Concept
Contractual Limits on Assignment
Assignment of rights
Contractual Limits on Assignment
A contract can close off assignment, and the Restatement treats that as the third and last limit on assignability: a contractual right can be assigned unless assignment is validly precluded by contract.1 The first two limits came from outside the agreement. One looked to the harm a substitution would do the obligor, and the other to a statute or a public policy. This limit comes from inside the agreement, and the Code recognizes the same source, because UCC § 2-210(2) makes the rights of a seller or buyer assignable only “unless otherwise agreed.”2
The word “validly” carries the weight. Courts honor an anti-assignment clause, but they read it against a presumption that contract rights are transferable, and the law takes some rights out of its reach altogether. Five questions follow. Does the clause clearly say what it bars? Does it remove the obligee’s power to assign, or only its right? Does a bar on assigning “the contract” reach rights at all? Is the right one that no clause can hold back because the assignor has fully performed? And is it a right to payment that Article 9 frees whatever the clause says? The rules lean toward the transfer: a clause defeats an assignment only when it is clearly worded and no override reaches the right.
Valid Preclusion by Contract
An obligor can have sound reasons to deal with one counterparty and no other. It may have extended credit on that party’s record, built a relationship worth keeping, or wish to avoid owing performance to a stranger who turns out to be a competitor or a litigation adversary. The default limits give it little help, because it must prove a material harm after the transfer has already happened. The buyer’s rights under most requirements contracts, for example, are assignable: an assignee cannot demand an amount of goods that unreasonably strays from the assignor’s estimate or actual requirements, so the assignee takes a contract measured at baseline by the assignor’s requirements.3 An obligor that wants more certainty bargains for a clause, and freedom of contract supports enforcing the bargain.
Against that freedom stands the presumption of assignability. A contract right is an asset, and its owner can sell it, donate it, or pledge it as collateral; the law presumes that contract rights can be transferred unless the contract or public policy precludes it.4 The Code goes further and encourages assignment, on the premise that limits on transferring contract rights restrict commercial activity.5 Courts reconcile the two by requiring that a bar be clearly expressed and by resolving doubt in favor of transferability.6 The obligor bargained for the clause and can say plainly what it wants, while an assignee, a stranger to the negotiation, cannot decode loose wording. Placing the cost of ambiguity on the obligor keeps vague boilerplate from quietly defeating a transfer the law otherwise favors.
A court read a general bar narrowly in Titan Exteriors, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London. An insurance policy forbade the insured to assign its rights and duties under the policy without the insurer’s written consent. After a storm damaged the insured’s property, it assigned its claim to a contractor hired to make repairs, and the insurer resisted. The court upheld the assignment, reading the clause restrictively as reaching only assignments made before the loss. A consent requirement of that kind guards the insurer against the added risk of a substitution of insured parties, and that danger ends once the loss has occurred and only a monetary claim remains. A claim for money is property, and public policy disfavors restraints on its transfer.7
Many clauses require the obligor’s consent rather than ban assignment outright, and the law treats the obligor’s power to refuse differently from a flat prohibition. Unless the contract makes clear that the obligor has complete discretion, the obligor must act reasonably in withholding consent, the approach reflected in Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735 (Md. 1990). In practice the obligor cannot legitimately refuse unless the assignment would be unduly burdensome or risky to it or would materially affect its contract rights, which is close to the showing the material-effect limit already demands.8 The reason lies in the clear-expression requirement itself. If a bare consent clause let the obligor refuse for any reason, drafters could obtain a flat ban by calling it a consent requirement, and the presumption of assignability would give way to a single ambiguous word. Requiring reasonableness protects the obligor’s real interests and demands that anyone who wants an unreviewable veto say so.
A clause that cannot be read narrowly produces the opposite result, and Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp. shows the older approach enforcing such a clause as written. A subcontract between the general contractor, Caristo, and its painting subcontractor, Kroo, declared void any assignment by Kroo of the contract, of any interest in it, or of money due or to become due under it, made without Caristo’s written consent.9 Kroo assigned its right to moneys due and to become due to a bank without that consent, the bank passed the right to Herman Allhusen, and his suit to enforce it was dismissed because of the clause. He appealed twice without success, and the final ruling, made in 1952, let the power to contract trump the power to transfer.10 Both Allhusen and Titan involved consent requirements, so the consent requirement did not separate them. The Titan clause spoke generally and had a purpose that ran out after the loss. The Allhusen clause named the very payment right being assigned and stated the consequence of assigning without consent, which left a court nothing to read narrowly.
