Concept
Proving Intent in Practice
Intended or incidental beneficiary
Proving Intent in Practice
Whether an outsider can enforce a promise depends on a fact the parties rarely write down: what they meant to do about enforcement. Section 302(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes a beneficiary intended only if recognizing a right to performance in that person is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention and one of two further conditions is also met.1 The consequences of the finding differ sharply. A promise creates a duty in the promisor to every intended beneficiary, who may enforce it, while an incidental beneficiary acquires no right against the promisor or the promisee.2
The parties can settle the question either way, because § 302(1) opens with the words “unless otherwise agreed.” Most contracts say nothing about outsiders, and a court must then read intent from the language of the agreement and the circumstances around it. The first subsection below collects the general evidence of intent. The next three apply it to government contracts, to construction chains and bonds, and to lawyers' will-drafting engagements. These settings differ in who the claimant is, who else could enforce the promise, and how much liability the promisor would face if everyone who gained could sue. The § 302 test stays the same in each; the typical evidence and the usual direction of the inference change.
Language and Circumstances
Intent to give a third party enforcement rights is a matter of interpretation, like any other contract term. Express language controls. Without it, a court reads the facts and, if they are inconclusive, construes what the parties must reasonably have intended, applying an objective test.3 The first Restatement used the same objective lens for donee beneficiaries: a third party could sue when it appeared from the terms and context that the promisee's purpose was to make a gift to that person, because a reasonable promisor would understand that a breach would chiefly injure the donee.4 The Restatement (Second) steered courts away from the mechanical creditor and donee categories toward a more flexible inquiry into whether the claimant is intended or incidental.5
Five questions organize the evidence that recurs in the opinions. Each is evidence on the central issue, and none is an element the claimant must prove:
- Does the contract name the claimant, or make the claimant identifiable by the time performance falls due?
- Does performance run directly to the claimant?
- Does the contract's language treat the claimant as holding rights under it?
- Does the claimant's relationship to the promisee explain why the promisee would want to benefit the claimant?
- Does the contract's enforcement scheme leave enforcement to the contracting parties?
Each question tells the promisor something at signing. A named claimant, direct performance, rights extended to the claimant, and a relationship that supplies a motive all make it likelier that the parties meant to give an enforcement right. A contract that routes enforcement through one party or a designated process points the other way, because a private suit would defeat the structure the parties chose. The demand for clear evidence also protects the promisor's ability to know its exposure when it signs. A promisor cannot weigh the expectations of myriad unnamed outsiders when it calculates the risk of its undertaking, and contract law is not directly concerned with the wealth effects of a breach on non-parties.6 The cases below show how small differences in drafting or setting move the answer.
A named claimant gives the promisor the clearest notice of whom it may answer to. If the parties mean to confer intended status on someone, they will likely name or identify that person, and when no one is named the strong inference is that the benefit is incidental. The inference is not inevitable. A claimant who will be identifiable when performance falls due can still be an intended beneficiary, despite the lack of identification at signing.7 The promisor needs a bounded, knowable group, and a class fixed by the time of performance can be counted as readily as a list of names, while “anyone who might someday gain” cannot.
Naming and purpose together explain two cases that look alike at first. In Cianciotto v. Hospice Care Network, a terminally ill father contracted with a hospice for six months of care, and the hospice ended its services after a few weeks. The contract recognized his daughter by name as his primary caregiver and contemplated that the hospice's care would relieve her of the burden of looking after him, so a New York court let her pursue a claim as an intended beneficiary.8 In Taylor v. Honda Motorcars, Inc., an Ohio appellate court denied an independent claim to Marcia Taylor, who was not a party to the car lease her husband Eric alone had signed, although both spouses chose the car and told the dealer it was for her use.9 Telling the dealer who would drive the car, and helping select it, did not suffice without language or circumstances showing an intent to give her a right to enforce the lease.10 In both cases the promisee wanted to help a family member and the promisor knew who that person was, so those facts did not separate them. The contract did. The hospice agreement recognized the daughter in a role tied to the very service being bought, and its purpose was to relieve her; the lease treated the wife as the person who would use the car. A promisee's wish that someone enjoy the performance explains the motive for the bargain. It becomes evidence of an intended right only when the contract or its setting ties that motive to enforcement.
