Concept
Identification of the Beneficiary
Identification and disclaimer
Identification of the Beneficiary
A third party who sues on someone else’s contract must prove that she is an intended beneficiary. A natural first guess is that the contract has to point to her, by name or by a description that fits one person on the day it is signed. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 308 rejects that guess: it is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made.1
The section completes a doctrine already in hand. Under § 304, a promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary, who may enforce it,2 so every beneficiary case turns on the word “intended.” Section 308 says what that word does not demand.
Three points follow. A beneficiary who cannot yet be named can hold an enforceable right. That beneficiary must still be findable when performance comes due. And a claimant who is named, or described down to a single person, has not yet proved anything about intent. In each point, identification is evidence of intent and never a substitute for it.
Naming Is Not Required
The rule follows from the test that decides who holds a right at all. A claimant is an intended beneficiary if recognizing a right of performance in her is appropriate to carry out the parties’ intention and the circumstances indicate that the promisee means her to have the benefit of the promised performance.3 Both halves of that test look to intent. Neither asks for a name.
A name is strong evidence of intent, which is why a named claimant usually clears the point quickly. It is still only evidence, and the intent can exist without it. Promisees often know whom they want to benefit before they can say which individuals those will be: a client who orders a will has not yet written down every gift. A naming requirement would exclude such arrangements and protect no one, because the promisor owes the same performance whether or not the recipient’s name appears on the page.
Will-drafting contracts show why the rule matters. Suppose a will fails because its drafter botched the job. The disappointed legatee was not a creditor of the estate, and an invalid will gives him no testamentary rights; if he has any recourse for the lost inheritance, it runs against the drafter, whose incompetence would have given the client a malpractice claim.4 The drafting contract was made between lawyer and testator, and when it was made the will did not exist, so the persons it would later benefit could not yet be named. In Lucas v. Hamm, the California Supreme Court rejected a decision that beneficiaries damaged by a drafting error cannot recover as third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the draftsman and the testator.5 The court reasoned that the main purpose of a will-drafting contract is to transfer the testator’s estate to the beneficiaries named in the will, so it is improper to hold that the testator intended only “remotely” to benefit them. It also observed that performance under a contract for a third person’s benefit usually goes directly to the beneficiary, but not necessarily. Here the lawyer’s work goes to the testator, and the legatees take the benefit through the will.
The ordinary beneficiary, by contrast, is someone everyone knows. In one old will dispute, a Judge swore that if Mrs. Beman would sign the will already prepared, he would leave enough to the niece in his own will “to make up the difference.” Mrs. Beman signed and died. When the Judge himself died, he had left the niece nothing, and she sued his estate for the value of the real estate, which was found to be $6,000.6 Nobody in that dispute needed § 308 to say who the niece was. The section matters when the beneficiary’s identity is still unsettled at formation.
Class language produces a different kind of anonymity. In Sisney v. Reisch, a current inmate sued on a settlement agreement between the Department of Corrections and a former inmate, alleging that officials breached it by not providing him with pre-packaged, certified kosher meals. The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed a dismissal, concluding that Sisney had pleaded facts supporting the inference that he was a third-party beneficiary of an agreement he had not made.7 Arbitration clauses work the same way. Consumers who bought plane tickets on Hotwire agreed to arbitrate claims against “companies offering products or services through us (which are beneficiaries of this arbitration agreement),” and American Airlines relied on that clause to compel arbitration of consumers’ pandemic-cancellation claims.8 The clause names no airline. It identifies its beneficiaries by a trait that can be checked later: offering services through Hotwire.
A third pattern puts the beneficiary outside the document altogether. In Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc., a jeweler sold a ring to a customer, knowing it was an engagement ring but not knowing who the fiancée was. The ring proved to be imitation, and the fiancée sued the jeweler directly on the sale. What could carry her claim was the circumstances. A seller who knows what a purchase is for has reason to see that the buyer means the recipient to have the performance, which is the inference § 302(1)(b) describes.9
Now the claimant who fails.
The contracting parties may have been pleased, indifferent, or resentful to see someone else benefit from their contract, but they did not make it for the purpose of giving that person a right to sue.10 The neighbor is exactly as anonymous at formation as the future legatee, so anonymity cannot be what separates them. The testator meant to benefit the legatees, and the owner and contractor never meant to give the neighbor anything. Section 308 removes the naming requirement and leaves the intent requirement where it was.
That leaves an unnamed claimant with work to do. If the parties meant to confer intended-beneficiary status, the person is likely to be named or identified in the contract, so a failure to identify her raises a strong inference that the benefit is merely incidental. The inference is not inevitable, because intent to benefit is a matter of interpretation.11 The claimant overcomes it with other evidence of intent: the nature of the contract, as with the will; language describing a class; or the promisor’s knowledge of what the performance is for.
One corner of the law does ask for a name. Under the modern trend in estate-planning malpractice, a lawyer’s duty extends beyond the client to intended beneficiaries. A handful of jurisdictions, worried that the trend would expose estate planners to too many baseless claims from frustrated beneficiaries, extend duty and privity only to intended beneficiaries identified in the testator’s estate planning instruments, typically a will or trust.12 That limit concerns who may hold a lawyer to account, and the general rule in § 308 is unaffected.
Identifiable by Performance
Section 308 speaks only to the moment of contracting, and a student who stops at its words may conclude that a beneficiary never has to be identified at all. That goes too far. The qualification stated in the commentary is that the beneficiary need not be identified when the contract is made but must be identifiable when the time for performance falls due.14 Identification is deferred, not dispensed with. The later-identifiability condition comes from that commentary and not from the text of § 308, so on an exam attribute the formation rule to the section and present the condition as the limit that goes with it.
