Concept
Assigning the Whole Contract
Assignment of rights
Assigning the Whole Contract
Parties who transfer a contract rarely stop to sort it into rights and duties. They say “I assign the contract to you,” and the law must decide what those words moved. An assignment of a right extinguishes the assignor’s right to the obligor’s performance, in whole or in part, and gives the assignee that right.1 General words of transfer ordinarily carry more: they move the assignor’s duties along with its rights. One exception, the assignment made as security for a debt, is common enough to need a section of its own.
The phrase “the contract” shows the same two-sided reach in a clause that prohibits assignment. There, unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, it bars only the delegation of the assignor’s performance of a duty or condition and leaves an assignment of rights untouched.2 In both settings the words cover rights and duties alike, and the difference lies in which half the speaker had in view. A clause that prohibits assignment is read as aimed at a substitute performer, while a transferor who speaks in general terms is giving up the whole position.
General Language Carries Delegation
Under UCC § 2-210, an assignment of “the contract,” of “all my rights under the contract,” or in similar general terms is an assignment of rights. Unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, it is also a delegation of the assignor’s performance of its duties, and the assignee’s acceptance constitutes a promise to perform them. Either the assignor or the other party to the original contract can enforce that promise.3
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328(1) reaches the same result for contracts generally, characterizing such a transfer as both an assignment of the party’s rights and a delegation of its duties.4 The commentary explains why a default is needed: the parties to an assignment may not distinguish between assignment of rights and delegation of duties.5 The rule supplies the meaning the words most likely carry when the parties have not spelled it out.
The implied promise gives the other party something concrete. Because acceptance of the duty is itself a promise to perform, the original party need not search for a separate undertaking by the assignee or build a third-party-beneficiary theory. The assignee is liable as though it had signed the contract.6
Two transfers occurred. Henry assigned his right to the $50,000 and delegated his duty to deliver the widgets, and Jane’s assent is deemed an implied promise to deliver them to Joe.7 Joe may sue Jane on that promise. He may also sue Henry, because even an effective delegation does not release the delegating party from its obligations, and Henry remains responsible if Jane fails to perform properly.8
Because one set of words carries two transfers, each is tested on its own, and the rights can pass where the delegation fails. A change of payee seldom troubles an obligor whose only duty is to pay money, since a change in the person to whom payment is to be made is not ordinarily material.9 A change of performer can matter a great deal more.
Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co. shows the two transfers coming apart. Best Barber & Beauty Supply Company was the exclusive distributor of Nexxus hair care products, and it transferred its distributorship to a company that was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Nexxus competitor. Nexxus objected. The court treated the transfer as both an assignment of Best’s rights and a delegation of its duties, and it analyzed the halves separately.10 Best’s rights passed without difficulty because moving them had no negative impact on Nexxus. Nexxus’s claim of a relationship of confidence and trust with Best’s management did not change that conclusion, since corporate officers can change even without an assignment and neither party was guaranteed the same officers for the term of the contract.11 The delegation was another matter. The risk is plain: Nexxus had bargained for a distributor whose best efforts would go to selling its products, and a distributor owned by a competitor must choose between its parent’s interests and Nexxus’s. The delegation denied Nexxus the benefit of its bargain.12
Joe, by contrast, has no apparent stake in who delivers the widgets, so nothing in Henry’s delegation threatens the bargain he made. Jane’s implied promise would not have answered Nexxus’s objection either, because that objection concerned who would perform, and a promise leaves the performer’s identity unchanged.
The Code gives the other party a middle course between silent acceptance and flat rejection. It may treat any assignment that delegates performance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and, without prejudice to its rights against the assignor, may demand assurances from the assignee under § 2-609.13 The demand suits a delegation that worries the other party without clearly defeating the bargain. If the assignee gives adequate assurance, the other party must accept the delegation and remains bound by the contract; if the assignee does not, the other party has the right to refuse the delegation.14
Language can also confine the transfer to rights. A landscaper owed $12,000 for building a patio signs a paper that says, “I assign to you my right to the $12,000 contract price, and I will complete the patio myself.” The words show that the landscaper is keeping the work, so nothing is delegated and the assignee promises nothing. A paper that said only “I assign the contract to you” would pass both the right and the duty, and the assignee’s acceptance would be a promise to build.