The contract's enforcement machinery is the last category of evidence, and it points away from third-party rights when it routes the consequence of breach through one party or a designated process. In Jackson v. American Plaza Corp., users of an online classified-advertising site sued a competitor for repetitive postings that violated the site's terms of use. The terms conferred no enforcement rights on other users, said that the consequence of repetitive posting was that the site would block the postings, and left a dissatisfied user no recourse except to stop using the site. Read as a whole, the prohibition existed to protect the site's infrastructure from overload, so the court held that the plaintiffs were not intended beneficiaries.11 A suit by a user would add a remedy the parties designed their contract to omit, and it would expose the promisor to claimants the chosen mechanism was built to exclude.
Because the test turns on what the contract and its setting show, the parties control how predictable the result is. A contract that names the claimants as beneficiaries makes them likely beneficiaries, and one that states that the parties intend to confer a cause of action on them lets them sue.12 A drafter who wants the opposite can say that the contract confers no rights on anyone but the parties, and the opening words of § 302(1) give that statement effect.13 The litigated cases are the ones in which the parties left the question to interpretation.
Government Contracts
Section 302(1) governs a contract with a government as it governs a private one, and § 313(1) says so directly: the same rules apply except to the extent that applying them would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.15 Because the rules are the same, the difference lies in how the facts line up. A government contracts on behalf of the public, so nearly every government contract can be said to intend a benefit to citizens or to a group whose interests the contract advances. That intent is almost always present, and it settles nothing, because § 302(1) asks whether the parties meant to create an independent right of enforcement in the citizen who is suing.16
Courts read the terms in context, and in a government contract the context includes any statute, regulation, or ordinance that authorizes the transaction and may provide for or preclude citizen enforcement. Courts then add a presumption: citizens who benefit from a government contract are presumed to be incidental beneficiaries. A citizen who wants to overcome the presumption must point to clear intent, in the contract or in the authorizing legislation, to give the class of citizens to which the claimant belongs a right of enforcement, and in cases of doubt a court will read the contract as not making citizens intended beneficiaries.17 Where a statute allows third-party suits only on a contract “made expressly for the benefit of a third person,” the intent to benefit the third party likewise must be clearly manifested.18
One reason for the presumption is the government's own interest. A government that has contracted can be expected to prefer to do its own enforcing and to reserve the right to rescind or modify the contract or to decide the manner and extent of enforcement. An independent claim in every citizen would take those choices away, which is why a court may doubt that a right of action is “appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties.”19
The classic application is H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., where a city contracted with a water company to supply water, including water at fire hydrants, and a citizen sued the company after a fire spread to the citizen's warehouse because the company failed to supply enough water to a hydrant.20 Judge Cardozo found no creditor beneficiary, because the city owed the citizen no duty to supply water at hydrants. He found no donee beneficiary either, because despite an obvious interest in the company's performance, the contract did not show an intention that the company would answer to individual citizens, as well as to the city, for loss from a failure to perform.21 His policy reason was that if every citizen could sue, the field of obligation would expand beyond reasonable limits and the company would bear a crushing burden.22 The warehouse owner's stake in performance was enormous, which confirms a point from the incidental-beneficiary discussion: how much a claimant cares about performance is not the variable. The rule also leaves the company a way to protect itself, since it can refuse to contract unless the city agrees to a term barring citizen suits.23
The same result follows when a contract speaks to citizens but routes enforcement elsewhere. In Cooper v. Charter Communications Entertainments I, LLC, customers sued their cable provider for failing to give credits for a period when a severe snowstorm disrupted service. They argued that they were intended beneficiaries of a licensing agreement between the city and the provider that required the provider to grant the credits and to pay the credited amount directly to customers.24 The First Circuit accepted that the contract was meant to benefit consumers of the cable service, but the agreement set out an enforcement process that provided only for enforcement by the city, which made clear that the parties did not intend to confer a private right of enforcement on customers.25 Payment was to run straight to the customers, yet a clause sending enforcement to the city told the provider that the city alone would hold it to the promise. That is the difference between an intent to benefit the public and an intent to let the public sue.
