Concept
Manifesting Intent to Assign
Assignment of rights
Manifesting Intent to Assign
An assignment starts with something the obligee says or does, and the law asks what that expression conveys. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 makes it essential that the obligee manifest an intention to transfer the right to another person without further action or manifestation of intention by the obligee.1 Section 317(1), set out in the previous section, says what a completed assignment accomplishes: the assignor's right to performance is extinguished in whole or in part, and the assignee acquires a right to that performance.2 Section 324 says what the obligee must do to bring that result about, and a private wish to pass the right along does not qualify.
This inquiry comes first because every limit on assignability developed later in the chapter presupposes an assignment to limit. Whether a substitution would burden the obligor, whether a statute forbids the transfer, and whether the contract bars it are all questions about a transfer that has already happened. A purported assignment that fails here never reaches them, so screen the facts for intent before considering any limit.
The phrase "without further action" has a mechanical reason behind it. If the obligee must still do something before the assignee can collect, the obligee still controls the right, and the extinguishment that defines an assignment has not occurred.
Screening takes three questions, each treated in its own subsection:
- Do the obligee's words and conduct express a present transfer of the right, as opposed to an authorization to collect it or a promise to pay the other person out of it?
- Does the right exist at the time of the transfer, a question that matters most when the right is conditional or not yet due?
- What form must the manifestation take, and does the transfer need consideration? The answers are more forgiving than students expect.
Present Transfer, Not Authorization
The closing phrase of § 324 does the work: the transfer must occur "without further action or manifestation of intention by the obligee." When an obligee speaks or writes, the question is whether anything remains for the obligee to do before the recipient can collect. A later decision to forward the money, or a power to cancel the arrangement, shows that the right is still in the obligee's hands. The manifestation may be made to the assignee or to a third person on the assignee's behalf and, unless a statute or the contract requires otherwise, may be oral or written.3
Because an assignment extinguishes the assignor's right, several arrangements that look like assignments fail the test. The appointment of an agent and the grant of a power of attorney are both revocable, and a power of attorney expires at the grantor's death, so the obligee remains the owner.4 A bare promise to pay someone out of a fund, and a promise to assign the right later, leave the right with the promisor for the same reason.
Kelly Health Care v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America shows an arrangement that failed. William Green was insured under a group health policy issued by Prudential, and his wife, covered as a dependent, incurred expenses as a patient in a facility operated by Kelly Health Care. Prudential refused to pay the bills Kelly submitted, and Kelly sued both Prudential and Green. Kelly obtained a default judgment against Green and pursued Prudential on the theory that Kelly was Green's assignee.5
The court rejected that theory. An assignment is a transfer, but a transfer is not necessarily an assignment: if the transfer is less than absolute, it is not an assignment, because the obligee must have intended, at the time of the transfer, to dispossess himself of an identified interest, or some part of it, and to vest indefeasible title in the transferee. One of the documents on which Kelly relied did no more than appoint Kelly as Green's special agent with authority to collect payments from Prudential as Green's entitlement fell due. Appointing an agent cannot qualify as an assignment, since the appointment is revocable, so Green remained the owner of the right.6
Herzog v. Irace came out the other way. Attorneys Anthony Irace and Donald Lowry collected personal injury settlement proceeds on behalf of their client, Gary Jones. Dr. John Herzog sued them for breach of an assignment of those proceeds, and the lawyers appealed from a judgment finding the assignment valid and enforceable against them.7 The court held that Jones's June 14, 1988 letter gave no indication that he tried to retain any control over the funds he assigned. Read in context, the word "request" gave the court no reason to question his intent to complete the assignment, and the absence of a stated amount did not change that.8
Set side by side, the two cases show that vocabulary does not decide the question. Kelly's papers made it Green's agent to collect, an arrangement Green could revoke, and the court would not call that an assignment however Kelly framed its claim. Jones's letter used the soft word "request" and still operated as an assignment, because it left him no control over the proceeds. Each court applied one test to a different manifestation: read as a whole, what do the obligee's words and conduct say about who controls the right?
Promise-based look-alikes fail on the same logic. Suppose Attorney X tells Attorney Y, "Write the brief and you will get one-half the fee." That statement may promise payment and may fix the amount and the time when payment is due, but it does not appear to manifest an intent to transfer to Y the present right to collect the fee or any part of it.9
A gift of a contract right draws the same line. Jane has contracted to buy a horse from Henry. If she tells Tony, "I want you to have the horse and she is yours," or "You can go tell Henry that he should deliver the horse to you," she has manifested a present transfer of her right under the purchase contract. If she says instead, "When Henry delivers the horse to me, she will be yours," she has made only a promise to give the horse later, and nothing has left her.10
The third step does most of the work, and it is where Kelly and Herzog part. A document that gives the recipient a right to collect while leaving the obligee free to cancel it fails there, whatever else it says.
