Concept
The Presumption of Assignability
Assignment of rights
The Presumption of Assignability
Contract rights begin from a position of transferability. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2) says that a contractual right can be assigned unless one of its listed limits applies.1 UCC § 2-210(2) takes the same stance for sales of goods. Unless otherwise agreed, all rights of either the seller or the buyer can be assigned, except where the assignment would materially change the duty of the other party, materially increase the burden or risk the contract imposes on that party, or materially impair that party's chance of obtaining return performance.2 Both provisions start with assignability and treat the limits as exceptions. That structure creates a presumption, and the presumption fixes who must prove what before anyone looks at the facts. The obligee who transfers a right need not ask the obligor's permission, and an obligor who wants to resist must identify a limit that applies.
The Restatement lists three limits, and the sections that follow take them in this order:
- The assignment would materially change the obligor's duty, materially increase its burden or risk, materially impair its chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the contract's value to it.3
- A statute forbids the assignment, or the assignment is otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy.4
- The contract validly precludes assignment.5
The presumption follows from what a contract right is. To the obligee it is an asset, an item of property with value, and the owner of property can ordinarily sell it, give it away, or pledge it as collateral.6 Commerce supplies a second reason. A merchant who sells on credit may need cash to buy more stock. The merchant can get it by selling the accounts for less than face value or by borrowing against them as collateral, so assignability works as a lubricant for the production-distribution process.7 The Code accordingly treats limits on the power to transfer contract rights as a restraint on commercial activity and encourages assignment. Accounts receivable financing is the clearest example, because it turns dormant accounts into working capital.8
Duties do not enjoy the same presumption. An obligor's contractual obligations are not its property, so the presumption of transferability is weaker for delegation, which is subject to greater restrictions than assignment of rights.9 Delegation comes up again later in this chapter. For rights, the general rule that both the Restatement and § 2-210(2) reflect is that a party can transfer them unless the contract prohibits it, the nature of the contract is such that the transfer would impair the other party's reasonable expectations, or the transfer would offend public policy.10 Those three exceptions line up with the three limits above, and each answers a different concern. The material-effect limit protects the obligor's bargain from a substitution that changes what it must do or receive. The statute and public-policy limit protects an interest that reaches beyond the two parties. The contractual limit gives effect to the parties' own agreement. Where none of these concerns is present, a restriction would only burden commerce, because an obligor who owes only money performs the same way whoever collects.11
The first limit turns on the word material. Almost every assignment has some effect on the obligor, if only that it must now deal with someone else, so the materiality requirement keeps an obligor from blocking a transfer over a trivial change. Clark v. B.P. Oil Co. illustrates the point. A retailer faced price increases and changed credit terms after its gasoline supply contract passed from a producer to a regional distributor, and those changes were treated as immaterial.12
A promise to pay money shows the presumption at full strength. Where the obligor's only duty is to pay money, a change in the person to whom payment is made is not ordinarily material.13 Suppose a lender sells to a finance company the right to be repaid $10,000 on a fixed date, and the loan contract says nothing about assignment. The borrower still owes the same sum on the same date, no statute is in play, and no term bars the transfer. With no limit to point to, the borrower must pay the finance company. A Restatement illustration shows the opposite case. If B promises to support A for the rest of A's life, A cannot assign to C the right to have B support C for the rest of C's life. A and C are different people with different needs and life spans, so the substitution changes what B must do.14
The Article 2 formulation keeps this architecture, but its wording differs from the Restatement's in ways that matter whenever goods are sold. The Code's text lists only the three material-effect prongs, so the Restatement's fourth clause, on a material reduction in the contract's value to the obligor, has no separate counterpart in § 2-210(2).15 The phrase unless otherwise agreed is where the contractual limit enters. The opening words also make the rule subject to § 9-406, which makes rights to payment for goods sold freely assignable notwithstanding a contrary agreement.16 Section 2-210(2) names no public-policy exception, but § 2-210 does not state all the law on assignment, so that silence does not take public policy out of a sale of goods.17 The subsection's last sentence also keeps two kinds of rights assignable despite an agreement to the contrary: a right to damages for breach of the whole contract, and a right arising out of the assignor's due performance of its entire obligation.18 Those overrides belong to the discussion of contractual limits below.
Step two asks the most of the obligor. It must show a material effect on the performance it actually owes, and when that performance is only a payment, a different payee does not supply one.