Benefit to a defined and sympathetic group does not change the analysis. Irrigators in Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n v. Patterson claimed to be intended beneficiaries of a government agency's contract with a power company for the management of a dam, and they lost. One goal of the contract was to satisfy the government's duty to water users, but the contract had other aims too, and nothing in it rebutted the presumption.26 In Edwards v. Aurora Loan Services, LLC, the plaintiffs invoked a contract between the Treasury and loan servicers that obliged the servicers to modify the mortgages of homeowners in danger of foreclosure. They did not carry their burden, because the contract's language did not demonstrate a clear intent to confer enforcement rights on the citizens who benefited.27
Two South Dakota decisions involving the same inmate, Sisney, show the presumption holding and yielding on the strength of contract language. In Sisney v. State, the contract was a public contract between the State and a private company. The court observed that every member of the public is to some extent intended to benefit from a government contract, so inmates generally cannot enforce public contracts, and a right of enforcement must arise from the plain and clear language of the contract.28 Nothing in the contract indicated that it was made for Sisney's direct benefit or enforcement. It reflected that it was made for the express benefit of the State, so any benefit to inmates was collective and incidental.29 In Sisney v. Reisch, by contrast, a settlement agreement between the corrections department and a former inmate committed the department to provide kosher meals “to all Jewish inmates who request it,” and added that inmates who request a kosher diet will receive kosher meals regardless of custody status.30 The court held that this language, which identifies a class and commits the promisor to every member of it, supported an inference of intent to provide more than an incidental benefit. Sisney, who alleged that he belonged to the class, therefore stated a third-party beneficiary claim at the pleading stage.31 The claimant was the same in both cases, so the difference lies in what the agreements say.
Rebuttal evidence comes from the same places that signal intent in any contract: express language, the enforcement scheme, and the authorizing law. Language can make the promisor answerable to individuals. In Keefer v. Lombardi, injured citizens could sue a contractor on its contract with a city because the contract made the contractor responsible for “any and all loss and damage sustained by any person or party” during or after the work.32 That clause supplies what Moch found missing: a promise that the contractor would answer to individuals. New York cases likewise treat a contract as clearly evidencing an intent to permit enforcement by a third party when it fixes the rate or price at which the third party can obtain services or goods, as in Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., even though the promisee owed the third party no duty.33
A Restatement illustration shows purpose doing the same work. A municipality, with the purpose of preventing harm to landowners downstream from its sewage system, obtains from a plant operator a promise to remove specified wastes from its deposits into the system, and a downstream landowner is an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(b).34 The stated purpose carries the result. The downstream owners are also a defined group the operator can identify when it signs, so its exposure is bounded in a way that exposure to every resident of the city would not be. Some courts have found rights in home buyers under a government contract requiring a builder to meet minimum standards for a class of buyers such as military veterans, and in apartment tenants under a federal agency's financing contract with an owner. Later decisions are less sympathetic and, when damages are sought, ask whether the contract itself suggests an intention to confer the right on a third party.35
Statutes can push in either direction, which is why § 313(1) treats the authorizing law as context. An ordinance or license that sets up a city-only enforcement process, like the one in Cooper, supports the presumption. In the other direction, an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, can require recognition of a right in the beneficiary without regard to the parties' intention.36 Section 313(1) also withholds the ordinary § 302 rules to the extent that applying them would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing remedies for its breach.37
In an exam problem, a stem that says a city contracted for the benefit of its residents has handed you the part that is almost always true. Your task is to find whether anything in the contract, its enforcement scheme, or the law that authorized it lets residents sue. Absent that, a resident whose business burned, whose street flooded, or whose cable service lapsed is an incidental beneficiary who acquires no right against the promisor or the promisee, and the contract's silence about citizen suits works in the contractor's favor.38
Construction Chains and Bonds
Construction projects run on chains of contracts, and the Restatement's illustrations on incidental beneficiaries use that chain as a leading example. When one party contracts to erect a building for an owner, and a lumber supplier then contracts with the builder to furnish lumber for it, the owner is an incidental beneficiary of the supplier's promise, and the supplier is an incidental beneficiary of the owner's promise to pay the builder.40
The vocabulary of the chain is worth fixing at the outset. The owner contracts with a general contractor, who agrees to deliver the finished building and in turn hires subcontractors, specialists who perform a portion of the work such as plumbing or electrical, and buys materials from suppliers. Each contract is made with the party next to it, and none connects the owner to the people at the bottom. Any beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary is incidental, and an incidental beneficiary acquires no right against the promisor or the promisee.41 So the question for each person in the chain is whether the promise being enforced was made with that person's enforcement in mind. The ordinary answer is no, and the principal exception is the payment bond.