The third step is where Sally Beauty was decided, and it is where students most often stop too early by reasoning that a valid assignment of rights ends the inquiry.
Assignments for Security
The general-language default gives way when the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, and the Code’s own example of such circumstances is an assignment for security.16 Many courts have relied on the security aspect of an assignment in holding that the assignor’s duties were not delegated.17 A lender who takes an assignment of “the contract” as collateral therefore takes the right to be paid and does not take the job.
The exception covers more ground than its parenthetical suggests, because most assignments of contract rights are made to provide security for a loan or other obligation.18 The reason lies in the lender’s interest. A lender wants a source of repayment if the borrower fails to pay, and a right to be paid by a third party serves that purpose; the lender’s stake is the money, not the work. If accepting the collateral carried a promise to perform the borrower’s duties, the lender would inherit liability for work it never meant to do, and that prospect would discourage the financing the Code means to encourage. The Code rests on the assumption that limitations on the power to transfer contract rights restrict commercial activity, and its most noteworthy example of encouraged transfer is accounts receivable financing, in which businesses use their accounts to secure loans and so turn dormant accounts into working capital.19
A lender may advance money to a contractor and take an assignment of the right to payment on certain construction contracts, to protect itself if the contractor does not repay the loan. A court would be most unlikely to find that the lender assumed the duty to build the structures.20 An owner whose building is left unfinished must look to the contractor, because the assignment moved the right to payment and left the promise to build where it was. Property law draws a similar line: a buyer of mortgaged property is not personally liable for the mortgage debt unless the buyer expressly assumes that obligation, and if the payments are not made, the property is foreclosed upon without a deficiency claim against the buyer.21
The same words of transfer produce the opposite result when the assignee is the one who will do the work. Jane, in the widget example, earns her return by making deliveries, so her assent to the assignment is an implied promise to deliver.22 A lender earns its return from the loan and has no use for the building. The inquiry therefore looks to the role the assignee is to play, and the parties’ words are evidence of that role. A lender that expressly promised to finish the work would be telling the court something different, and the security label would then carry little weight.
A second Code provision answers a different worry. An assignment fails if it would materially change the other party’s duty, materially increase its burden or risk, or materially impair its chance of obtaining return performance. A seller that pledges its interest in a sales contract might seem to invite that objection from the buyer. The Code says it does not: the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the seller’s interest is not such a transfer unless, and only to the extent that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material performance of the seller.23 The rule waits for the harm. Granting security changes nothing about who builds or ships the goods, since the seller keeps performing and the lender holds only a claim on the proceeds. The buyer is exposed only if the lender enforces by putting someone else to work on the seller’s obligations.
Even then, the Code does not unwind the financing. The creation, attachment, perfection, and enforcement of the security interest remain effective, but the seller is liable to the buyer for damages caused by the delegation, to the extent the buyer could not reasonably have prevented them. A court with jurisdiction may also grant other appropriate relief, including cancellation of the contract for sale or an injunction against enforcement of the security interest or consummation of the enforcement.24 The remedies are aimed at the party and the harm. The seller promised the buyer the performance and its default set enforcement in motion, so the seller answers in damages, while cancellation or an injunction covers the case where damages would not make the buyer whole. Making the security interest itself ineffective would strip the lender of its collateral because of events at enforcement, and lenders could never be sure of the collateral’s value when they decide whether to lend.
The second step is where a problem tempts you to apply the general-language default mechanically. A lender that takes “the contract” as collateral has taken the right to be paid and has not accepted the borrower’s duties.