Performance is where the promisor’s practical problem arises. A promisor can live with a beneficiary who is a stranger at signing, because nothing need be delivered until performance comes due. It cannot live with a beneficiary who is still a stranger that day, for it can neither perform nor know when it has finished. A court faces the same difficulty when a claimant appears: the contract’s description, read with the circumstances, has to sort the claimant from everyone else. The condition also protects the intent requirement. A promisee who truly means to benefit someone can usually describe that someone, even if only by class or by a future event, and a description that never picks out anyone is weak evidence that the parties meant any particular claimant to hold a right.
A promisor that learns the beneficiary’s identity while performing shows the condition at work. In Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Associates, Inc., MidAmerica Savings Bank hired Hayes Appraisal to monitor the progress of new home construction for Susan and Rollin Vogan, who had obtained a construction loan from the bank.15 The Vogans were the plaintiffs, and the bank’s contract was with Hayes. Even if nothing in that contract named them, the job itself pointed to them: it was the monitoring of one house being built for particular borrowers, so anyone doing the work would learn for whom it was done. Whether the bank meant to give the Vogans a right to enforce is a separate question, the one § 302(1)(b) asks about the promisee’s purpose.16
The condition does its screening work when a description cannot resolve into a person by the time payment is owed.
The two scenes are equally anonymous at formation, so anonymity at signing cannot separate them. They part ways on the day performance is owed: the first description resolves to one person, and the second never does. The second scene also differs from the neighbor above. The neighbor lost because the parties never meant to benefit anyone outside their bargain. The strangers lose because even a promisee who wished to benefit an outsider has described no one, and a right needs a holder that the promisor and a court can find.
Identifiability at performance is necessary for an unnamed claimant, but it does not finish the analysis. It shows that someone can receive the performance, and the claimant must still show that the parties meant the contract to give that person an enforceable right. The usual exam error is sorting claimants into named and unnamed. The better question is whether the claimant will be identifiable when performance falls due, and whether the parties meant her to have a right.
Naming Is Not Enough
The opposite error treats identification as proof. A claimant who is named, or described down to one person, has told the court who she is but not whether the parties meant her to be able to sue. The right belongs only to an intended beneficiary,18 and a contract is for a third party’s benefit only if it manifests the parties’ intent to give that party a benefit directly enforceable against the promisor.19 The rest of the agreement and the circumstances answer whether it does.
Identification and intent must stay apart because parties name outsiders for many reasons that have nothing to do with enforcement: to describe the subject matter, to recite who will be affected, or to allocate a cost. If every mention carried a right to sue, a promisor pricing a bargain would face claims from anyone the paperwork touched. Foreseeing a benefit is no better. A promisor can nearly always foresee who will gain from its performance, and parties who are pleased, indifferent, or resentful about an outsider’s gain have not for that reason made the contract to give the outsider a right to sue.20
Both outsiders are named, so the name cannot separate them. The purpose of the contract does.
The same inmate lost on a different contract. In Sisney v. State, Sisney alleged that CBM breached its contract with the State to provide food services at Department of Corrections facilities, and he sought damages as a third-party beneficiary. The circuit court dismissed, concluding that he was not a third-party beneficiary who could enforce a public contract, and the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, finding no third-party beneficiary status.21 Sisney was as identifiable there as in Reisch: he was an inmate who ate the food. The two decisions came from the same court in the same year, and one let him proceed while the other did not. What differs is the contract. One was a settlement between the department and a former inmate over kosher meals, and the other was a vendor’s contract to feed the institution generally. Showing that he would benefit from performance did not carry him through the second.
Being one of many who benefit defeats intent in private contracts too. Kelly, a health care provider, claimed the benefit of Green’s policy with Prudential. It did not allege, and could not argue, that Prudential and Green “clearly and definitely” intended to confer the policy’s benefits on it, because Kelly was only one member of a large class of health care providers and at best a potential and incidental, never an intended, beneficiary.22 Class membership helped the airlines earlier because the arbitration clause itself called the class beneficiaries. It did nothing for Kelly, who pointed to no comparable sign that the policy’s parties meant to benefit providers as a class.
Foreseeability has its own cautionary case. In Grigerik v. Sharpe, according to the evidence (Sharpe denied it), Lang told Sharpe that he needed a site plan to obtain approval of his land as a building lot and that he had a buyer if the town granted approval. The plan was prepared and approved by the sanitarian, and the sale went through.23 On that evidence Sharpe knew a buyer was waiting on his work. The fact shows that the buyer, Grigerik, would benefit. It does not show that Lang and Sharpe meant him to be able to sue. Lang’s stated reason was his own: he needed approval to close a sale. Telling Sharpe a buyer was waiting explained the urgency, but it did not say Lang was contracting for the buyer’s benefit. A buyer in that position must find evidence of intent elsewhere in the contract or its circumstances.
A name does real work when it arrives with other evidence of intent. Russell’s injury claim was settled by what the court called the DCS agreement. In its first numbered paragraph, Russell alleged that he had incurred medical expenses as a result of the injury that gave rise to the settlement, among them “Sacred Heart Hospital, Eugene, OR [$]98,872.50.”24 The court said a jury could infer from the extent of Russell’s injuries, the treatment provided, and the size of the bills that the parties to the agreement intended to ensure that someone would pay the plaintiff. It added that Russell’s testimony that the plaintiff’s services saved his life let the jury infer that Russell, at least, intended the plaintiff to be paid by Aetna.25 The name did not carry the claim alone. It sat next to an amount, in a settlement of the very injury that produced the bill. The useful question about any named or precisely described claimant is what the contract and its circumstances do with the name.