Begin with the owner's side of the chain. The owner's promise runs to the general contractor and is a promise to pay for the construction of the building. It does not extend to discharging the general contractor's separate obligations to the plumber, so the plumber has no claim on it.42 The reason is a matter of risk. The owner could not have known the costs and profit expectations of subcontractors who might number in the dozens and whose identities it might never learn. A rule giving the subcontractors an enforceable right would impose a risk the owner did not and could not take into account when it agreed to the price.43
The same reasoning runs up the chain. If the plumber fails to perform and the owner sues the plumber for the profit and other costs lost on the building, the owner meets the same barrier, because the plumber promised the general contractor to do the plumbing and did not promise to erect a building. The plumber answers to the general contractor for the difference between the subcontract price and the higher price paid for replacement plumbing, and does not assume the owner's profit expectations, which would likely exceed the value of the plumbing contract itself.44 An exam stem will often stress how heavily a subcontractor depends on the owner's money, or point out that the money eventually reaches the subcontractor. Neither fact moves the line. Payment to the general contractor is the price of the general contractor's work, just as the manufacturer in the Restatement's car illustration is paid and remains incidental.45 The unpaid subcontractor is not left without recourse, since it has its subcontract against the general contractor. Against a private owner, unpaid workers, subcontractors, and suppliers can also file mechanics' liens, which are claims against the building itself that may be foreclosed, although they ordinarily have no personal action against the owner.46 That lien is the key to the bond exception.
A surety bond changes the promise being enforced. When a general contractor undertakes a substantial project, the owner commonly requires the contractor to obtain a bond. The general contractor and the surety, the party that answers if the contractor defaults, are the promisors, the owner is the promisee, and the beneficiaries are those named in the bond, normally workers, subcontractors, and suppliers.47 A payment bond, the type most likely to create third-party beneficiaries, is conditioned on the contractor's paying those named, and the surety promises to pay if the contractor does not.48 In the Restatement's illustration, a homeowner contracts with a builder, and the builder and its surety sign a payment bond promising the homeowner that all of the builder's debts for labor and materials on the house will be paid. The builder later employs a carpenter and buys lumber from a supplier, and both are intended beneficiaries of the surety's promise to the homeowner, whether or not they have power to create liens on the house.49
A payment bond reverses each feature that made the subcontractor incidental in the ordinary chain. The promise runs in terms to the very people who are claiming, so the promisors know exactly whom they answer to. The debts guaranteed are the contractor's own, so the surety weighs its risk against claims it agreed to cover. And the owner has an evident reason to want the claimants able to enforce, because payment removes the possibility of a mechanics' lien on the owner's property.50 The Restatement groups this kind of promise with a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee's property or to satisfy the duty of a third person: a beneficiary who would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right is an intended beneficiary.51
Public projects give the exception a statutory footing. Public property is generally exempt from mechanics' liens, so an unpaid subcontractor on a public job has no lien to fall back on, and the United States and other public entities have enacted statutes requiring payment bonds on construction projects. Because those statutes exist to protect the workers and suppliers, bonds given under them are generally held to make those parties third-party beneficiaries, and if a public entity neglects the statute, a person the statute protects is an intended beneficiary of the contract with the general contractor.52 The Restatement makes the same point in recognizing that an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, can require a right in the beneficiary without regard to the parties' intention.53
The exception reaches only as far as the bond's words reach. For a private owner the decisions are not uniform. Some courts conclude that workers and suppliers are incidental beneficiaries, often because of how the particular bond is worded, while others protect the owner by treating them as intended beneficiaries, since the promisors are then bound to pay them and payment removes the lien threat.54 Because a payment bond is the type most likely to create third-party beneficiaries, a claimant suing on another type of bond, such as a performance bond that assures the owner of completion or damages, must find a promise to pay claims like its own in the bond's language. Holdings are likewise not uniform when a subcontractor furnishes the general contractor with a payment bond and the question is whether the parties named in it are beneficiaries.55
Will Drafting and Nonclients
The contract between a client and a lawyer to draft a will is the best-known professional-services setting in which courts find an intended beneficiary. Under § 302(1), the claimant is intended if recognizing a right to performance is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention.57 The leading decision, Lucas v. Hamm, held that intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testamentary rights because the drafting attorney failed to carry out his contract with the testator may recover as third-party beneficiaries.58 The client is the testator, who hired and paid the lawyer. The claimant is a person the will names to take property, who never dealt with the lawyer and gave nothing for the lawyer's promise. Whether that outsider holds a right depends on the two questions earlier sections used to find intent: what the promisee meant to accomplish by obtaining the promise, and who else could enforce it.
