Concept
The Obligee's Response
Delegation of duties
The Obligee's Response
An obligee who learns that its obligor has handed the work to someone else must respond before any court decides whether the delegation was proper. The vocabulary helps. The obligor becomes the delegator, the person who takes over the duty is the delegate, and the other party, whose right to performance has been delegated, is the obligee.1 Delegation is usually possible, but it faces greater restrictions than the assignment of a right, because a change in who performs can affect the obligee more significantly than a change in who receives performance.2
Those restrictions are the tests the earlier sections developed. An obligor may delegate unless the delegation is contrary to public policy or to the terms of the promise,3 and a promise requires a particular person to perform only to the extent that the obligee has a substantial interest in that person's performing or controlling the acts promised.4 For goods, the statute draws the same line.5
Those tests classify a delegation after the fact, and the obligee must act before. It has three moves: refuse the delegate's performance, accept the delegate in words or by dealing with the delegate, or, in a sale of goods, demand assurances before choosing either. The first two moves are bets on how a court will later classify the delegation, and the losses differ. An obligee who refuses a proper delegation repudiates, meaning it refuses the performance the contract requires. An obligee who accepts surrenders its objection to the delegate but not its claim against the delegator, because unless the obligee agrees otherwise, neither the delegation nor the delegate's promise to assume the duty discharges the delegator's duty or liability.6 The first subsection works through refusal and acceptance. The second covers the statutory demand that lets a party to a sale of goods learn the facts before it bets.
Refusing an Improper Delegation
Refusal is safe only when the delegation is improper, so everything turns on classification. A proper delegation obliges the obligee to take the delegate's work as the obligor's own. An improper one, because the contract or public policy forbids it or because the obligee has a substantial interest in a particular performer, need not be accepted. The consequences run in opposite directions for the two kinds of duty, and a hypothetical shows each.
Start with a duty that cannot be delegated. An attempt to delegate it is not yet a breach. In legal effect it is only an offer to waive non-delegability, a proposal that the obligee take a substitute for the performer it bargained for.7 The obligee may accept the offer by assenting, for example by dealing with the delegate. It may instead reject the offer, and the rejection is safe, because an obligee entitled to a particular person's performance does not breach by declining a stranger's.
Suppose a student contracts with Studio A for personal dance instruction, and the contract bars Studio A from delegating the lessons. Studio A announces that Studio B will teach the rest of the course. The announcement is an offer and nothing more. If the student declines, and Studio A replies that it will be Studio B or no one, Studio A has refused to honor the contract unless the student assents to the delegation, and it is guilty of repudiation.8 The breach comes at the last of three steps: offer, rejection, insistence. The student need not take a single lesson from Studio B.
Now change one fact. The student, knowing of the substitution, attends Studio B's classes for several weeks. That is dealing with the delegate, and it accepts the offer to waive non-delegability.9 The duty and the delegation are the same in both versions. Only the obligee's response differs, and the response decides the result: refusing preserves the objection, and dealing with the delegate gives it up.10
Waiving the objection to Studio B does not release Studio A. Consent to a delegation, standing alone, does not result in a novation, which is an agreement that substitutes the delegate for the delegator and releases the delegator.11 The student can still hold Studio A to the contract if Studio B's teaching falls short. The price of dealing with the delegate is the objection to the substitute, not the claim against the original promisor.
A delegator can also repudiate by conduct, without ever announcing a refusal. In a dispute over a contract for ice, Frederick attempted an assignment, and his pleading alleged only that the assignee had undertaken the remaining contractual obligations. It did not allege that Frederick himself was ready to pay for ice delivered after the attempted transfer. The court held that his course was a repudiation and that he could not deny it, because his own act had made it impossible for him to perform what the contract contemplated.12
The other direction applies when the duty can be delegated. If the delegate performs, the delegator's duty is discharged. It follows that the obligee must accept the delegate's performance and that a refusal to do so is a repudiation by the obligee.13 Suppose a restaurant company contracts with a vending supplier to install cold-drink machines in its pizza parlors, keep them stocked and repaired, and pay the restaurant a percentage of the income. These are routine duties that any competent firm can perform to the same standard. The supplier delegates them to such a firm, and the restaurant company cancels because it likes the way the original supplier does business. The company has no substantial interest in having that supplier perform or control the work,14 so the delegation was proper, and the cancellation is the restaurant company's own repudiation. Its preference for the original supplier is only a preference. Cancelling also gains it nothing, because the supplier remains liable on the contract.15
The two hypotheticals mirror each other. In the dance case, the delegator who insisted on a forbidden substitute is exposed. In the vending case, the obligee who refused a permitted one is exposed. Both parties act in the same way, insisting on the delegation or refusing it, and the classification of the delegation decides who is in breach.
