Concept
Scope of the Discharge
Discharge of repudiation damages by later impracticability or frustration
Scope of the Discharge
Section 254(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts discharges a repudiator’s duty to pay damages for total breach when it appears after the breach that the repudiated duty would have been discharged by impracticability or frustration before any breach by non-performance.1 The sections above covered what triggers that discharge: a repudiation, a later event that qualifies as an excuse, a repudiator who neither caused the event nor bore its risk, and an excusing date that falls before any breach by non-performance. A court that finds those conditions met still has to decide how much the discharge removes. The answer turns on when the excusing event would have arrived and on what the parties had already done by then.
Two questions follow. How far does the discharge reach into the damages claim, and who must prove it? And what becomes of the value the parties exchanged before the excusing event? The first has a firm answer: liability stops at the date the event would have operated, and the party who claims the excuse carries the proof. The second does not. Courts disagree about whether to leave the parties where the excuse finds them or to adjust their positions through restitution or reliance relief, so a successful § 254(2) defense does not settle whether money changes hands.
Damages Cutoff and Burden of Proof
A discharge ends an obligation as of a moment in time, so the § 254(2) discharge reaches exactly as far as the excusing event would have reached.2 A permanent event would have released the repudiator from every performance falling due after it, and those performances drop out of the damages claim. Performances that would have fallen due earlier came due while the duty still stood, and a later event cannot excuse them retroactively. The rule therefore sets a cutoff at a date instead of erasing the claim, and a court applying it asks which part of the claim lies on each side of that date.
The casino and disc jockey illustration puts the cutoff on a calendar. A disc jockey held a contract to provide music in a Las Vegas casino for 2019 and 2020. Near the end of 2019 the casino went out of business and repudiated its 2020 obligation. It conceded the breach but denied liability for damages from March 2020 forward, because the governor’s shutdown order required it to close that month and a force majeure clause relieved both parties of damages liability if performance was “rendered impossible.”3 A court that heard similar facts in 2021 denied the disc jockey summary judgment, reasoning that a jury could find the order triggered the clause, and it applied the Restatement rule. The consequence, assuming the casino paid for 2019 and the clause would excuse it as of March 2020, is that the casino would not be liable for 2020 damages beyond that date.4
The phrase “beyond that date” leaves the earlier part of 2020 outside the discharge. Suppose the disc jockey’s fees fell due monthly. The January and February performances then fell due before the order issued, so the repudiation cost the disc jockey those payments, and the order cannot reach back to excuse them. For the months after March, the casino’s duty would have been discharged anyway, so the repudiation cost the disc jockey nothing the order would not have cost.
The cutoff applies only when the excusing event would have discharged the duty, and an event that merely delays performance does not. Under the Restatement’s rule on temporary impracticability or frustration, the obligor’s duty is suspended while the obstacle lasts but is not discharged and is not prevented from arising, unless performance after the obstacle ends would be materially more burdensome than it would have been without it.5 That limit follows from what § 254(2) tests. The rule asks whether the repudiator would ever have been released from the performance, and a duty that waits for an obstacle to clear and then revives is a duty the repudiator would still have owed.
The exception for performance that becomes materially more burdensome means a long or costly suspension can harden into a discharge, so the question in each case is what performance would have required once the obstacle cleared. An event that reaches only part of the performance poses a related limit. Restatement (Second) §§ 269 and 270 recognize relief short of complete excuse where the impracticability is temporary or partial, and a court may excuse a portion of the performance with a matching reduction in counterperformance, or excuse a delay the event caused.6 By the same logic, an event that would have excused only part of the repudiated performance should discharge only the matching part of the damages claim.
A permanent discharge also runs in both directions. Total supervening impracticability or frustration discharges the excused party’s remaining duties, and it discharges the other party at the same moment, because the excused party’s performance will not be forthcoming.7 After the excusing date, then, neither side owes anything for the discharged period. The disc jockey who loses damages for the months after March 2020 owes no music for those months either, and the live dispute is confined to the performances that fell due before that line.
