Concept
Willful Breach
Restitution for the party in breach
Willful Breach
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1) lets a party in breach recover the benefit he conferred by part performance or reliance, to the extent it exceeds the loss his breach caused, once the other side has justifiably refused to go on; the text never asks why the breach happened.1 That silence departs from the rule § 374 replaced, which did look at motive.2 It also answers the hardest version of this chapter's question: should someone who knowingly broke his word be paid anything for what he had already delivered? The modern answer divides in two. A deliberate default no longer bars restitution by itself, but a party who deliberately delivers something materially different from what he promised still goes unpaid.
Intentional Nonperformance
The First Restatement excluded the willful defaulting purchaser from recovery, and § 374 deleted that exclusion. The court in Lancellotti v. Thomas, citing the Reporter's Note, explained the deletion as apparently due in part to the Uniform Commercial Code, which permits a buyer who willfully defaults to recover.3 The Code takes the same position with a modest penalty attached. Article 2 allows restitution to a breaching party whether or not the breach was willful, but under UCC § 2-718(2)(b) a defaulting buyer recovers only the payments that exceed validly agreed damages or the smaller of $500 or 20 percent of the price.4
The case for the old exclusion is easy to state: a person who knowingly breaks a promise should not profit from it. Two objections outweigh that intuition. The first is that the exclusion makes courts sort defaults into the excusable and the inexcusable, and willfulness is hard to pin down. Professor Corbin made this point against Cardozo's “willful transgressor” limit on substantial performance, calling willfulness a vague concept and arguing that even a willful breach should not necessarily prevent recovery.5 A buyer who stopped paying after a job transfer, a better offer, or a bad quarter could describe the same default in any of those ways, and the seller would have to litigate which description was true. The second objection is that the exclusion is unnecessary to protect the innocent party, because § 374(1) already subtracts the loss the breach caused from whatever the breacher recovers.6 What a flat bar adds is a forfeiture unconnected to that loss, and one that grows with the value of what the breacher delivered before stopping: the greater the performance, the greater the forfeiture.7
Intentional Variation
Dropping the general bar leaves one limit that turns on deliberate conduct. Comment b to § 374 separates intentional nonperformance from intentional variation. A party who intentionally furnishes services or builds a building materially different from what he promised has “acted officiously” and has not performed part of his promise, so he is denied recovery even if his performance benefited the other side.8 To act officiously is to volunteer a benefit the recipient never asked for.
The limit follows from what the benefit element requires. Section 374(1) pays for a benefit conferred by part performance, and part performance means carrying out some of what the contract called for. A builder who frames the promised garage and then quits has delivered a fraction of the bargained-for performance, so the owner holds part of what she chose to buy. A builder who knowingly erects a different building has delivered none of it, because what stands on the lot is his preference in place of her specification. Paying him would let any contractor substitute his own design for the owner's and then bill for the substitution.
A builder who frames the specified garage and then leaves for a more lucrative job also acts deliberately, yet he recovers the benefit conferred in excess of the owner's loss, just as the lakeside buyer did. Intent therefore cannot be the dividing fact. What matters is whether the deliberate act left the promised performance partly delivered or replaced it with a different one.
The word willful also appears in the law of substantial performance, where it does different work. Cardozo's opinion in Jacob & Youngs said that the willful transgressor cannot recover under that doctrine, but the Second Restatement adopts Corbin's view instead. A willful breach does not automatically bar recovery, and the breaching party's motive is one factor in deciding whether performance was substantial. Restatement (Second) § 241(e) & cmt. f.9 Motive there is a weight on the scale, while under comment b to § 374 an intentional variation ends the restitution claim.
Continuing Disagreement
Courts have not settled the question. The modern trend holds that a party in substantial default should not be treated as an outlaw, and both case law and legislation reflect it: the Second Restatement is more liberal than the first in allowing recovery, and most states require by statute the periodic payment of wages and the payment of accrued wages at termination despite any contrary contract term. Even so, there is a substantial division over whether a willful breach should prevent restitution.10 The answer therefore depends on the jurisdiction. Where the common-law forfeiture rule survives, the breacher recovers nothing, whatever his motive. Where § 374 governs without the old exclusion, a deliberate default does not defeat the claim. Where a court keeps a willfulness bar, intent decides.
The dissent in Lancellotti states the strongest case against the modern approach. The court remanded because the trial court had rested its decision on the common-law rule and never considered whether the buyer was entitled to restitution under § 374(1).11 The dissent objected to restitution on the buyer's conduct. The facts reasonably supported the inference that the buyer learned the hoagie business, benefited from the trade and goodwill it acquired at the sellers' place of business, and then ran a hoagie business at its own pizza shop the following season. Restitution in that situation, the dissent said, was “a wholly unmerited reward for bad faith,” a result inconsistent with the intent of law and the expectations of equity.12
A bad-faith limit would ask whether the defaulter used the bargain to take something from the other side and then walked away, which is a narrower inquiry than whether the default was deliberate. The offset gives the objection some force, because it subtracts only the losses the seller can prove, and the harm from a buyer who absorbed the seller's goodwill can be hard to measure. The point remains an argument and not a rule, but it explains why some courts hesitate to pay a defaulter who profited from the relationship he abandoned.