Allhusen would come out differently today for money due. The enactment of UCC § 9-406(d) superseded Allhusen and decisions like it: with some qualifications, a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective to the extent that it prohibits, restricts, or requires the account debtor’s consent to the assignment of an account.11 The last section of this chapter develops that override. Its limit matters here: it frees rights to be paid, and a clause aimed at another right keeps its force under the rules just described. The next section asks what that force amounts to when the clause is clear.
Right Versus Power to Assign
When the parties have written a prohibition into the contract and the obligee assigns anyway, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322(2) supplies the default consequence. Unless a different intention is manifested, a term prohibiting assignment of rights gives the obligor a right to damages for breach of the terms forbidding assignment but does not render the assignment ineffective.13 The prohibition is for the obligor’s benefit, so it neither prevents the assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor nor keeps the obligor from discharging its duty as if there were no prohibition.14 A clause that clears the clear-expression hurdle therefore does less than its wording suggests: it restrains the assignor’s conduct without necessarily undoing the transfer.
Courts compress the result into a formula: an anti-assignment clause takes away the right, but not the power, to assign.15 The right is the assignor’s permission under the contract to make the transfer, and the power is its legal ability to make the transfer effective. A clause that promises only that rights will not be assigned gives up the first and leaves the second, so an assignor who violates it has done something it had no right to do and has still done it. The assignee owns the right, and the assignor is in breach. Where a contract says only that rights may not be assigned and is silent about the effect of a violation, the obligor must pay the assignee, and it may recover from the assignor whatever damages it proves.16 Reading “prohibited” as “ineffective” gets this problem wrong, because the clause governs what the assignor may do while the problem asks who now owns the right.
Each half of the default protects a different party. The obligor’s real interest is compensation for whatever harm the assignment causes, such as added cost or a counterparty it did not choose, and damages deliver that without undoing the transfer. The assignee’s interest is secure title. Assignees buy or lend against rights under contracts they did not write, so if a clause buried in the underlying contract could cancel the transfer, every assignee would have to read each such contract before paying or bear the risk of losing what it paid for. That burden would cut against the Code’s policy of encouraging assignment.17 An obligor who wants more can say so plainly. When the parties’ words declare an unauthorized assignment void, the obligor’s interest has been clearly bargained for, and an assignee who reads the clause is on notice.
The Restatement’s qualifier, “unless a different intention is manifested,” leaves room for language that does take the power away, and courts ask for express words. To preclude the power to assign, or to make an assignment that violates the contract wholly void, the clause must contain express provisions that any assignment shall be void or invalid if not made in the specified way. Otherwise the assignment is effective and the obligor has damages.18
Garden State Buildings L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., 702 A.2d 1315 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997), applied that test. A partnership had entered a loan agreement with Midatlantic Bank for construction of a hotel, and the anti-assignment clause provided that assignments without the other party’s written consent “shall be void.” The court separated the clause’s effect on a party’s right to assign from its effect on the party’s power to assign. Because the clause clearly declared such assignments void, the court concluded that the parties had sufficiently manifested an intent to limit Midatlantic’s power to assign the loan.19
The same framework governed a later dispute over limits on assignment in Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd. Bel-Ray, a New Jersey maker of specialty lubricants, had a series of trade agreements with Chemrite Ltd., a South African corporation, for blending and distributing Bel-Ray products in South Africa. In 1996 a newly formed firm, Lubritene Ltd., acquired Chemrite’s lubricant business, including its rights under the agreements; Bel-Ray was told of the transfer, and business went on as before.20 Applying New Jersey law, the court noted that the New Jersey Supreme Court had not yet addressed the effect of contractual provisions limiting or prohibiting assignment and looked for guidance to Garden State.21
The weaker clause appears in Owen v. CNA Insurance/Continental Casualty Co., 771 A.2d 1208 (N.J. 2001). There the New Jersey Supreme Court treated a clause limiting assignment of structured-settlement proceeds as a covenant not to assign, for which the assignor would owe damages, and not as a bar on the assignment itself. Owen and Garden State mark the two poles. In both a clause restricted assignment, and the outcomes differ because the Garden State clause attached voidness to an unauthorized assignment while the Owen clause, as the court read it, lacked language that would take the power away.