Demanding Assurances
In a sale of goods, the other party may treat any assignment that delegates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and, without prejudice to its rights against the assignor, may demand assurances from the assignee under § 2-609.17 The statute speaks of an assignor and an assignee because it addresses an assignment that delegates performance, so the delegator and delegate of the last subsection fill those roles. The demand gives the obligee a third response to a delegation it cannot yet classify.
A delegation does not prove that the delegate will perform badly. It shows only that the performer has changed, and from the outside the obligee cannot tell whether the new performer is better, worse, or the same. Refusing is a gamble, because a refusal of a proper delegation is a repudiation. Accepting is a gamble too, because an obligee who deals with a delegate may give up its objection to a performer it did not choose. The demand replaces the guess with an answer from the one party who can supply it.
The statutory text has three parts, and each has its own logic. The first makes the delegation itself the ground for concern: the delegation is an ipso facto basis for insecurity and gives a right to demand assurances.18 The obligee therefore need not show any specific reason to doubt the delegate. That makes sense because the delegate's capacity is exactly what the obligee cannot see, and requiring proof of inadequacy before the obligee may ask would demand proof of what the demand exists to discover. The second part preserves the obligee's rights against the assignor, which matches the statute's rule that no delegation of performance relieves the delegating party of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.19 Asking the delegate for assurance costs the obligee nothing in recourse. The third part aims the demand at the assignee, the person whose ability and intentions are in doubt.
The trigger is an assignment that delegates performance, and a transfer that moves only the right to be paid does not qualify. Suppose Widget Company agrees to sell goods to Pinnacle and assigns its right to payment to Secured Party. Pinnacle is an account debtor and must pay Secured Party what it owes Widget. The statute's rules on assignment are subject to § 9-406, which makes rights to payment for goods sold freely alienable notwithstanding a contrary agreement or rule of law. Widget delegated no duty of performance to Secured Party, so Pinnacle has no delegate to question and nothing to demand.20
The usual mistake is to skip the demand and cancel on the spot. Frumme agreed to supply Gator Deli with kosher sausages and then transferred her contract to Chazzer, which has not said whether it will honor the kosher requirement. Gator may be tempted to refuse the delegation and declare Frumme in breach at once. It may not, because Chazzer has not stated that it will fail to comply, and the law's presumption in favor of assignability balances Frumme's right to sell her assets against Gator's right to its contractual expectations.21 Gator must first give Chazzer the opportunity to declare its intentions. The vehicle is the statute: Gator should treat the delegation as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and demand an adequate assurance of performance.22
Chazzer's answer fixes what happens next. If Chazzer assures Gator that the sausages will be processed separately from nonkosher meat, in a plant and by a process that complies with Jewish law, Gator must accept the assignment and remains bound by the contract.23 Frumme does not drop out, because no delegation of performance relieves the delegating party of any liability for breach.24 If Chazzer gives no adequate assurance, Gator may refuse the delegation. Because Frumme would have repudiated by improperly delegating her duties, Gator may also declare a material breach and claim damages from her for any loss.25
A court confronting Nexxus's cancellation of its contract with Sally Beauty made the same point. On the record before it, Nexxus at most had grounds for 'insecurity' about whether Sally Beauty would use its best efforts to promote Nexxus products, and its remedy was not to cancel the contract but to demand assurances of due performance.26 The demand is the route the statute offers an obligee that fears a performer but cannot yet show the fear is justified. A credible answer keeps a working contract alive, and a missing or inadequate answer gives the obligee grounds to refuse.