Concept
Objecting to Admitted Evidence
Objections and offers of proof
Objecting to Admitted Evidence
Rule 103(a) sets separate conditions for claiming error in a ruling that admits evidence and in a ruling that excludes it, and in either case the error must affect a substantial right of the party.1 This unit takes the first kind of ruling. When the court admits evidence, the party who opposed it must act on the record: the party must make a timely objection or motion to strike and must state the specific ground, unless the ground was apparent from the context.2
The burden falls on the opponent, not the judge, because the judge must be told promptly, and told why, whenever a party contends that evidence should be excluded.3 Each requirement does its own work, so each can fail alone. An objection made after the jury has heard the answer comes too late to prevent the harm. An objection that names no rule leaves the judge guessing and gives the proponent nothing to fix. An objection that names the wrong rule, or that attacks a whole exhibit when only part is objectionable, may be sound as far as it goes and still fail to preserve the point pressed on appeal.4 The subsections that follow take the requirements in the order a lawyer meets them in the courtroom: when to speak, how to speak once the evidence is already in, what to say, what the objection must target, and what a reviewing court does when the objection made differs from the argument later pressed.
Timely Objection
Rule 103(a)(1)(A) supplies the first requirement: the party must have timely objected or moved to strike.5 Courts apply a practical test. An objection is timely if it is stated as soon as the basis for it is clear.6 For testimony, the basis usually becomes clear when the question is asked, because the wording of the question is likely to show that it calls for inadmissible evidence.7 The best moment to object is therefore after the question and before the witness answers.8
That moment is best for both sides. Once jurors hear an inadmissible answer, they may find it hard to disregard even on the judge’s instruction, and the instruction itself can emphasize the point to be forgotten.9 A sustained objection before the answer prevents the harm, because the jury never hears the testimony. It also lets the proponent cure the problem on the spot by rephrasing the question, laying a further foundation, or asking another witness.10
Defense counsel objected after the question and before the answer and named the ground, so the claim of error is preserved for appeal even though the objection lost at trial.11 Preservation turns on giving the trial judge a chance to rule while the answer can still be prevented, not on winning the ruling.
A lawyer who sees the problem in the question has no reason to wait. The opponent may not gamble on the possibility of a favorable answer and must object as soon as the ground becomes apparent.12 A trial court is not generally charged with error in admitting evidence unless the error and its specific ground are brought to the court’s attention.13
The objection is untimely. The wording of the question revealed the ground, nothing prevented an objection before the answer, and the claim of error is not preserved. The lawyer waited to see which way the testimony cut, and that is the gamble the rule forbids.
Delay is treated differently when it is forced. A witness may answer too quickly for counsel to speak, a proper question may draw a nonresponsive answer, or the defect may surface for the first time on cross-examination. In those cases the clock starts when the objector could first perceive the defect, and the proper step is a motion to strike made at that moment.14 The next subsection takes up that device.
One further rule limits how often the objector must speak. When the court rules definitively on the record, whether before or at trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve the claim of error for appeal.15
Motion to Strike
Rule 103(a)(1)(A) permits two ways to meet the timing requirement: a timely objection or a timely motion to strike.17 The objection addresses a question not yet answered. The motion to strike makes the same protest after the evidence is already before the jury, and the words change from “objection” to “I move to strike.”18 Ideally counsel uses the term of art, but any phrasing that directs the judge’s attention to the ground as soon as it appears will do.19 Counsel should also ask that the jury be told to disregard the evidence at once, and ask again for a similar instruction at the end of the trial before the case goes to the jury.20
The motion to strike fits whenever the ground for objection could not fairly be raised before the evidence came in. Four situations account for most uses:
- A witness answers so fast that counsel has no fair chance to speak. Counsel moves to strike so that the objection to the question can be stated once the judge agrees that the witness jumped the gun.21
- A proper question draws a nonresponsive answer, or an answer whose defect becomes apparent only after the response.22
- Cross-examination shows for the first time that testimony given as personal knowledge rested on inadmissible hearsay.23
- Evidence admitted on condition that the proponent later connect it up is never connected.24
In each situation the opponent could not have objected in advance, so the duty to act begins when the defect appears. The opponent must act as soon as the ground becomes apparent and may not hold the point in reserve to see how the trial turns out; silence after the ground appears waives the point for appeal.25
Had the eyewitness in the earlier example answered before defense counsel could speak, the proper step would have been a motion to strike stating the same ground.26 Cross-examination supplies the clearest picture of a ground that arrives late.
The ground surfaced with the concession, counsel acted on it immediately and named it, and the claim of error is preserved whether or not the judge grants the motion. A lawyer who hears the same concession and stays quiet, planning to raise the point only if the verdict goes the wrong way, has waived it.