Prohibiting Assignment of the Contract
A clause that prohibits assignment of “the contract” is read narrowly. Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, it bars only the delegation to an assignee of the assignor’s performance of a duty or condition, as Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322(1) provides.23 UCC § 2-210 construes the same words the same way for sales of goods.24 The assignor stays free to assign every right under the contract. What it cannot do is put a substitute performer in its place.
The narrow reading tracks what an obligor stands to lose. A party that owes payment is ordinarily indifferent whether it pays the obligee, the obligee’s bank, or some other assignee, so long as the person who promised the work still does it. Concern arises when the performance itself passes to a stranger, because the obligee usually chose its counterparty for particular skill, reliability, or reputation, and unless that person or someone under his supervision performs, the obligee is denied what was promised.25 A distributorship dispute shows the difference. The court saw no problem in assigning the distributor’s rights, because that hurt the manufacturer not at all, but held that delegating the distributor’s duties deprived the manufacturer of its bargain, because distribution of its products would pass into a competitor’s hands (a dissent doubted that reason).26 A drafter who bars assignment of “the contract” is therefore most plausibly guarding against a substituted performer. Reading the same words to freeze the right to payment would take a marketable asset from its owner while protecting the obligor against nothing it fears.
The narrow reading also gives the clause something the law will enforce. An agreement not to delegate is binding, and the law treats prohibitions on delegation differently from prohibitions on assignment: the first are valid and are not overridden, while the Code and other law override some of the second.27 Delegation of duties is, in general, subject to greater restrictions than assignment of rights.28 Construed as a delegation bar, a bare “the contract” clause lands among the restrictions that survive, which gives the obligor the protection it most plausibly wanted.
The default reaches only as far as the clause’s words. A clause that prohibits assignment of rights falls under § 322(2), where the right-versus-power rules apply, and § 322(1) has nothing to construe.29 Compare two drafts. “Neither party may assign this contract” bars delegation only. “The buyer may not assign its rights under this agreement, and any attempted assignment is void” names both the rights and the consequence, so § 322(2) governs and the word “void” removes the buyer’s power to assign.30 The clause in Allhusen had the second shape: it reached any interest in the subcontract and any money due or to become due, and it declared such an assignment void.31
Because the rule applies unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, it works as a presumption that other facts can rebut.32 A contract that pairs its anti-assignment sentence with a separate term requiring every payment to go to the original party alone shows that the obligor cared who collects, and the delegation-only reading would give way. Without facts of that kind, an obligor who wants to bar assignment of rights must say so in terms that name them. On an exam, a stem that recites a clause against assigning “the contract” and asks whether the assignee may collect payment tests this default. The payment right passes, and the clause blocks only the assignor’s attempt to hand off its performance.
Rights After Full Performance
The second sentence of UCC § 2-210(2) takes two kinds of right out of the parties’ freedom to bar assignment: a right to damages for breach of the whole contract and a right arising out of the assignor’s due performance of its entire obligation can be assigned despite agreement otherwise.34 A clause barring assignment cannot hold them back, however plainly it is written. Restatement § 322(2)(a) reaches the same place for contracts generally, because a term prohibiting assignment of rights does not forbid assignment of either kind of right.35 The wording differs in a way that matters. The Restatement states its carve-out as a construction rule that applies unless a different intention is manifested, while the Code says “despite agreement otherwise,” a phrase that broke from most earlier contract law.36
Both overrides rest on what an anti-assignment clause protects. A clause of this kind serves an obligor who wants to keep dealing with one counterparty while performance remains to come. Once the assignor has done everything it promised, the obligor owes only the payment or other performance it promised in return, and that duty is the same whoever collects it. The right, meanwhile, is a valuable asset and often the assignor’s best way to raise cash, and the Code’s policy is to encourage assignment, most visibly in accounts receivable financing.37 The damages claim stands on the same footing. A claim for breach of the whole contract measures what the obligor owes for its own default, so a clause that kept the claim with the original party would shelter the obligor from nothing it bargained for.
