what the decedent said or promised, and the decedent, who obviously cannot respond, cannot contradict the account. By prohibiting a claimant from putting words in the mouth of a deceased person, the statutes protect estates from fraudulent claims.18
The lender's loss shows the cost of the rule. A flat bar applies to every interested survivor, truthful or not, so a lender who dealt on a handshake may hold a valid claim and be forbidden to prove it with the only evidence available. The ordinary tools for testing an interested witness remain in place, since interest may be proved to impeach credibility and most jurisdictions instruct the jury to weigh a party's testimony in light of the stake in the outcome.19 Even in states that retain some version of the statute, reform has been widespread, and the reforms can be learned together because each softens the bar in a different way. One lets the living party testify but treats the testimony as opening the door, so the opponent may then introduce the decedent's hearsay statements about the event. A second lets the survivor testify but requires corroborating evidence before the survivor can win a favorable judgment. A third narrows the statute, so that it is likely to apply only when the defendant is the deceased party and only to oral communications between the plaintiff and the decedent, whereas older statutes typically reached any transaction between a live party and the deceased.20
Congress declined to override state Dead Man's Statutes in federal court. The proposed version of Rule 601 would have abolished incompetency under those statutes in all actions tried in federal court, and Congress did not accept that change.21 The second sentence of the enacted rule is the result, because it leaves state competency law in force in a civil case for any claim or defense on which state law supplies the rule of decision.22 A federal court hearing a state-law claim against an estate therefore applies the state's statute in whatever form that state retains it. On a claim governed by federal law, Rule 601 eliminates incompetency grounds beyond those in the Federal Rules, so the survivor testifies under the first sentence.23 The statute answers the who question about who may speak of the dealing, so a survivor barred from describing it is disabled however the account might fare under the other rules of evidence.24
Which State's Law Applies
The second sentence of Rule 601 sends a federal court to state law without saying which state's law.26 The gap stays hidden when the forum state and the state whose law governs the claim are the same, and it opens when they differ. Once the state is chosen, a second question remains: how much of that state's approach to competency the federal court must import.
Turbyfill v. International Harvester Co. shows how a federal court answers the first question. A federal court sitting in Michigan had to decide whether Michigan or Missouri law governed a competency issue, and it began with the settled principle that a federal court must apply the conflict-of-laws rules of the state in which it sits, a principle traced to Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co.27 The relevant inquiry, the court said, was whether Michigan's conflicts rules required Michigan or Missouri law on competency.28 Michigan's approach is to apply Michigan law to procedural questions, including the admissibility of evidence, even when another jurisdiction's substantive law supplies the rule of decision.29
A quick reading of Rule 601 suggests that the state whose law decides the claim also supplies the competency rule, since the text ties competency to the rule of decision. The court's route shows why that shortcut can mislead. The rule of decision determines whether the second sentence applies at all, and the forum's conflicts rules determine which state's competency law fills it. Because the federal court uses the conflicts rules of the state where it sits, it chooses among states by the same method as that state's own courts.
Choosing a state's rule does not finish the analysis, because the chosen rule has to remain good law. In Turbyfill it was not enough to show that the Michigan Supreme Court intended to alter the competency rule of M.C.L.A. § 600.2166. It also had to be shown that the court has power to adopt binding evidentiary rules inconsistent with legislative enactments.30 A court-adopted evidence code can therefore displace an older competency statute only if the court has that power, so a student who finds a statute in a state's code should ask whether the state still enforces it.
The third and fourth steps do the work that students most often skip. The usual error is to stop at step two and assume that the state whose law decides the claim also supplies the competency rule, or to find a statute in a state's code and assume it bars the testimony without asking whether the state's courts still enforce it.
The second question concerns how much of the borrowed state's approach the federal court must import. Apart from the state-law exception, a literal reading of Rule 601 leaves no competency objection independent of Rules 602 and 603, and so no challenge to interpose before the witness begins to testify.31 The exception adds one thing to that picture, a state's substantive competency standard. A federal judge applies that standard but need not follow the procedures a particular state uses to dispose of competency objections.32 Applying a state's standard is a different act from importing its procedure into a federal courtroom. The standard decides which witnesses may speak and can change what a party is able to prove, which is why the state's choice binds the federal court, while the procedure governs only the manner of resolving the objection.33
The two questions in this section therefore have different answers. The choice of which state's competency law applies follows the forum's conflicts rules, and the content of that rule can change as the chosen state revises its evidence law. The handling of the objection stays federal. The state rule changes who may take the stand without changing how the federal court runs its own trial.