Concept
Meaning of Personal Knowledge
Requirement of personal knowledge
Personal Knowledge Requirement
Meaning of Personal Knowledge
A witness may tell the jury only what she herself knows from experience, and Rule 602 makes that principle a condition of lay testimony: the witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that she has “personal knowledge of the matter.”1 The rule has three sentences. The first states the condition. The second lets the witness’s own testimony serve as proof of it. The third exempts expert testimony under Rule 703, an exemption that gets its own section later. The phrase “sufficient to support a finding” sets the standard of proof, and the next section examines it. A similar question about foundation arises when a party requests a jury instruction: the party is entitled to an instruction on its theory of the case if the instruction is “supported by law and has foundation in the evidence,” and the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting it.2 This section takes up the thing being proved: what personal knowledge is, and why the law demands it.
Personal knowledge is knowledge gained through firsthand observation or experience, as distinguished from a belief based on what someone else has said.3 The source must be the witness’s own senses, and any of them will do: sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste all count.4 The definition looks to where the witness’s information came from and says nothing about whether the information is right. The Advisory Committee Note treats personal knowledge as “not an absolute,” so a witness who misjudged what she perceived still has it; it may consist of what she thinks she knows from her own perception.5 Whether she perceived accurately is a matter for cross-examination and the factfinder, who weigh her perception, memory, sincerity, and narration.6
A slippery street marks the line. A witness who walked the street after a rain, felt her feet slide on the wet pavement, and says it was slippery perceived the condition herself. A witness who says the same thing because a neighbor walked the street and told him so has no personal knowledge of its condition; all he knows firsthand is that the neighbor thought the street was slippery.7 On direct examination the two may use identical words, and the difference lies entirely in where the words came from. Suspicion fares no better than a report. A witness who strongly suspects a fact but never saw, heard, or otherwise sensed it holds a belief, and the rule limits testimony to matters the witness acquired through her own senses.8
The passenger did hear the plaintiff make the remark, and that is a different matter. Rule 602 does not govern a witness who testifies to the making of a statement he personally heard, so whether he may repeat it turns on the hearsay rules. The same rule does bar him from testifying to the subject matter of the statement, the light itself, because he has no personal knowledge of it.9
The system insists on firsthand sources because of what cross-examination can reach. A witness who describes her own perception can be tested at the points that matter: where she stood, how closely she watched, and how well she remembers. A witness who relays what others perceived puts the real source of the information outside the courtroom, where no one can put those questions to it. The Advisory Committee Note calls the requirement a “most pervasive manifestation” of the common-law insistence on “the most reliable sources of information.”10 The setting of testimony fits the same design. A witness speaks under oath, before the factfinder, subject to cross-examination, and those features let the factfinder assess the credibility of what she personally perceived.11
The requirement also blocks a quieter evasion. A witness who would say, “I heard that Oliver was dealing cocaine out of his apartment,” cannot simply delete the words “I heard” and announce that Oliver was dealing. Stripped of its attribution, the assertion rests on nothing the witness perceived, and Rule 602 keeps out the subject matter of what he was told.12 Yet the rule alone does little work. The same witness may testify, “Two months ago, mutual friends told me Oliver was dealing cocaine,” because he did perceive that conversation and so satisfies Rule 602. Whether the friends’ words may be used to prove what they asserted is a hearsay question.13 Each rule covers ground the other leaves open, and together they confine trial testimony to firsthand accounts.