Concept
Out-of-Court Declarants
Requirement of personal knowledge
Out-of-Court Declarants
Rule 602 ties a witness's testimony to evidence sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, and its words are addressed to the person on the stand.1 When a statement made outside court is repeated at trial, two people stand in that position: the witness who heard it and the declarant who made it. The witness needs personal knowledge only that the statement was made, as the preceding section showed. The declarant raises the harder question. The jury is invited to use her words as proof of what they assert, so it must rely on her perception just as it would rely on a witness's, with no chance to test it by cross-examination. A declarant who merely passed along a rumor presents the same weakness as a witness who does so.
Whether the requirement follows the declarant out of the courtroom depends on the route her statement takes into evidence. Declarants whose statements come in under a hearsay exception generally remain bound by it. A party-opponent, whose own words are offered against her, is not.
Hearsay Exception Declarants
Fitting a statement within an exception to the hearsay rule does not satisfy Rule 602 as to the person who made it. A hearsay statement reaches the jury by a different route than testimony, since the speaker is absent and someone else reports her words, and that difference tempts students to treat the exception as a substitute for the knowledge requirement. It is no substitute. To be admitted under Rule 803, 804, or 807, the declarant must also be shown to have personal knowledge of the matter she related, and the same is true of prior statements that Rule 801(d)(1) defines as not hearsay.2 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803 reflects the point by treating the declarant as a witness whose firsthand knowledge is still required.3 The in-court witness who repeats the statement carries a lighter burden, because she must know only that the statement was made.4
The exceptions leave the requirement in place because each rests on a circumstance that makes a statement likely to be sincere, and sincerity is a separate question from perception. Spontaneity does the work in an excited utterance, because the excitement temporarily stills the capacity for reflection and so produces statements free of conscious fabrication.5 A belief of imminent death does the work in a dying declaration, since that belief substantially curtails the chance that the declarant will falsify.6 A statement against interest rests on the assumption that people do not make false statements that damage themselves.7 A business record rests on a practice and environment that encourage accurate record-keeping.8 Each circumstance gives a reason to believe the speaker said what he believed, and none shows that he was positioned to see or hear what he described. A spontaneous, self-damaging, or routine statement from someone who never perceived the event is a sincere guess or a repeated rumor, and cross-examination, the tool that could have exposed it, is the very thing the exceptions dispense with.
An exception therefore answers the hearsay objection and nothing more. A statement that qualifies under Rule 803 must still satisfy the other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court decides under Rule 104(a) whether the exception's requirements are met.9 A student who finds that a statement was spontaneous, or made under belief of impending death, has resolved only the hearsay objection, and the personal-knowledge objection remains open. One relaxation does carry over to hearsay, and its limits are instructive. The opinion rule, a preference about the form of testimony, does not apply to statements admitted under Rule 803, because no one can ask an out-of-court speaker to rephrase.10 Personal knowledge concerns the substance of what the declarant knew, and no change in form supplies it. The same defect defeats a lay opinion when the witness lacks personal knowledge of the case-specific fact.11
Because the declarant is usually absent, the showing cannot rest on her own account of where she stood, the route that Rule 602 leaves open for a witness.12 It comes from the statement and its setting, since personal knowledge may appear from the statement itself or be inferable from the circumstances.13 For an excited utterance, the content and context of the statement can establish the declarant's knowledge.14 The exception does not require that the declarant have taken part in the event, because a non-participant may be moved to describe what he perceives, and that is why his perception is the question that matters.15 The same inference is available for a present sense impression, where the statement itself, read in light of the surrounding circumstances, may show that the declarant was perceiving the event as he spoke, and corroboration is not required.16
A business record shows how circumstances can stand in for an identified witness. Direct proof that the maker of a record knew the facts may be difficult, and the identity of the informant who did may be impossible to establish. Evidence that observing the matter was someone's business duty in the organization's routine is prima facie enough to establish actual knowledge, because a routine practice and a reasonable assumption that it was followed can prove personal knowledge.17 The inference lasts only as long as the routine does. If any person in the chain from observation to final recording is not acting in the regular course of business, an essential link in the trustworthiness chain fails, just as it does when the person supplying the information lacks firsthand knowledge.18 In Johnson v. Lutz, decided under New York's business-records statute, a police officer's report was held inadmissible insofar as it rested on what a bystander told the officer instead of on the officer's own knowledge, and courts have generally followed that analysis under Rule 803(6).19