An insurance example shows the damages half. A policyholder’s industrial insurance policy lapses for unpaid premiums, and the insurer then refuses to pay the cash surrender value still due under the policy. The refusal breaches the entire contract, so the policyholder, and others in the same position, can assign their claims to a collector without regard to any contractual prohibition.38 The policyholder has nothing further to do, and the insurer’s only remaining task is to answer for its refusal, in the same amount whoever holds the claim.
The second half covers a right that exists because the assignor has finished its own part. A buyer agrees to buy 200 fruitcakes and pays the full $600 price. When the seller refuses to deliver, the buyer assigns its rights to C, and the assignment is effective despite any contractual prohibition.39 The same logic protects a seller. Widget Company delivers widgets to Pinnacle Corporation on time and assigns its right to payment. Widget performed its entire obligation, so its right to payment is no longer executory, and a right that is no longer executory may be assigned although the agreement prohibits assignment.40 Completion does not depend on the other side’s cooperation. If a seller tenders delivery and the buyer wrongfully rejects, the seller has fulfilled its obligation to tender, its obligation is no longer executory, and it may assign its right to payment despite a prohibition.41 In each scene the assignor has done all it promised, and the assignee takes a right the assignor will never have to earn again.
The harder question is whether the assignor has really finished, and an Article 2A lease example shows how to ask it. Suppose a lessor delivers equipment on a six-month lease with monthly rent, owes no duty to service, maintain, or upgrade it, and has not disclaimed the implied warranty of merchantability. The lease prohibits transfers, and the lessor assigns its right to the rent. The prohibition cannot stop the assignment, because the lessor performed its entire obligation by delivering. The distinction that matters is between a potential duty to answer a later claim, which is not remaining performance, and a continuing duty to render stipulated performance, which is. Exposure to a later claim that the equipment is unfit falls on the first side. A lessor bound to maintain and service the goods regularly, or to provide periodic upgrades against obsolescence, would have remaining performance, because each of those is a stipulated act still to be done.42
The override stops at the boundary of the statute that carries it. Section 2-210(2) is an Article 2 rule, so it helps an assignee only if Article 2 governs the contract. In Mingledorff’s, Inc. v. Hicks, a heating and air-conditioning contractor finished its work and assigned part of the money due under its contract to Mingledorff’s without the other party’s consent, although the contract prohibited assignment.43 Mingledorff’s argued that the clause was invalid under § 2-210(2). The court declined to apply the section, because the contract was one for services and labor with only an incidental furnishing of equipment and materials, so Article 2 did not apply, and it held the rights not assignable.44 The contractor’s performance was as complete as Widget’s, and its claim for money was just as real. What differs is the subject matter of the contract, a sale of goods in one case and predominantly a services contract in the other, so the first question under this override is whether Article 2 reaches the contract at all. Whether a payment right under a services contract can still be freed by a separate provision is the question the next section takes up.
Article 9 Override for Payment Rights
UCC § 9-406(d) supplies the second override of a contractual bar on assignment. A term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor is ineffective to the extent that it prohibits, restricts, or requires the account debtor’s consent to the assignment or transfer of an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note, or to the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in one.46 The account debtor is the person obligated on the right being assigned, which makes it the obligor of this chapter. Every item on the statute’s list is a right to be paid money. An account is a right to payment for goods, services, or similar benefits, and chattel paper joins a buyer’s payment obligation to a security interest in the goods sold.47 That feature defines the scope of the override.
The sales-law rule already points here. Section 2-210(2) begins with the words “Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-406,” so Article 9 has the last word on rights to payment.48 The official comment to § 2-210 explains that § 9-406 makes rights to payment for goods sold freely alienable “whether or not earned,” despite a contrary agreement or rule of law.49 That phrase marks the difference from the first override, which freed a right only after the assignor had fully performed. A builder under a $10,000,000 construction contract, payable as the work progresses, may need money at once to begin work, so it assigns its right to payment to a lender in return for a loan. That right has not yet been earned, because it is constructively conditioned on the builder’s performance.50 The sales-law override alone would not reach it, and Article 9 is what lets such financing proceed.