Existing and Future Rights
Before an obligee can transfer a right, the right must exist, because an assignment extinguishes the assignor's right and vests it in the assignee.12 Assignment is possible only once a contract has been made and the right has come into existence.13 The line therefore runs between a right that exists under a contract already made, however contingent, and a right that is only hoped for.
The construction loan shows a contingent right that still counts. A builder contracts with an owner to build a building for $10,000,000, payable as the work progresses, and needs funds at once to begin. The builder assigns the right to payment to a financial institution in return for a loan. The right has not yet been earned, since it is constructively conditioned on performance, but it arises under a contract that already exists.14
Speelman v. Pascal drew the same line for a right to profits. Pascal held contract rights to produce a musical based on Shaw's play Pygmalion and assigned a share of the profits before any of the musical existed. The court held the assignment effective, because the right to those profits arose under a contract already in place.15
A right under a contract not yet made cannot be assigned. A landscaper who has not yet secured a contract to mow Alice's lawn cannot give Taylor a right against Alice. Taylor has no rights against Alice before the contract is secured, and none afterward unless the landscaper then assigns the right to payment or Alice and the landscaper make Taylor a third-party beneficiary.16 The landscaper can bind himself to Taylor only by promising to assign the payment right once it exists, and that promise runs against the landscaper alone. Beside Pascal's case, the words of transfer may be identical; the results differ because Pascal already held a contract and the landscaper did not.
The question to put to any purported assignment of an unearned right is whether a contract is in place at the moment of the transfer. If it is, the lateness or contingency of the payment affects only when and whether the assignee can collect. If it is not, the transfer binds the transferor and gives the transferee nothing against the obligor.
Form and Gratuitous Assignments
The second half of § 324 governs form: the manifestation may be made to the assignee or to a third person on his behalf and, except as provided by statute or by contract, may be made either orally or by a writing.18 Because the first half demands a present transfer, any words that convey one will do, spoken or signed. The exceptions have real content. Article 9, for example, requires a signed writing called a security agreement when a right is assigned for security, and the financing statement (the UCC-1 form) filed under Article 9 must also be signed.19 A contract between the original parties can likewise demand a writing, a possibility taken up in the sections on contractual limits.
An assignment does not depend on a bargained-for exchange. A contract right is an asset, and its owner may sell it, donate it, or use it as collateral.20 A right that is donated has been gratuitously assigned, and the assignment takes effect when made.21
The law of gifts supplies the rules for what happens next. When Jane contracted to buy a horse from Henry and tells Tony the horse is his, property law finds no completed gift, because there is nothing to deliver. Yet Tony holds more than an unenforceable promise: if Jane's words manifested a present intent to transfer, she has gratuitously assigned him her rights under the purchase contract.22
That assignment is revocable. Agency is no longer the theory for recognizing an assignment, and the assignee enforces the right in his own name rather than as the assignor's agent, but the revocability that came with the old theory has outlasted it. It persists except where events amount to completing a gift or would make a gratuitous promise to assign enforceable.23
A gratuitous assignment comes to an end in any of these ways:
- the assignor manifests an intent to revoke, communicated to the assignee or to the obligor;
- the assignor makes a later assignment of the same right to another person;
- the assignor dies or becomes incapacitated.
Bankruptcy proceedings begun by or against the assignor also make the assignment revocable under federal bankruptcy law.24
Other developments make the assignment permanent, because each does for a right what delivery does for a horse:
- the assignee collects the performance from the obligor, as when Tony takes the horse from Henry;
- the assignee reasonably changes position in reasonable reliance on the assignment;
- in some jurisdictions, the assignor signs a writing that purports to assign the right, treated as a thing that can be delivered to complete the gift, which lawyers have labeled a "deed of gift."25
Tony's position therefore depends on the order of events. If Jane assigns the same right to someone else before Tony collects, or she dies, his rights end, though he could have enforced the right against Henry up to that moment. If Tony takes the horse first, the gift is complete and ownership is irrevocably his.
Revocability bears on how long a gratuitous assignment lasts, not on whether it took effect. Even a revocable assignment is effective, and the assignee can enforce the right up until the moment of revocation.26 Students often see the word "revocable" and conclude that the donee holds only a promise, which would leave Tony no better off than if Jane had said she would give him the horse later. The assignment operates at once, and the revocation question arises only afterward. On an exam, first confirm a present manifestation of intent under § 324, then ask whether the assignment was gratuitous, and if so, whether a revoking event came before the assignee collected or relied.