The first question is purpose, and the answer is unusually clear. A will-drafting contract exists to move the testator's property to the people the will names, so the persons who take under the finished document are the people for whose benefit the lawyer's work is done. The Lucas court reasoned that the testator's main purpose in making the agreement is to benefit the persons named in the will, and that this purpose can be effectuated, after a breach by the attorney, only by giving them a right of action.59 The result fits § 302(1)(b), under which a beneficiary is intended where the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance, because a testator who leaves a legacy is making a gift and hires the lawyer to complete it.60 Performance runs to the testator, since the lawyer hands over a will and not money to the legatee, but performance need not be rendered directly to the beneficiary. The Lucas court gave as an example a life insurance policy that lapsed because a bank failed to pay the premiums as it had agreed, after which the beneficiaries could recover against the bank.61
The promisor's side of the intent inquiry is just as easy. A contract to draft a will unmistakably shows the testator's intent to benefit the persons the will names, and the attorney necessarily understands that. After calling earlier language in two cases unnecessary to the decisions and unfortunate, the court said that insofar as intent to benefit a third person matters, it is sufficient that the promisor must have understood the promisee to have that intent.62 That is the objective measure described earlier in this chapter. A lawyer asked to put a particular gift into a will has been told exactly what the gift is for, so no separate promise to the legatee is needed.
The second question, who else could enforce, supplies the policy reason for a direct right. Once the testator has died, the estate has no interest in pursuing a claim against the attorney, and the disappointed taker is the only party positioned to hold the attorney accountable for the breach.63 If that person could not enforce the contract, the lawyer would keep a fee for work that failed to accomplish the very transfer the fee purchased, and no one would answer for the failure. In the terms of § 302(1), recognizing a right is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention precisely because the intention would otherwise be defeated.64 The lawyer's exposure is also bounded, because it runs only to the people named in the document the lawyer was hired to prepare.
Other courts reach the same result, and one of them shows where the reasoning stops. In Hale v. Groce, an attorney breached the contract by failing to draw the client's will as instructed, a legatee lost the legacy the client intended for him, and the Oregon Supreme Court held the legatee an intended beneficiary of the lawyer-client contract with an independent claim for the breach.65 In Guy v. Liederbach, the attorney had the named beneficiary of a will sign it as a witness, which voided her legacy. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that a legatee does not become a third-party beneficiary merely by being named in a will, yet it found her intended because, without a right to enforce, no one would hold the attorney accountable: the testator was dead and the estate had no incentive to sue.66 The qualification in Guy shows what carries the result. Appearing in the will is evidence of the testator's purpose to benefit the legatee, and the missing enforcer is the reason a direct claim is appropriate. Recognizing the right also settles only who may sue. In Lucas itself, the court went on to hold that an attorney is not liable to the client or to a beneficiary for errors of the kind alleged there, so a legatee must still prove that the lawyer breached the duty owed under the contract.67
Many courts stop short of this result, or demand more, because of a concern about the lawyer's loyalty. The ordinary rule is that a lawyer's duty of reasonable competence runs to the client, so a nonclient who suffers economic loss from the lawyer's handling of the client's affairs generally has no tort claim without special circumstances, such as a commitment to the nonclient, a misrepresentation, or a failure to disclose information the lawyer had a duty to disclose.68 The policy stated in Guy and in Noble v. Bruce is that potential liability to a nonclient could distract the attorney from the client's best interests, weaken the attorney's loyalty, and create a conflict of interest as the attorney weighs the client's goals against the need to protect the nonclient.69 Courts that resist intended-beneficiary status for nonclients voice the same worry about contract claims, since an independent right of action would compromise the lawyer's undivided loyalty to the client.70 Advice shaped by the lawyer's own exposure to third parties serves a client less well than advice shaped only by the client's interests, which is why the concern carries real weight.
The concern is most acute where the nonclient's interest runs against the client's, because a lawyer who owed enforceable duties to the other side would be pulled in two directions.
In the will case that pull is absent. The testator wants the legatee to receive the property, so the lawyer's duty to the legatee and the duty to the client point the same way. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers makes the point in § 51, which recognizes circumstances in which a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient and says that enforcing that duty may promote the lawyer's loyal and effective pursuit of the client's objectives. Its illustration treats a lawyer who botches the execution of a will as accountable to the person named in it for negligence, and it cites Lucas as supporting authority.71
Tort theories are available in some places, though this section concerns the contract route. Lucas held that the lack of privity did not bar the beneficiaries' tort action, and the Hawaii Supreme Court in Blair v. Ing allowed a nonclient testamentary beneficiary a negligence claim against a lawyer who handled an estate-planning matter incompletely.72 Where no special circumstances exist, courts usually confine the lawyer's duty to the client. When an exam asks whether a disappointed legatee can sue on the lawyer's contract, identify the lawyer-client agreement as the promise, ask what the testator sought to accomplish by it, and ask whether anyone else is positioned to enforce it. The legatee prevails on that analysis when the gift was the point of the engagement and the testator is gone. A nonclient whose loss comes from ordinary work for a client, with no purpose to give that person a right, is an incidental beneficiary who acquires no right against the promisor or the promisee.73