Concept
The Oath or Affirmation
Competency of witnesses
The Oath or Affirmation
Rule 601 presumes that anyone may testify, but Rule 603 still asks each witness for a commitment before testimony begins. The witness must declare, by oath or affirmation, that the witness will testify truthfully, and the declaration must take a form designed to impress that duty on the witness's conscience.1 The rule therefore has two parts: a declaration, in which the witness promises in words to testify truthfully, and a standard for its form, which must bring the duty of truthfulness home to the witness.
Oath and affirmation are two routes to the same promise. An oath traditionally invokes God (“so help you God”). An affirmation omits the invocation and, in the Advisory Committee's words, “is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no special verbal formula is required.”2 The Committee wrote the rule to give the flexibility needed in dealing with religious adults, atheists, conscientious objectors, and children, among others.3 Either form may be administered by the judge or by the court clerk.4
The declaration does two jobs, and each works by a different means. Its principal design is to affect the witness's conscience: the formal moment impresses on the witness's mind the duty to speak the truth.5 Its second job works from outside the witness, because a witness who willfully falsifies testimony may be punished for perjury.6 That is why subscribing to a statement “under penalty of perjury” is the functional equivalent of taking an oath and suffices for a perjury prosecution under § 1621(b) and § 1623: the witness feels the pressure on conscience and the threat of prosecution together.7 A witness who makes no declaration at all has given the court nothing on which either pressure can act.
Rule 603 does not use the declaration to exclude anyone. Its purpose, the drafters explained, is merely to add a stimulus to truthfulness wherever such a stimulus is feasible.8 A purpose of that kind cannot sensibly demand a formula that keeps a willing, competent witness off the stand, and the cases enforce the point. In United States v. Ward, a defendant objected to the court's standard oath, and the Ninth Circuit rested its ruling on the rule's text and the Advisory Committee's explanation. The text requires only a declaration “administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so,” and the Committee's note adds that no special verbal formula is required.9
The Supreme Court reached the same result for a defendant whose objection was religious. In Moore v. United States, the trial judge refused to let the defendant testify because he would not use the word “solemnly” for religious reasons. The Supreme Court overturned that ruling, holding that “there is no requirement that the word ‘solemnly’ be used in the affirmation.”10 One objection was secular and the other religious, but each witness was prepared to make the commitment and objected only to the court's wording. A judge who insists on a particular formula in that situation turns a quarrel about vocabulary into a disqualification that has nothing to do with truthfulness. The proper question is whether the words the witness will use still commit the witness to testify truthfully and impress that duty on the witness's conscience.
The procedure follows the same line. Rule 603 mandates that the prospective witness take an oath, yet the opponent has nothing to object to before the oath is given, and an objection is usually appropriate only after the witness refuses to take it.11 Whether the witness has sufficiently declared that he will testify truthfully is a determination for the court under Rule 104(a).12 Judges and jurors called as witnesses fall under Rules 605 and 606 and not under this procedure.13 The prohibition on a presiding judge testifying is absolute, and it can be enforced even if the party it prejudices does not object.14 Both topics return later in this chapter.
Rule 603 stops at the promise. Neither Rule 603 nor Rule 601 requires moral capacity, in the sense that the witness actually possesses a sense of responsibility to speak the truth, and neither requires belief in God.15 A witness who gives the declaration in adequate form has therefore satisfied the rule even if the judge privately doubts the witness's sincerity. Skepticism of that kind is no ground for excluding the witness. It is material for argument to the jury about credibility, with the threat of a perjury prosecution standing behind the promise.
Children press the flexibility hardest, because a child may not follow any formula at all, and the Advisory Committee drafted the rule with children in mind.16 One prosecution shows how a court can satisfy itself without a script. The prosecutor began with simple questions about the young victim's name, age, and home, then moved, after about thirty questions that she almost all answered correctly, to questions about the difference between the truth and lies.17 She acknowledged that she understood she had promised to tell the truth in court, and the questioning established that she knew the difference between a truth and a lie, knew she was to tell the truth in court, and knew she would be punished if she lied.18 The court then directed the prosecutor to proceed to the heart of her case, over repeated defense objection.19 The standard for excluding a child witness is taken up later in this chapter.