Concept
Knowledge Versus Hearsay
Requirement of personal knowledge
Knowledge Versus Hearsay
Rule 602 permits a witness to testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of it.1 The rule works in conjunction with the hearsay rule to confine trial testimony, generally, to firsthand accounts.2 Because the two rules share that aim, a witness who repeats what others told her can seem to violate either one. The firsthand-knowledge requirement is the older rule, and although the two are kin in policy, they should be kept apart: Rule 602 asks whether the witness had a reasonable opportunity to observe the facts she describes, while the hearsay rule asks whether she is passing along someone else's out-of-court statement for its truth.3 Two answers about the same red car show how the questions differ.
The two answers share a subject and differ in form. The first witness gives the fact directly on his own credit, so the only question is whether he perceived it, and the other testimony shows that he did not. The second witness gives an account of what the plaintiff said and offers it to establish that the plaintiff's report was true. A personal-knowledge objection to her answer would miss, because she heard the plaintiff speak and never claimed to know the car's color from her own observation. The defect lies in using the plaintiff's out-of-court words to prove the color, and that is a hearsay problem.4
The classic airport illustration runs the same way. A witness who says a flight arrived on time, when her other testimony shows she was not at the airport, can speak only from conjecture or the reports of others, and the proper objection is want of personal knowledge. A witness who says his brother told him the plane came in on time presumably does know what his brother said, so a knowledge objection to his answer is inappropriate. The objection is hearsay.5
The objections differ because the two defects sit at different points in the chain of perception. With the first witness, nobody on the stand ever perceived the car's color. He holds only a report, and by presenting it as his own observation he hides its real source. With the second witness, the person on the stand did perceive something, the plaintiff's statement, but the observation behind that statement belongs to the plaintiff, who spoke outside the courtroom and was never cross-examined. A hearsay exception or exemption speaks only to the out-of-court statement, so it cannot rescue the first witness, who has no perception of his own to supply. Even for the second witness, a statement offered under an exception in Rule 803, 804, or 807 requires that the declarant himself have personal knowledge of the matter related, a point a later section develops.6
What the second witness must know firsthand is narrow. A witness who testifies to a hearsay statement as such needs personal knowledge only of the making of the statement, and Rules 801 and 805 govern the statement itself. Rule 602 would still bar her from testifying on her own to the statement's subject matter, of which she has no personal knowledge.7 The same holds when the statement is defined as not hearsay or falls within an exception: the witness must know that it was made and need not know the matter it describes.8 Applied to the second witness, she may say the plaintiff spoke those words, and whether the jury may use the words to prove the car's color is a hearsay question. The usual error is to object that she was not at the collision and therefore lacks personal knowledge. That objection treats the red Volvo as her matter, when the matter she is describing is the plaintiff's remark, which she heard.
Courts do not always keep the labels apart. When the phrasing or the surrounding evidence shows that a witness is relying on what others reported without saying so, the objection “hearsay” generally suffices.9 The distinction loses much of its significance in that setting, and courts may simply apply the hearsay label.10 Suppose a witness testifies that the defendant started the fire, when all he knows firsthand is that people in the neighborhood think so. He has personal knowledge only of what the neighborhood thinks happened, so the testimony should be stricken. If it is offered to prove that the neighbors' account is true, it is inadmissible as hearsay as well.11 Because such testimony draws both objections, a clear statement of why it is defective matters more than the choice of label.
Routine background answers present a practical complication. Direct examination customarily opens with the witness's name, address, occupation, and similar basic facts, partly to put the witness at ease and partly so the jury learns who is speaking.12 Some of those answers rest on nothing the witness perceived. A witness asked her place of birth, her parents' names, and her date of birth ordinarily knows them only because her family told her, even though she never mentions anyone's statement. Strictly, such answers invite a personal-knowledge objection and are hearsay in substance. Common sense nonetheless says they should be unobjectionable, because something is wrong with a system that refuses to take a witness's word on her own name, parentage, and place and date of birth.13
This tolerance is a practical accommodation and not a rule, since Rule 602 exempts only expert testimony under Rule 703 and contains no exception for background facts.14 The result might be different if place of birth or the date the parents arrived were central points of contested fact, as where citizenship rights or entitlement to benefits turned on them. Even then judges would likely accept the testimony, though it might carry little weight against official records or other persuasive counterproof.15