Concept
Suing Promisor, Promisee, or Both
Creditor-beneficiary remedies
Suing Promisor, Promisee, or Both
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 310(1) gives a creditor beneficiary with an enforceable claim against the promisee three choices of defendant: the promisee, the promisor, or both. Each judgment rests on that defendant's own duty to the beneficiary.1 The beneficiary needs no help from the promisee to bring any of these suits.
A running example shows how the choices work. Debtor owes Creditor $200,000 and sells land to Buyer for the same sum, and Buyer promises to pay the price to Creditor. Two duties now stand behind one sum of money. Buyer's duty comes from Buyer's promise. Debtor's duty comes from the original debt, which predates the sale and which Buyer's promise did not erase. Each defendant answers for the duty it owes, and each claim rests on its own foundation.
Because both duties point at the same $200,000, the same sentence of § 310(1) adds that satisfying either duty, or a judgment on it, satisfies the other to that extent.2 A later section develops that limit. It matters here because it explains why the options do not exclude one another: a beneficiary may hold claims against two defendants and still collect the debt once. The options follow in turn: the direct suit on the promisor's duty, the claim that survives against the promisee, and suit against both without a forced choice.
Direct Claim Against the Promisor
The first option in § 310(1) is a judgment against the promisor on the promisor's own duty to the beneficiary.3 Creditor can sue Buyer on Buyer's promise to pay the $200,000 price, and a judgment for Creditor holds that Buyer owes the sum because Buyer promised it. The suit has no preliminary steps. It requires no demand on Debtor, no prior judgment against Debtor, and no consent from Debtor, since the same sentence lists the promisee, the promisor, and both as defendants the beneficiary may choose among.
Buyer's promise was bought to get Creditor paid, and that purpose explains the direct right. Without it, only Debtor could sue Buyer, and Creditor would hold nothing but the original claim against Debtor.4 Creditor's payment would then depend on Debtor's willingness to sue, although the whole arrangement was built to put the money in Buyer's hands. A cause of action in Creditor's own name removes that dependence, and that directly enforceable right is the hallmark of a contract for the benefit of a third party.5
The right is so familiar now that it is easy to forget it once needed a justification. English common law gave the beneficiary no direct action unless the beneficiary could show that the promisee acted as the beneficiary's agent or that the contract created a trust.6 Lawrence v. Fox broke from that requirement. Holly had loaned money to Fox, and Fox promised Holly to pay the loaned sum to Lawrence, to whom Holly owed a debt. Fox did not pay, and Lawrence sued Fox and won a verdict for the loan and interest.7 Lawrence was a stranger to the Holly–Fox contract and so lacked privity, meaning a direct contractual relationship with Fox. The court nonetheless allowed the suit, recognizing that contracting parties have the power to create rights enforceable by a nonparty, even without proof of agency or a trust.8 It stated the rule this way: a third person may maintain an action on a promise made to another for the third person's benefit when the promise rests on consideration advanced by the debtor.9 In Lawrence, the consideration was Holly's loan to Fox; in the running example, it is Debtor's sale of the land to Buyer.
Later courts generally accepted the majority's analysis in Lawrence, and the plaintiff in such a case is typically called a third-party beneficiary of the defendant's promise.10 The narrower label comes from Lawrence's own position. The promise sued on grew out of the promisee's wish to satisfy an obligation he owed Lawrence, so plaintiffs of Lawrence's kind came to be called “creditor beneficiaries.”11 The first Restatement defined the category as the case where the promisor's performance would satisfy an “actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary.”12
Once the privity objection falls, a second error tempts: treating the direct claim as free of the contract it grows out of. It is not. The beneficiary acquires the right to enforce only because the parties elected to create it as part of their agreement,13 so the right takes the agreement as the parties made it. The promisor therefore may assert against the beneficiary any defense that would have been good against the promisee. Buyer promised to pay Creditor as part of a sale to Debtor, and a promise that Buyer could have avoided against Debtor does not become firmer because Debtor's creditor is the one enforcing it. Creditor loses nothing Creditor was ever promised, because the original claim against Debtor remains.
