Concept
Working Through a Defense Problem
Defenses against the beneficiary
Working Through a Defense Problem
A promisor sued by an intended beneficiary will usually raise every grievance it has against anyone connected to the deal, and an exam stem tends to hand you a mixed pile of them. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309 supplies the sorting principle. The beneficiary's right rests on the promisor-promisee contract, so defenses that go to that contract's formation or later force reach the beneficiary, and grievances from somewhere else generally do not.1 Your job is to trace each argument to its source before you decide whether it counts.
The beneficiary's right exists because a promise in a contract creates a duty that the intended beneficiary may enforce.2 That foundation can fail at two moments. A promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless promisor and promisee actually formed a contract, and if that contract was voidable or unenforceable when made, the beneficiary's right is subject to the same infirmity.3 If a contract that was sound at formation later ceases to bind in whole or in part because of impracticability, public policy, non-occurrence of a condition, or present or prospective failure of performance, the beneficiary's right is discharged or modified to that extent.4 Those two inspections come first. An argument that survives neither attacks the contract at all, and the remaining questions ask whose dealing it belongs to.
The third step does the most work on exam facts, because a promisor's list nearly always includes a grievance that sounds like a defense but comes from a dealing the beneficiary had no part in. A claim the promisor holds against the promisee on some other transaction does not travel to the beneficiary, and a dispute between the promisee and the beneficiary is not the promisor's to litigate. One qualification turns on what the promise measures. If Dan promised to pay whatever Joe legally owes Mary, the amount Joe owes sets the size of Dan's obligation. The details of the Joe-Mary transaction then become relevant, and Dan may prove defenses Joe could have raised against Mary. Dan is not borrowing Joe's defense to escape his own duty; he is proving the measure of that duty.5
Rouse shows both outcomes inside a single dispute. Rouse took on an obligation to pay $850 in connection with buying Winston's house, and the beneficiary, Associated, sued him on it. He raised two defenses. The first was fraud. The court reasoned that Rouse's liability to a third party could be no greater than his liability to the promisee, so if he could raise fraud against Winston, the same defense had to be available against the beneficiary.6 That defense passed the first inspection because it attacked the contract itself. The second defense was a claim of improper installation, and the court sustained the order striking it.7 Rouse had assumed an obligation to pay a specific sum, not to take over a litigable claim. It was as if Winston had already settled with Associated and conceded she owed $850 when she sold him the house, so Rouse took on the burden of that settlement and could not reopen it.8 The same promisor, plaintiff, and $850 produced opposite results on the two arguments, and the only variable was the dealing from which each argument came.
Take the arguments in turn. Step one finds no formation problem. The drainage defect is a failure of performance under the Ostrander-Pike contract, so step two reduces Ostrander's duty, and Lindgren's claim with it, by $4,000. The unpaid loan comes from a separate dealing between promisor and promisee, so step three keeps it out. The interest dispute belongs to Pike and Lindgren, and Ostrander promised a fixed $15,000 rather than whatever Pike legally owes, so step three excludes that argument too, just as the installation claim was excluded in Rouse. Nothing in the facts triggers steps four or five. Lindgren recovers $11,000, and Ostrander must look to Pike for the loan. A student who accepted all three arguments because the promisor raised them would gut the claim, and one who rejected all three would award the full $15,000. Only by tracing each argument to its source does the correct figure emerge.
Everything above concerns what the promisor may say once the beneficiary has made a case, and the case itself still has to be made. Qualifying as an intended beneficiary gives a right to enforce the promisor's duty,9 and enforcing a duty means showing that the promisor failed to do what the promise required. The beneficiary must therefore prove the promisor's breach; standing does not supply it.10 In Lucas v. Hamm the intended legatees had standing in tort and in contract, but the contract claim failed because the alleged error about the rule against perpetuities was one a lawyer using the requisite skill, prudence, and diligence might make, so it was not a breach.11 The contract's own terms can also limit the beneficiary's right, as with a clause requiring disputes to go to arbitration.12 In the retaining-wall problem, Lindgren's first task is to show that Ostrander has not paid. A beneficiary facing a promisor with no defense at all still loses if the promisor performed the promise as made.