Concept
Expert Witness Exception
Requirement of personal knowledge
Expert Witness Exception
Rule 602 demands that a witness testify only to matters she personally knows, yet its final sentence lifts that demand from one class of testimony: “This rule does not apply to a witness's expert testimony under Rule 703.”1 The exemption is narrow. It reaches expert testimony under Rule 703 and nothing broader, so a lay witness who offers an opinion under Rule 701 must still have personal knowledge of the facts on which the opinion rests.2 An expert, by contrast, may testify about matters she never personally observed.3
Why Experts Are Treated Differently
Lay opinion must be rationally derived from the witness's perceptions, while expert opinion need not be, and the foundation at trial reflects that difference.4 For a fact witness, the proponent shows facts that place her at the scene of the accident or the signing of a will. For an expert, the proponent brings out the special skill or training that supports testimony on unfamiliar or technical matters.5 Common law already let an expert base an opinion on facts she knew personally or on facts stated in a hypothesis, and today those two bases no longer exhaust the possibilities.6
Once firsthand perception stops guarding the door, other requirements take its place. Even a qualified expert whose opinion would help the jury needs a proper foundation: sufficient facts or data under Rule 702, and facts or data of a permitted kind under Rule 703.7
Three Permitted Sources of Expert Information
Rule 703 allows an expert to testify on the basis of facts or data from three sources, and the Advisory Committee Note to the rule identifies the same three.8 The sources differ in how the expert came to know the fact:
- Facts or data the expert learned by firsthand observation before trial.
- Facts or data the expert learns at the trial or hearing itself.
- Outside facts or data the expert gleaned before trial by consulting other sources, provided experts in the field would reasonably rely on that kind of information.
Firsthand observation is the one source on which the exception changes nothing. It is the personal knowledge Rule 602 requires of lay witnesses, and an expert often acquires it by personally observing, examining, or testing the place, object, or person she describes.9 The Advisory Committee Note lists this source first and observes that it matches the perceptual basis of Rule 701.10
The second source belongs to experts alone, and here the exception does its work. It covers testimony the expert hears from other witnesses while sitting in the courtroom before she takes the stand, and facts summed up in a hypothetical question about evidence already admitted. The clause at the end of Rule 602 exists to accommodate both techniques.11 An expert who hears those witnesses or assumes those facts has perceived none of the underlying events and may still rest an opinion on them. The question itself is not evidence, only the answer is.12 The commentary also expects trial judges to keep enforcing the traditional requirement that the proponent present independent, admissible evidence of the hypothesized facts.13
The third source is the broadest. It formally recognizes what was long the reality: experts necessarily rely on facts and data that never come up at trial.14 The material need not be admissible. Even opinions not in evidence may serve as a basis, provided experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on them.15 Reliance does not turn the data into evidence, however, because the underlying information ordinarily may not be admitted as part of the expert's opinion.16
Reasonableness is the limit, and trustworthiness is where it bites. An expert may not reasonably rely on a bystander's statement, because the bystander has no business duty to report and his statement has no indicia of trustworthiness beyond that of hearsay at large. Nor may she rely on a statement by a member of her own organization that merely reports a rumor, because it is not based on personal knowledge of the underlying facts. Such a statement is hearsay too untrustworthy for reasonable reliance, even if experts in the field customarily rely on that type of statement.17 Rule 602's concern thus carries forward into the reliance screen.
Where the Exception Stops
Dropping the perception requirement does not excuse an expert from having enough to go on. She must gather sufficient facts or data to support her opinion, and in Pelletier v. Main Street Textiles, LP, 470 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2006), the court affirmed the exclusion of a safety-practices expert who never inspected the facilities and equipment at issue.18 Other rules also still apply to the expert. The Fifth Circuit excluded a tax professor's opinion that a taxpayer's theory was not implausible, because evidence of the “uncertainty of the controlling law” is excludable under Rule 403.19
The exception attaches to testimony, not to credentials. A professional who reports facts she observed is a fact witness, and her account of those facts must rest on personal knowledge like anyone else's, because Rule 602 exempts only her expert testimony.20
Because one witness can play both roles in a single appearance, the personal knowledge objection is resolved answer by answer, the same matter-by-matter inquiry used for any witness. What she observed needs her own perception; the opinion she draws from training and trustworthy data does not.