Rouse v. United States shows both the rule and its limit. Winston sold her house to Rouse, who undertook to pay a specific sum, $850, to Associated, Winston's creditor. Rouse pleaded two defenses. The first, fraud, would have been good against Winston, and the court held it available against the beneficiary too, because “one who promises to make a payment to the promisee's creditor can assert against the creditor any defense that the promisor could assert against the promisee.”14 The second, improper installation, was a defense against Associated itself, and the lower court's decision to strike it was sustained.15 The reason was that Rouse had assumed an obligation to pay a specific amount of money, not to take over a litigable claim.16 It was as if Winston had already settled with Associated and conceded she owed $850 when she sold the house; Rouse assumed the burden of that settlement and was not free to reopen it.17 The full catalog of defenses is a topic of its own. For the direct claim, the point is that a judgment against the promisor is only as good as the contract the promisor made.
Continuing Claim Against the Promisee
The second option in § 310(1) is a judgment against the promisee. Like the direct claim, it rests on a duty owed to the beneficiary, and it is available when the intended beneficiary has an enforceable claim against the promisee.19 A creditor beneficiary has one: the promisee owed the money before anyone made a promise. Debtor's duty to Creditor is the original $200,000 debt, and Buyer's promise to pay Creditor does not remove it. Creditor therefore holds two claims, the old one against Debtor and the new one against Buyer.
Buyer's promise does not discharge Debtor, because Creditor never released Debtor and never bargained for a substitute. The sale contract, to which Creditor is a stranger, cannot release Debtor on Creditor's behalf. The original obligation continues unimpaired, and Creditor may take judgment against both Debtor and Buyer while remaining entitled to one satisfaction.20 Risk allocation points the same way. Buyer may prove insolvent or unwilling, and that loss should fall on the person who chose Buyer, not on a creditor who did nothing but become the named recipient. If Debtor could escape a debt merely by finding someone to promise payment, Buyer's reliability would become Creditor's problem.
The Restatement captures this position with the label of suretyship. In a creditor-beneficiary case the promisee is surety for the promisor, and the promise is an asset of the promisee.21 A surety answers for another's obligation if the party primarily responsible fails to meet it. Between Debtor and Buyer, Buyer agreed to carry the payment and so is primarily responsible; Debtor's continuing duty to Creditor is the backstop. To the extent Buyer does not perform, Debtor remains liable for the undischarged balance.22 The suretyship idea also limits the category. A promisee who was never under a duty to the beneficiary is no surety, so a promise to satisfy a merely “supposed or asserted” duty does not make the beneficiary a creditor beneficiary under § 302(1)(a), although the beneficiary may still be an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(b).23
Some courts treat the beneficiary's pursuit of the promisor as an election that extinguishes the original debt, but the more common contemporary view holds that the beneficiary surrenders no rights against the promisee by seeking to enforce the promise against the promisor.24 The next subsection returns to that disagreement.
The practical result appears when Buyer has no assets. A judgment against Buyer cannot be collected, so Creditor proceeds against Debtor on the original loan, and Debtor owes whatever Buyer left unpaid.25 Debtor can look to Buyer on the broken promise, a right the later discussion of reimbursement develops.
Creditor can lose the claim against Debtor, but only by agreeing to lose it. The clearest form of that agreement is a novation.
A novation is a contract among all three parties that substitutes one obligor for another and releases the original obligor. Without the release, the original obligor stays answerable when the substitute performs badly or not at all.26 The two arrangements differ in whose agreement is involved. A promise from Buyer to Debtor to pay Creditor is a two-party contract, so it leaves Debtor liable unless Creditor separately agrees to release Debtor. A novation requires Creditor's own consent to give Debtor up. A fact pattern that says only that Buyer agreed to pay, or assumed the debt, describes the first arrangement and leaves Debtor liable. Language that Creditor released Debtor, or agreed to accept Buyer in place of Debtor, describes the second.