A court of appeals applied these principles to a 911 call. The proponent, Bemis, offered a recording of a caller named Estep describing events outside his house. The court accepted that the call met the timing requirements shared by the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions, which call for a statement nearly contemporaneous with the incident and made with little chance for reflection, and it then turned to the separate requirement that the declarant have personal knowledge of what he described.20 Bemis, as the proponent, bore the burden of establishing Estep's personal perception by a preponderance of the evidence, which fits the judge's role in deciding whether the foundation for a hearsay exception is met.21
Proximity to the scene ordinarily carries a telephone caller a long way on that showing. The court recognized that a caller who is watching police arrest a suspect could qualify under either exception.22 It also pointed to Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., which admitted an unidentified 911 caller's description of a hit-and-run accident because the call was made in close physical and temporal proximity to the accident and the caller indicated she had seen it.23 In First State Bank of Denton v. Maryland Casualty Co., a caller's assertion that a party was not at home came in because the call was made from the phone at that home.24 In each of those decisions the setting or the words of the call supplied an inference that the caller was in a position to know what he described. Estep's call lacked that inference, because the record held affirmative signs of a borrowed account. Estep admitted at one point that he could not describe what was happening outside, and he could be heard repeating the words of an unidentified voice in the background, which gave the court an articulable basis to suspect that he was relaying descriptions from other people watching at the windows of his house.25 The line falls between a record that merely lacks proof of perception, which circumstances can fill, and a record that points to someone else as the source, which circumstances cannot overcome. Estep was available to testify about the circumstances and Bemis declined to call him, so nothing answered the signs, and the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the statement.26
The unidentified voice in the background also shows why courts treat declarants nobody can name with more caution. An identified declarant can be located, asked about his vantage point, and called to the stand, as Estep could have been. An unidentified bystander leaves the statement itself as the only evidence of perception. Courts have shown hesitancy about admitting a present sense impression without more when the declarant's identity is unknown, and the Advisory Committee's Note suggests the same reluctance toward an excited utterance from an unidentified bystander.27 Reluctance falls short of exclusion, as the admitted hit-and-run call shows, since that caller's own words indicated that she had seen the accident.28
A dying declaration adds a question of capacity to the foundation. Establishing personal knowledge there may require evidence that the declarant possessed adequate mental and physical facilities after the injury to perceive, record and recollect, and narrate the cause or circumstances surrounding his death.29
The same sorting applies to every exception. The exception supplies a reason to trust the speaker's sincerity, and the proponent must still supply the speaker's perception.
Party Admissions Exemption
A party's own statement, offered against her by the opposing side, is the major departure from that pattern. Rule 801(d)(2)(A) defines it as not hearsay, and it need not relate to a matter as to which she had personal knowledge.31 No showing of mental capacity is required either, the statement need not have been against her interest when made or when offered, and it may be offered whether or not she is available or testifies.32 It may also take the form of an opinion, even a conclusion of law.33
The reason for the departure lies in why these statements come in at all. The routes examined in the last subsection rest on some circumstance that bears on the statement's reliability, and firsthand knowledge is one of the guarantees that reliability depends on. A party's statement comes in on a different footing, which is her position in the adversary system. The rules once treated it as an exception to the hearsay rule and now define it as not hearsay.34 The usual objection to hearsay is that the speaker was not cross-examined, and a party who raises it is complaining that she did not cross-examine herself, an incongruity that deprives the objection of significance.35 Since admission never depended on a showing of reliability, a knowledge requirement would serve no purpose here, and it would let a party escape her own careless words by pointing to her ignorance. The same logic explains why the exception for statements against interest is confined to nonparties: when a party's own statement is offered by her opponent, it comes in as an admission instead.36
The two remarks are identical in content and opposite in result, and the only moving fact is the speaker's status. A party's words are admitted because of who she is, so her ignorance does not matter. A nonparty's words are admitted because of some circumstance that supports their reliability, so the declarant's perception must be shown.37 An answer that treats a nonparty's statement like a party's, or that demands firsthand knowledge from a party, applies the right rule to the wrong speaker.
The exemption removes one objection and leaves the others in place. Admissions of a party-opponent may still be excluded under Rule 403.38 The in-court witness who repeats the admission must also have personal knowledge of one fact, that the statement was made, and the neighbor in the scene above meets that requirement because he heard the owner speak.39 The requirements of Rule 801(d)(2) that do not involve conditional relevance, such as whether a speaker was authorized to make a statement for the party, are decided by the court.40