Concept
Repudiation and Total Breach
Discharge of repudiation damages by later impracticability or frustration
Later Excuse and Repudiation Damages
Repudiation and Total Breach
Section 254(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts cuts back one claim: damages for total breach by repudiation. That duty to pay is discharged, the section says, if it appears after the breach that the repudiated duty would have been discharged by impracticability or frustration before any breach by non-performance.1 Applying the rule requires three prior points: what a repudiation is, what it lets the injured party do, and what damages it supports. This unit takes them in that order, and the rest of the chapter tests them against events that happen after the repudiation.
A breach ordinarily occurs only when promised performance falls due, and repudiation is the exception. A party who makes clear, by words or conduct, before the due date that it will not perform has repudiated.2 Consider a lessee who has paid the security deposit and the August rent and has been given possession of the premises. In mid-August it tells the lessor that it is abandoning the lease and will vacate at the end of the month. Performance has begun, yet the announcement is a repudiation rather than a breach, because the September rent is not due until August 31.3
Nineteenth-century courts came to regard the older approach as both unfair to the promisee and inefficient, and that is why a clear advance refusal now counts as a breach.4 Hochster v. De La Tour is generally regarded as the preeminent statement of the change: when one party clearly repudiates a material promise in advance, the other may treat the repudiation as a breach immediately and seek relief without delay.5 The court relied in part on mitigation. Instead of “remaining idle and laying out money in preparations which must be useless,” the plaintiff was “at liberty to seek service under another employer,” and what he earned there would reduce his damages.6
The equivalence between repudiation and breach carries one condition. The repudiation counts as a material breach only if the threatened action or failure to act would be a material breach if it happened when performance was due.7 The doctrine is now well established at common law and under the UCC, and a clear repudiation also limits how long the injured party may await performance. In Oloffson v. Coomer, a seller of corn agreed in April to deliver in October and December. On June 3 he told the buyer that he would not plant corn because the season had been too wet, and he advised the buyer to find substitute corn elsewhere. In September he said again that the corn would not be delivered. After the delivery times passed, the buyer covered at prices significantly above both the contract price and the June 3 market price, and argued that §2–610 let him await performance for a commercially reasonable time. The court concluded that, given the seller’s unequivocal repudiation, that period expired when the first notification of non-performance was given.8
A repudiation must be clear, but it need not be a flat refusal. A definitive statement that a party will not perform unless the other agrees to new significant terms is a repudiation. Had the defendant in Hochster written that he would not go on the trip unless the courier accepted a material pay cut, his letter would have qualified, and one court found that a concrete subcontractor’s letter to the general contractor did.9 A hedge does not qualify. The communication must clearly and unequivocally express an intention not to render the promised performance when it falls due, so a statement that leaves open whether the party will perform is not enough.10
Conduct can also repudiate. A voluntary act that makes substantial performance impossible, or apparently impossible, amounts to a repudiation. If A agrees to work for B for one year starting June 1 and on May 25 embarks on an ocean voyage around the world, A has repudiated. So has a party that surrenders its license to do business, as to contracts related to that business, and so has a public entity that exhausts its spending limit by paying the wrong party. Courts sometimes call these implied repudiations.11
Once a repudiation is established, the claim is one for total breach, and that classification controls the damages. After a total breach, the injured party may recover not only the actual damages accrued but also future damages that will reasonably flow from the breach. A partial breach yields damages only for actual harm to date, not for future harm.12 The difference matters most for repudiation, because the repudiated performance is not yet due when the claim arises, so a repudiation claim is largely a claim about the future. Timing can narrow that uncertainty. If a repudiation case reaches trial after performance would have ended, damages will rarely be speculative, since the facts needed to determine damages, or whether there are any, will usually be available.13 Those facts include whatever happened after the repudiation, and that is where Section 254(2) takes hold.
The rest of this chapter takes up that question: what becomes of a repudiation claim when later events show that the repudiated performance would never have had to be rendered.