Last, the promisee-side judgment requires an enforceable claim against the promisee. Section 310(1) bases each judgment on the defendant's duty to the beneficiary, and it makes the promisee-side judgment available where the beneficiary has such a claim.27 The Restatement is more generous about who counts as a creditor beneficiary: a suretyship relation can exist even though the promisee's duty is voidable or barred by the statute of limitations, the Statute of Frauds, or a discharge in bankruptcy, and § 302(1)(a) covers those cases.28 Its first illustration has A owing C a debt barred by the statute of limitations, B promising A to pay the barred debt, and C qualifying as an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(a).29 C therefore keeps the status on which the claim against B rests, but C cannot obtain a judgment against A on a debt no court will enforce. The two questions are separate: whether the beneficiary is an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(a), and whether the beneficiary can reach the promisee. A student who answers the second by looking only at the first overlooks the enforceability requirement.
Suing Both Without Electing
The phrase “either the promisee or the promisor or both” settles whether a creditor beneficiary must pick a defendant.31 The two preceding subsections asked whether each defendant can be sued at all. This one asks whether suing one defendant costs the beneficiary the other. Nothing in § 310(1) conditions one suit on giving up the other, and the words “judgment or judgments” cover a single action against both defendants as well as separate suits in sequence. Creditor may therefore name Debtor and Buyer together, or sue either alone and pursue the other later, and each judgment rests on that defendant's own duty to Creditor.
No choice is required because the two claims arise separately. Creditor's claim against Buyer comes from Buyer's promise to pay the price, and the claim against Debtor comes from the loan. Creditor therefore has two parties against whom to seek recourse for the unpaid debt, and the right to sue Buyer is added to the right to sue Debtor, not substituted for it.32 The original obligation continues unimpaired, so Creditor may obtain judgment against both and remains entitled to a single satisfaction.33 That single-satisfaction limit makes it safe to leave both defendants available. Creditor cannot be overpaid, so the law has no need to force a choice to prevent double recovery.
A forced choice would turn the decision into a gamble. Creditor would have to pick a defendant before learning which one can pay, and the natural first target is Buyer, the one who promised. If Buyer had no assets and the suit against Buyer had extinguished the loan claim, Creditor would hold a worthless judgment and no remaining right against Debtor. Creditor never agreed to that exchange. Creditor did not bargain with Buyer to trade away the loan; the promise reached Creditor through a contract between two other people. The risk of Buyer's insolvency belongs with Debtor, who chose Buyer and, as surety, remains answerable for the undischarged balance.34 Letting both claims proceed keeps Creditor whole, and the one-satisfaction limit keeps Creditor from collecting more than the debt.
Some courts have taken the opposite position. They hold that once the creditor beneficiary elects to proceed against the promisor, the claim on the promise takes the place of the original debt and eliminates the claim against the promisee, a result sometimes labeled novation.35 The label should not be confused with the three-party novation described in the previous subsection. That arrangement depends on Creditor's own agreement to release Debtor. The election view imposes the substitution by law, as a consequence of Creditor's choice of defendant, with no release from Creditor. The more common contemporary view, expressed in § 310, is that the beneficiary surrenders no rights against the promisee by seeking to enforce the promise against the promisor, and that to the extent the promisor fails to perform, the promisee remains liable for the outstanding debt.36
The only fact that moves the result in that scene is the rule the forum applies to the beneficiary's choice. An exam question often says the creditor sued the promisor and won, then asks whether the creditor can now reach the promisee. The Restatement answer is yes: the judgment against the promisor adds a right and does not replace the original duty. What reduces the other defendant's duty is satisfaction, meaning payment, in whole or in part, of either duty or of a judgment on it. Winning a judgment is not payment.37 The next section develops how satisfaction operates.