Concept
Disclaimer by the Beneficiary
Identification and disclaimer
Disclaimer by the Beneficiary
A promise can leave a person holding a right she never asked for, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 306 lets her turn it down. A beneficiary who has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit may, in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and terms, render any duty to himself inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer.1 A disclaimer is the beneficiary's own refusal of the benefit. It reaches back to the start of the promise, so the promisor's duty to the beneficiary is treated as though it never arose. The section answers § 304 from the other side: § 304 gives an intended beneficiary a duty to enforce, and § 306 gives that beneficiary the power to decline it.2
The section has one effect and two conditions. The first subsection takes the power, the reason for it, and its effect. The next two take the conditions: the beneficiary must not have assented, and the refusal must come within a reasonable time after she learns of the promise and its terms.
The Power to Disclaim
The power exists because a beneficiary's right can arise without her taking part in the bargain, or even knowing of it. A right in an intended beneficiary arises, if at all, when the contract is formed. Vesting, which asks whether the promisor and promisee may later modify or rescind the arrangement, becomes an issue only if they try.3 Section 308 adds that the beneficiary need not even be identified when the contract is made, so a person may hold a right under a contract she has never heard of.4 That feature is what makes the doctrine useful, since a beneficiary who had to join the bargain could not be protected by it. It also means that two other people may have created an entitlement the recipient does not want.
Contract law handles the problem by letting parties confer rights on outsiders while denying them any power to impose duties. The arbitration cases show the pattern. An intended beneficiary can compel arbitration but cannot be compelled to arbitrate, because contractual duties bind only those who agree to them.5 Disclaimer applies the same consensual principle to the benefit itself. The contracting parties judged the benefit worth conferring without the beneficiary's participation, so the law lets the beneficiary make her own judgment and refuse it.
A timely disclaimer works retroactively. The duty to the beneficiary is treated as though it never arose.6 That differs from a release. A beneficiary who releases a right was owed the duty until she released it, while one who disclaims in time was never owed it, so there is no interval in which she held a claim. The section speaks only of the duty to the beneficiary. It does not say what becomes of the promisor's duty to the promisee, and a disclaimer should not be read to decide that question. Wills law offers a parallel: a beneficiary who disclaims a gift is treated as having predeceased the testator, and the lapse rules then apply.7
A disclaimer is something the beneficiary does, and silence is not one. A promisor who faces a beneficiary that has heard of the promise and said nothing sees no sign of refusal, and people ordinarily want benefits that come to them. Jurisdictions that tie a beneficiary's rights to knowledge and acceptance go further. If the beneficiary learns of the contract and does not expressly reject its benefits, acceptance is ordinarily presumed.8
Both beneficiaries know the promise and its terms, so knowledge cannot separate them. What separates them is whether either did anything to refuse. Two errors recur on exams. One treats a beneficiary's silence, or her failure to sue, as a disclaimer. The other treats vesting and disclaimer as a single idea. Vesting limits what the promisor and promisee may do to the beneficiary's right, while disclaimer is the beneficiary's own power to refuse it. The two conditions on that power come next.
No Prior Assent
The first condition looks to the beneficiary's own conduct: the power belongs only to a beneficiary who "has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit."10 Assent is the beneficiary's act of accepting the promised benefit, and a beneficiary who has performed it no longer holds the power the rest of the section describes. The power exists because a right can arise in a person who took no part in the bargain. Once she does take part by assenting, that reason is spent.
Assent also changes everyone else's position. A beneficiary who accepts tells the contracting parties that she wants the benefit, and they may arrange their affairs on that footing: the promisee may stop looking for other ways to provide for her, and the promisor may plan its performance around her. If she could undo an acceptance already given, she would hold a free option. She could keep the benefit when it turns out well and refuse it when it does not, while the others bore the cost of relying on her word.
The law of vesting expresses the same idea from the other side. Once a right has vested, the beneficiary has a direct claim against the promisor and may enforce it if the promisor fails to perform.11 Under the Restatement (Second), the promisor and promisee lose their freedom to modify or cancel the right when the beneficiary manifests assent at the request of one of them, sues on the promise, or materially changes position in justifiable reliance on it.12 The two rules mirror each other. The assent that protects her right against modification also ends her power to refuse it, because she cannot hold a protected right and a freedom to walk away from it at the same time.
Section 306 does not borrow that whole list, so keep the two questions apart. The disclaimer clause asks only whether the beneficiary previously assented. Suit and reliance bear on vesting, which governs what the promisor and promisee may do to the right. A beneficiary who sues on the promise or builds her plans around it may well have assented in fact, and those acts are strong evidence of it, but the text of § 306 speaks only of assent. A good answer therefore asks whether the facts show assent and does not announce that a lawsuit or reliance automatically bars a disclaimer. A neutral reply is no assent either, since a beneficiary who says only that she needs time to think has accepted nothing.