When an answer wanders from the question, the right to have the nonresponsive material stricken belongs to the questioner.27 An opponent who wants the answer excluded needs a ground of his own, such as hearsay. An opponent who wants to stop a witness who keeps volunteering may object that no question is pending or that the answer is being volunteered, since without a pending question it is impossible to predict, and so to object in advance to, inadmissible evidence.28
The fourth situation runs on a longer clock. When the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, the proponent must introduce proof sufficient to support a finding that the fact exists, and the court may admit the evidence on the condition that the proof be introduced later.29 Testimony that a truck passed a warehouse at high speed matters in a suit against a trucking company only if the truck is later shown to be the company’s. The burden of invoking the failure of the condition falls on the objecting party. Under the majority view, the opponent must move to strike when the failure becomes apparent, which is when the proponent completes the stage of the case in which the evidence was offered. If the proponent rests without supplying the missing proof and the opponent does not then move to strike, the opponent cannot later invoke the condition as of right, either at trial or on appeal.30 Some courts have treated the form of the request as dispositive, but a motion to strike, a motion to withdraw the fact from the jury, and a request for a curative instruction to disregard should each count as a sufficient invocation.31
A successful strike is followed by the judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard the stricken evidence.32 The cure is imperfect. Telling jurors to ignore damaging evidence is like telling someone in a room to ignore the elephant in it; studies suggest that people focus on what they are told to ignore, and even the motion itself signals that the evidence matters.33 A mistrial is an alternative remedy, but it is seldom granted and occurs only where an instruction to disregard is deemed insufficient to cure the prejudice.34 Lawyers sometimes couple the motion with a request for a mistrial, arguing that the damage cannot be undone, but that request is unlikely to succeed.35 Counsel therefore face a dilemma: an objection or request for an instruction may draw unwanted attention to the evidence, and silence may waive the claim for appeal.36 The dilemma is the best reason to object before the answer whenever the question reveals the ground.
A bar-exam stem in which a witness blurts out an answer, cross-examination exposes the basis of direct testimony, or a proponent rests without delivering promised proof calls for a motion to strike made at that moment. A stem in which counsel noticed the problem and waited signals waiver.
Stating the Specific Ground
Rule 103(a)(1)(B) supplies the second requirement: the objector must state the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.38 Timeliness tells the objector when to speak; this clause tells the objector what the words must accomplish. An objection made at exactly the right moment still falls short if it names no ground, so the two requirements can fail independently. The burden of supplying the ground rests on the opponent, not the judge.39
A stated ground does three jobs. It helps the judge, who must rule quickly in a body of law as vast as evidence law and does not always have the right answer at hand; a label such as “hearsay” turns an open search into a single question.40 It helps the proponent, who needs the ground to cure the problem on the spot by rephrasing, laying a foundation, or calling another witness.41 And it makes a record, because a reviewing court can judge the ruling only if the record shows what the trial judge was asked to decide.42 A bare “I object” does none of the three.
An objection must specify its ground in a way particular enough to identify the issue, unless the ground is self-evident.43 “Objection, hearsay” is specific, and so are objections invoking the Best Evidence doctrine, a privilege, or the rules on character evidence and subsequent remedial measures, because each names a rule the judge can apply.44 A bare “I object” is general. So are objections that the evidence is “inadmissible,” “illegal,” “incompetent,” or lacking “foundation,” that it is not “proper” testimony, or that it is objectionable “on all the grounds ever known or heard of.”45 The most overworked general objection is the stock formula that evidence is incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial.46 Relevance can still be a proper ground, because a detailed argument that evidence is irrelevant counts as specific, and if the context leaves room for doubt, the objector should describe what he wants excluded.47 Where a jurisdiction has an enacted code, adding the rule number and subdivision is sometimes wise.48 Objections to manner and form, such as a leading question or a nonresponsive answer, usually must be made when the defect appears, as the practice at depositions shows.49
The objection told the judge that something was wrong without saying what. The hearsay ground never reached the trial judge, and the plaintiff’s lawyer had no notice that would have led him to call the crew chief or to try another route. Counsel who said “Objection, hearsay” to the same question would have done what the rule asks. How a reviewing court treats the gap is the subject of the last subsection.
The rule excuses a stated ground when it was apparent from the context.50 The test asks whether the ground should have been obvious to the judge and to the proponent; if so, the missing words are immaterial.51
The hearsay ground was the subject of the exchange just held, so neither the judge nor the proponent could have missed it, and the objection suffices. The same single word, spoken where no one had mentioned hearsay or any other problem, would identify no ground at all.
The exception covers grounds nobody could have missed and gives no shelter to grounds a careful lawyer might have guessed. When the ground is not evident, the need for specification remains, because a proponent put on notice might have substituted other proof.52 The safe habit is to name the ground every time. Nothing in the rule prescribes a formula, but even a one-word objection such as “foundation” appears on the list of general objections, because it does not say what is missing.53 A stem in which counsel says only “Objection,” or recites the stock formula, tests this element; a stem in which counsel names a rule has moved the question to whether the ruling itself was right.