The effect of the override is complete. Official Comment 5 to § 9-406 says the clause is “of no effect whatsoever,” which means it does not prevent the assignment from taking effect between the parties and the assignment is not a default under the agreement between the account debtor and the assignor.51 That goes a step past the general default of the previous section. Under the Restatement, an ordinary clause takes away the assignor’s right to assign but not its power, so the assignee holds the right and the obligor recovers damages for the breach, and only language declaring the assignment void removes the power.52 Article 9 leaves the account debtor with neither a voided transfer nor a breach claim. Even the clause in Allhusen, which declared void any assignment of money due without the general contractor’s consent, would not survive as to an account, because § 9-406(d) superseded that decision.53 A drafter cannot rescue a restriction on payment rights by adding the word “void” or by recasting the bar as a consent requirement, because the statute names consent requirements too.
The reason for so complete a rule lies in how receivables are financed. A merchant who sells on credit may need cash to buy more stock, and it has two ways to get it. It can sell the accounts for cash, ordinarily at less than face value to reflect the burden of collection and the risk of default, or it can borrow against them as collateral. Assignability of contract rights thus serves as a lubricant to the production-distribution process.54 Article 9 promotes assignability because the ability to assign contract rights is a very important source of financing for businesses.55 A financier lends against the promises of the borrower’s customers, and a seller with many customers has many contracts, often on forms the customers wrote. If a bar in any one of them could undo a transfer, the financier would have to read every contract before advancing a dollar. If a bar could only give the customer a damages claim, the financier would have to price the risk that such claims reduce what it collects. Making the clause ineffective removes both risks. The rule also completes a development already under way: under prior law such a prohibition was in theory given effect, but most courts construed purported prohibitions so that they did not defeat the assignment in practice.56
The account debtor gives up little in return. An obligor whose only duty is to pay money performs identically for any payee, and a change in the person to whom payment is made is not ordinarily material.57 The obligor also keeps its key protection: until it receives notice of the assignment, the assignment has no effect on it, and it may discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.58 A later section takes up notice, discharge, and defenses.
The override attaches to the kind of right assigned, so the first step on any problem is to identify which right the clause restricts. In the sales illustration, Widget Company sells widgets on account to several firms, including Pinnacle Corporation, and assigns its accounts receivable to a secured party, satisfying the notice requirements of § 9-406. Pinnacle, as account debtor, must pay the secured party what it owes Widget.59 A prohibition in the Pinnacle contract would change nothing, because the thing assigned is a right to be paid. One contract can hold rights of both kinds, as the next scene shows.
A clause aimed at a right other than a right to payment keeps its force. A real estate form widely used in California says that the buyer may not assign any rights under it without the seller’s prior written consent, and the Code’s definition of an account covers neither the buyer’s principal right, a conveyance of property, nor the seller’s principal right, to be paid for it.60 Article 9 also generally does not apply to the creation or transfer of interests in real property.61 A clause aimed at a buyer’s right to receive goods is likewise untouched, as in Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., where a contract for canned tomato paste declared the contract not assignable and restricted where the goods could be shipped. Such a clause protects the performance the seller must render, an interest a party owing only money lacks.62
The same focus on the right answers the question left open about Mingledorff’s, where the contractor’s right to be paid failed the sales-law override because the contract was one for services. Article 9 looks at the right itself, and the definition of an account reaches payment for services as well as for goods.63 A payment right under a services contract is therefore a candidate for the override even when Article 2 says nothing about the contract.
The override also has boundaries that a course on secured transactions treats in detail. Four matter here:
- A clause aimed at a right other than a right to payment, such as a right to receive goods or a conveyance of land, is not displaced.64
- Special rules govern transactions such as the sale of a payment intangible or the assignment of a promissory note or a health-care-insurance receivable. There the person obligated need not render performance to a secured party who seeks to enforce its security interest (UCC §§ 9-408, 9-409).65
- An individual account debtor who incurred the obligation for consumer purposes may invoke other law that sets a different rule.66
- Article 9 excludes many transactions from its scope; UCC § 9-109(c)–(d) identifies seventeen exceptions.67
Article 9 carries the same policy past contract terms. It treats a debtor as free to create a security interest in its assets even if the contract, or the legal rules governing that type of asset, say the debtor cannot transfer its rights, though it does not address restrictions on attaching an agricultural lien.68 Restrictions that come from law rather than from the parties’ agreement call for the analysis of the earlier limits, and Article 9 addresses some of them but not all.
Taken together, the five limits support a screening sequence for any problem built on an anti-assignment clause.
The order matters. The overrides in steps two and three defeat even the clearest drafting, while the questions in steps four and five matter only for rights that no override frees.