What separates the two beneficiaries is something each of them did. Lena has said nothing that accepts the promise, and Dev has said something that does. Lena's power is still not unlimited, because she must use it within a reasonable time after she learns of the promise, as the next subsection explains.
Where assent ends and vesting begins depends on the jurisdiction, so an answer should say which rule it applies. Under the original Restatement, a creditor beneficiary's right vested when she brought an action to enforce the contract or materially changed position before learning of a discharge or modification, which required injurious reliance.13 The Restatement (Second) replaced that approach with a single rule for every intended beneficiary, the one just described.14 Olson v. Etheridge adopted that formulation, while Biggins v. Shore kept immediate vesting for donee beneficiaries on the ground that it fits the idea of a gift.15 Another view vests a creditor beneficiary's right once she learns of the contract and assents to it, and it seems preferable because a beneficiary who has assented is likely to rely in subtle ways that are hard to prove.16 Some authority goes further and suggests that mere notification may be enough for a creditor beneficiary, who would relax her own efforts to collect once told that someone else has agreed to pay.17
Immediate vesting needs a warning. A rule that fixes the beneficiary's right at formation tells you what the promisor and promisee may do to that right. It does not show that she assented, so a beneficiary who has never heard of the promise has not lost her power to disclaim merely because her right vested at formation. The effect runs the other way in a jurisdiction that presumes acceptance from knowledge and silence. There a beneficiary who hears of the promise and says nothing may be treated as having accepted, and a beneficiary who wants out should refuse expressly and promptly.
Reasonable Time After Learning
The second condition is timing. A beneficiary who has not previously assented may disclaim only "in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and terms."19 That clause does two jobs. It fixes the moment the clock starts, which is when the beneficiary learns both that the promise exists and what it provides. It also fixes how long the clock runs, which is a reasonable time and nothing more exact. The text names no number of days or months, so on any set of facts the answer comes from asking what the clause is for.
The clock starts at learning, and not at formation, because of when the right comes into being. A right in an intended beneficiary arises when the contract is formed, whether or not the beneficiary has heard of it.20 Section 308 carries that point to its limit by allowing the right to arise before the beneficiary has even been identified.21 A period that began at formation could expire before such a beneficiary ever heard of the promise, and the power to disclaim would then be worthless to the people who most need it, those who took no part in the bargain. Starting the period at learning gives a beneficiary who was unidentified or unaware at formation a real chance to refuse.
Learning that the promise exists is not enough to start the period, because the text requires knowledge of its terms as well. Refusal is a decision about a particular benefit, and a beneficiary who has heard only that someone has promised her something cannot tell how much it is, what it requires of her, or whether it carries consequences for her other affairs. A beneficiary who has caught a secondhand report that a promise exists, without the amount, the conditions, or the identity of the person who must perform, has therefore not yet learned its terms, and the period has not begun to run against her.
The same clause that protects a beneficiary's ignorance also limits her delay. A promisor must plan to perform for someone, and a promisee may be deciding whether to make other arrangements for the beneficiary, so both need to know within a reasonable period whether the performance will go to her. Without a time limit, the beneficiary would hold the same free option that the no-prior-assent condition guards against. She could keep the benefit while it looks attractive and refuse it later if it turns sour, while the contracting parties bore the cost of planning around her silence. The limit turns that option into a decision she must make while the others can still adjust.
Because § 306 supplies no fixed period, a court measures reasonableness against that purpose, and an answer should not announce a set number of days. Three questions follow from what the clause protects, though they are reasoning from the clause and not a list the text supplies. The first is how promptly she acted, measured from the day she learned the promise and its terms. The second is whether the promisor or promisee changed position in the meantime, since protecting their planning is the reason for the limit. The third is whether she treated the benefit as her own, which signals keeping and not refusing. That last question can overlap with the first condition, because conduct that treats the benefit as hers may amount to assent, which would end the power altogether. A late disclaimer can therefore fail on timing even when no assent is found. In jurisdictions that presume acceptance when a beneficiary learns of the contract and does not expressly reject its benefits, unexplained silence can also be read as acceptance, which narrows the window further.22
The usual trap is the starting point of the interval. A beneficiary who refuses a year after learning of the promise and one who refuses three years after the contract was signed may be in very different positions, as the facts below show.
Tomas refused three years after formation and succeeds, while Rena refused a year after learning and fails. Only the interval after learning counts, and only Rena's interval was filled with reliance by others and with conduct that treated the benefit as hers.