Concept
Limits on Delegation
Delegation of duties
Limits on Delegation
An obligor may delegate performance of a duty unless the delegation is contrary to public policy or the terms of the obligor's promise.1 The sales statute draws the same line in other words: a party may perform through a delegate "unless otherwise agreed" or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having the original promisor perform or control the acts required.2 Between them, the two texts name three limits: the terms of the parties' promise, public policy, and the other party's substantial interest. This section takes up the first two. The third gets its own section because it turns on the facts of the particular performance.3
The default itself is a weaker presumption than the one favoring transfer of rights. A contract duty is not the obligor's property, so the power to delegate rests on no right to transfer property, and a transfer of duties can affect the obligee more than a transfer of the right to performance. Delegation is therefore usually possible, but it is subject to greater restrictions than assignment of rights.4
The two limits covered here share one feature: neither depends on how simple the work is. A clause forbidding delegation can govern a duty as routine as supplying bricks, and so can a statute.5 Once the clause or the prohibition is found, it applies whether or not the work is routine.
Contract Terms Barring Delegation
Parties may agree that a duty will not be delegated, and nothing restricts their power to say so.6 The sales statute treats the agreement the same way: an agreement not to delegate is binding.7 Because the default applies only "unless otherwise agreed," a clause displaces it, and it does so even when the work is routine. A buyer who wants bricks supplied only by one seller must prohibit delegation expressly in the contract, and a contract that does so will be enforced.8
The agreement can also cut the other way. Some duties, such as teaching, singing, or painting a portrait, are obviously too personal to delegate. Even those become delegable when the contract permits delegation, and any delegation is proper when the person to whom the duty is owed consents.9
Had the contract said nothing about subcontracting, Ortega's instruction after signing would change nothing. The limit must appear in the terms of the promise, and an objection voiced later is not one of them.10
A clause barring delegation meets none of the resistance that greets a clause barring assignment. Rules favoring free alienation of rights limit the validity of clauses that purport to prohibit assignment, but no rule restricts the parties' ability to make duties non-delegable.11 The sales statute follows the same line. Section 2–210 and other law override some prohibitions on assignment, while prohibitions on delegation are valid and are not overridden.12 The difference traces to what each transfer touches. The law presumes that contract rights can be transferred unless the contract or public policy precludes it. A contractual obligation, by contrast, is not the obligor's property, and moving it can affect the obligee more than moving the right to performance.13
Some contracts stop short of a ban and require the obligee's consent to delegation. When such a clause supplies no standard for granting or withholding consent, a "silent" consent clause, courts are divided on how to read it. Some require the obligee to act reasonably and in good faith when refusing consent.14 A drafter who wants a different standard should state it in the clause.
Drafters often write "assignment" when they mean delegation, and the law adjusts for the habit.16 Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, a term prohibiting assignment of "the contract" bars only the delegation to an assignee of the assignor's performance of a duty or condition.17 The sales statute reads such a prohibition the same way. How far a clause can restrict assignment of the right itself belongs to the law of assignment, so the point here is what the clause does to delegation.
The construction is a presumption about loose drafting, and the rule itself says it yields when the circumstances indicate the contrary. Absent such circumstances, a general bar on assigning "the contract" blocks the delegation and leaves the assignment of rights intact.
Public Policy and Statutes
The contract is not the only source of a limit. A delegation may be prohibited by statute, by rule, or by public policy, and an obligor cannot properly delegate in the face of such a prohibition.19 The contract clause binds because the parties agreed to it. This limit binds because the law has forbidden the delegation, and the parties' silence does not undo that.
A contract to supply bricks shows how much the buyer's identity can matter.
Standing alone, the duty to supply bricks is delegable. Bricks are bricks, and performance by a delegate would not vary materially from the original obligor's.20 A federal statute, 41 U.S.C. § 6305, nevertheless forbids a party to a government contract from transferring it without the government's consent. That prohibition applies whether or not the contract itself bars delegation.21 The contractor who hands the work to another supplier without the agency's consent has therefore delegated improperly. With a private developer, no clause and no statute stands in the way, and the delegation is proper. A developer who wants bricks only from this contractor would have to say so in the contract.22 The brick, the delegate, and the duty are the same in both versions. The statute alone moves the result.
This limit asks only whether a legal prohibition exists. It differs from the substantial-interest limit taken up next, which asks how much the identity of the performer matters to the obligee. A patron who contracts for Picasso's personal skill has a substantial interest in performance by Picasso. Picasso therefore could not delegate his duty to paint, though no statute and no clause forbids it. Such a bar is read into the contract from the nature of the duties involved.23 A delegation problem thus calls for a search for a contract clause, then for a statute or public policy, and only afterward for an analysis of how personal the performance is.