Objecting to Part of an Item
Naming the right rule is not always enough, because an item offered at trial may be admissible in part. When only a portion of a document or answer is objectionable, the objection must fit that portion. An appellant who objects to proof that does not all fit the objection may limit or lose the right to review: if part of a document is not excludable under the hearsay doctrine, a hearsay objection to the whole may be viewed as inadequate even though other parts should be excluded.55 In short, a ruling against a party who later appeals may be sustained if the party was not precise enough in specifying the evidence subject to the objection.56
The rationale follows from what the rule is for. A judge faced with a blanket objection to a mixed item must either exclude the sound material with the unsound or admit the unsound with the sound, and the proponent learns nothing about what to redact or replace. The objector knows what is being attacked, so the rule puts the sorting on the objector.
The lawyer objected on time and named a real rule, so neither the timing requirement nor the labeling requirement failed. The defect lay in the target: the objection swept in paragraphs that no rule excluded, and the ruling is judged against the objection actually made. A lawyer who had said “hearsay, as to the fourth paragraph only, the part repeating the neighbor’s account” would have let the judge admit the rest and exclude or redact that paragraph, and would have shown the proponent what to fix.
The same precision governs offers. An offer of a whole document may be inadequate when only part of it fits a hearsay exception, even though that part is admissible.57 Offers of proof receive their own treatment in the next part of this chapter.
Wrong or General Objections
A reviewing court measures the trial judge’s ruling against the objection actually stated, not against positions counsel might have taken and did not.59 The trial judge is entitled to address only the argument made, and an afterthought on appeal is to be discouraged.60 The same measure applies to offers of proof. In a suit over a golf-cart injury, Peter offers the club’s earlier negligent acts to prove negligence at the time of his accident. The judge does not err in rejecting the offer, because prior acts of negligence cannot prove negligence at the time in dispute. That the evidence might have been admissible for another purpose, such as notice to the club, does not help Peter on appeal, because he might have cast his offer in different terms but did not.61
On the objecting side, the result depends on what the objector said and which way the judge ruled. Start with the vaguest objection. A general objection states no distinct ground, as with a bare “I object” or the stock formula.62 When the judge overrules a general objection, the appellate court ordinarily upholds the ruling, and the objector may not attack it by urging a ground never mentioned at trial.63 The reasoning is that of the specificity rule itself. Had the ground been named, the proponent might have rephrased the question, laid a foundation, or substituted other proof, and an objector who withheld the ground cannot claim the benefit of an error the proponent had no chance to prevent.64
Three exceptions have been urged, and none gives an objector much comfort:
- If the ground should have been obvious to the judge and the proponent, the lack of specification is immaterial, which matches the rule’s own allowance for a ground apparent from the context.65
- Some courts hold that if the evidence is inadmissible for any purpose, a general objection suffices. The reasoning is thin when the ground is not evident, because a proponent put on notice of the dispute might have substituted other proof.66
- It has been suggested that an omitted ground that could not have been obviated may be considered on appeal. Rule 103(a)(1) does not codify this exception, and it overlooks that a proponent who recognized the objection’s validity might have withdrawn the evidence and filled the gap with other evidence.67
The scaffold defendant, who objected with the stock formula and then argued hearsay on appeal, would rest on the first exception, because a question asking what a third person said carries its hearsay ground on its face. The argument works only because the ground was so visible. A lawyer who relies on it bets on a reviewing court’s reading of the transcript instead of naming the rule.
The mirror image arises when the judge sustains a general objection and the proponent appeals. Here the reviewing court is charitable to the trial judge. The ruling is upheld if any ground for exclusion in fact existed, on the assumption that, absent a request by the opposing party or the court to make the objection more definite, the objection was understood and the ruling rested on the right ground.68 A proponent who wants to cure the defect should therefore ask for the ground. Once it is stated, the proponent can rephrase the question, lay a foundation, or turn to another witness.69 A proponent who stays silent leaves a record in which the objection is presumed to have been understood.
An objection that names the wrong rule fares no better than a general one. An objection on one ground preserves only that particular claim of error. If the objector argued hearsay and lost, the objector prevails on appeal only if the testimony did offend the hearsay rule; a ground first raised on appeal, such as the rule against proving conduct by character, was waived and can succeed only if the court finds that failing to apply it was plain error.70
The reviewing court asks only whether the testimony was hearsay, and a witness describing what she saw is not repeating anyone’s statement. The character argument never reached the trial judge, and the prosecutor had no chance to answer it; it survives only if admitting the evidence was plain error.
A party who names the right rule and loses stands differently. The claim is preserved and the court reaches the merits, but a preserved error does not require reversal automatically; the court must separate errors serious enough to require a new trial from those that are not.71 A party may claim error in a ruling that admits evidence only if the error affects a substantial right,72 and a substantial right is affected by error that had a material effect upon, or substantially swayed, the jury’s deliberations. Error that does not meet that standard is often called harmless.73