The repudiating party must prove the excuse. The burden of proof lies on the party who asserts impracticability, who must show that the task could not be accomplished, and a party who creates the impracticability by its own voluntary act gets no excuse.8 A repudiator who invokes § 254(2) is that party. It must show that the later event would have occurred and would have discharged the duty, and, because the date fixes how much of the claim falls away, when that would have happened. The allocation fits the shape of contract liability: liability does not depend on fault, so excuse is an exception, and the party who asks for the exception must prove it. The casino case shows the burden at work. The denial of summary judgment meant only that a jury could find the order triggered the clause, so the excuse remained a question for the factfinder.9
Restitution and Reliance After the Discharge
Section 254(2) answers the claim for the lost performance and says nothing about value the parties already exchanged.11 That question has its own authority. The Restatement (Second) gives courts broad flexibility in fashioning remedies after an excuse under §§ 158 and 272,12 and it provides that a court may grant relief on such terms “as justice requires including protection of the parties’ reliance interests.”13 Restitution is a question a court must actually reach. One court remanded a case because the trial court had rested its decision on the common law rule and never considered whether the appellant was entitled to restitution under Restatement (Second) § 374(1).14 A § 254(2) discharge therefore closes the claim for the lost bargain and leaves open a claim to adjust what has already changed hands.
A discharge ends duties that remain to be performed, but it cannot return a payment or a piece of work that has already moved between the parties. If a deposit bought a performance that will never occur, the payee holds a gain and the payer bears a loss, and the event that would have discharged the contract was no one’s doing. For that reason the adjustment looks to the gains and losses each side sustained. Courts increasingly recognize that restitution used to unwind a contract that cannot be performed serves an equitable adjustment of gains and losses, a purpose wider than redressing unjust enrichment alone.15
In the United States, courts have generally held that when a contract is discharged by impracticability or frustration, the parties must make restitution for the benefits conferred on them, and “benefit” is at times stretched to include expenses incurred in preparing to perform.16 If either party had performed before the court found impracticability, the benefit or its value is measured under the same restitutionary principles that apply to mistake.17 The court may also supply a term necessary to determine the parties’ rights and duties.18 Restitution has its own measures and limits as a remedial subject, and this chapter marks only the point where it meets the § 254(2) discharge.
Courts have not decided the remedial issue uniformly.19 Three approaches appear, running from least to most protective of a party who spent money on the failed contract:
- Some courts leave the parties where the excuse finds them, so that neither side recovers anything from the other.20
- Others require restitution for the benefits conferred, the generally stated rule, and sometimes stretch “benefit” to cover preparation expenses.21
- Still others, following the Restatement’s grant of discretion, adjust gains and losses as justice requires, including protection of reliance.22
Hart v. Arnold sits at the protective end. A buyer’s promise to build a lake became impracticable after governmental regulations intervened, and the court awarded the land’s seller restitution plus reliance damages even though the seller’s acts in reliance had not benefited the buyer. The buyer had also failed to inform the seller in time of the changed circumstances.23
English law moved in a similar direction. Chandler v. Webster reflects the older rule that the parties stay where the frustrating event finds them, so money already paid stays with the payee. At the suggestion of the Law Lords in the later Fibrosa case, Parliament authorized recovery of the value of benefits received under a discharged contract “if it considers it just to do so, having regard for all the circumstances,” and courts may deduct certain expenses incurred in reliance.24
Both arguments rest on the discretion the Restatement gives a court after an excuse is found, and that discretion lets it weigh good-faith spending against the allocation of risk.25 The adjustment runs both ways, since the general rule has each party make restitution for benefits conferred on it.26 A successful § 254(2) defense therefore extinguishes the claim measured by the lost bargain but does not guarantee that no money changes hands. A claim for a deposit, for part performance, or for protected reliance rests on a different footing, the adjustment of what each side gave and lost, and whether it succeeds depends on the jurisdiction and on the court’s view of what justice requires.