Concept
Statute of Frauds Contracts
Restitution interest
Statute of Frauds Contracts
A worker accepts an oral promise of employment for a term longer than one year, labors for two months, and is fired without pay. The Statute of Frauds requires a signed writing before a court will enforce promises of that kind, so the worker cannot sue on the promise. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 375 nonetheless lets the worker seek restitution. A party who would otherwise have a restitution claim under a contract is not barred because the Statute makes the contract unenforceable by that party, unless the Statute provides otherwise or its purpose would be frustrated by allowing restitution.1
Section 375 separates two questions that an oral contract tends to run together. Enforcement asks whether a court will hold the defendant to the promise; restitution asks whether the defendant received something of value from the claimant. The Statute answers the first question against the claimant, and § 375 leaves the second open. The claimant here also differs from a party who avoids a contract for lack of capacity, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or abuse of a fiduciary relation, whose restitution right the next section develops.2 The Statute of Frauds claimant has avoided nothing; the claimant simply cannot enforce.
Section 375 therefore works as a general grant with two exceptions. Restitution is generally available to a party who performed under an oral contract, and it is withheld only when the Statute so provides or when an award would frustrate the Statute's purpose.3 The first subsection explains the grant, and the second takes up the exceptions.
Restitution Despite the Statute
Parties to a contract that the Statute of Frauds makes unenforceable often act on it before they discover the defect. One renders services; another improves land that the contract concerns.4 Section 375 lets such a party seek restitution anyway. The oral promise stays unenforceable, and the dispute turns to a different question: does the other side now hold value that came from the claimant?
Restitution leaves the Statute undisturbed because it does not enforce the contract. The claim asks what the claimant delivered and what that delivery is worth to the recipient, and it never asks a court to hold anyone to the promise. Allowing restitution therefore ordinarily does not contravene the policy behind the Statute.5 Courts reason the same way when a plaintiff has partly performed under such a contract. They ordinarily award the reasonable value of that performance, on a theory of preventing unjust enrichment rather than enforcing the contract. A Connecticut decision, Montanaro Brothers Builders, Inc. v. Snow, recognized a right to restitution of a payment made for a real estate option that the Statute made unenforceable.6
The Restatement's first illustration shows the rule with services. A makes an oral contract to furnish services to B that are not to be performed within a year, and after two months of work B discharges A without paying anything. A recovers from B, as restitution, the reasonable value of the services rendered during those two months.7 The Statute defeats any suit for the compensation the promise would have produced over the full term, but B has received two months of labor for nothing, and that received value is what the recovery reaches. The award ends with the second month because nothing was delivered after it.
The second illustration combines three figures. A makes an oral contract to sell a tract of land to B for $100,000. B pays $50,000, takes possession, and makes improvements, and A then refuses to convey. B sues for restitution of the $50,000 plus $20,000, the reasonable value of the improvements, less $5,000, the value to B of the use of the land, and recovers $65,000.8 Each figure answers a separate question. The $50,000 is money A holds against a conveyance A will not make. The $20,000 is a benefit of another kind, since B's labor and materials improved land that A still owns. The $5,000 runs against B, because B occupied A's land in the meantime and a recovery that ignored that use would let B keep it free. The result is $50,000 + $20,000 − $5,000 = $65,000. The offset reflects a general feature of restitution: a party who seeks it must also restore any benefits received under the agreement.9 And because A is the party who refused to perform, B's claim follows the rule for an injured party after a breach or repudiation, which gives restitution for any benefit conferred by part performance or reliance.10
Courts measure the benefit in these cases as they do in similar situations under enforceable contracts, a subject the measuring section later in this chapter develops. The unenforceable agreement remains useful as evidence: an oral price term, for instance, can help show what services or land were worth, though no court will compel anyone to pay that price as a promise.11 A claimant who seeks only what was spent, with nothing having reached the defendant, has left restitution for the reliance interest, which § 139 treats separately.12
The grant carries a condition, which a land-installment illustration displays. A makes an oral contract to buy land from B for $100,000, payable in $10,000 installments, with conveyance on payment of the third. A pays $10,000, refuses to pay more, and sues to recover the $10,000. If B signs a sufficient memorandum, A's refusal to pay is a defense and A cannot get restitution. If B refuses to sign, A's refusal is not a defense and A can get restitution.13 The only change between the two outcomes is whether B stands ready to be bound. Section 375 gives a right to restitution only to one who would have such a right if the contract were enforceable. That right is subject to the ordinary limits on restitution, so the other party's tender of specific restitution may terminate it, and the claimant must have conferred a benefit by part performance or reliance.14 The Statute removes a single obstacle, the missing writing, and it gives the claimant nothing beyond what a valid contract would. A party therefore has no right to restitution when the other party is not in breach and is prepared to perform, except to the extent that such a right would exist if the Statute were satisfied. A party does have the right when the other side will neither perform nor sign a sufficient memorandum.15
Section 375 also marks its own territory, for it governs only when the Statute is what makes the contract unenforceable. A land buyer whose reliance entitles the buyer to specific performance falls outside it, as does a party who has completely performed a contract not to be performed within a year and can enforce it for that reason. Sections 373 and 374 govern both.16 The completely performing party's right to restitution is then subject to § 373(2), the full-performance exception taught at the end of this chapter, which denies restitution to one who has performed all duties and is owed only a definite sum of money.17 The next subsection turns to the two limits that come from the Statute itself.
When the Statute Bars Restitution
Section 375 withdraws its grant in two situations: when the Statute provides otherwise, and when allowing restitution would frustrate the Statute's purpose.19 The grant rests on the premise that restitution returns value and does not enforce the promise, so each limit marks a place where that premise fails. Under the first limit, the legislature has closed the restitution route itself. Under the second, the legislature has said nothing about restitution, but the award would deliver exactly what the oral promise carried, so the court would enforce the contract in another form. Restitution remains the general rule, and the limits are exceptions to it.
The first limit asks only what the particular statute says. A legislature may address restitution directly, as New York's General Obligations Law § 5-701(a)(10) does for broker's commissions: it also applies to a contract “implied in fact or in law to pay reasonable compensation” for a broker's services.20 That language reaches a claim for the reasonable value of services as well as a claim on an express oral promise. A broker who sues in New York for the value of services under an unwritten commission arrangement therefore meets the statute's own words, and the court need not ask what the statute was for.
A statute's description of the unwritten contract does not by itself settle the matter. The Restatement states that the mere fact that the Statute's wording makes the contract “void” is not controlling.21 The word describes what the writing requirement does to the promise, while a restitution claim never relies on the promise to obtain what it seeks. A court must still ask whether the Statute provides otherwise as to restitution or whether restitution would frustrate its purpose, and the label answers neither question.
The second limit applies when the statute does not mention restitution but the award would defeat what the statute is for. The Restatement's illustration involves a home owner who orally promises a real estate broker the usual 5% commission if the broker sells the house, in a state whose Statute of Frauds provides that a broker has no right to such a commission without a written memorandum. The broker sells the house for $100,000 and sues in restitution for $5,000, the reasonable value of the services. The broker cannot recover, because the purpose of the Statute would be frustrated if the broker were allowed to recover as restitution the same amount that had been promised under the contract.22
The reasoning turns on what the award would contain. The statute denies a broker any right to a commission without a writing, and the sum the broker seeks as reasonable value is $5,000, the same figure the oral promise fixed. A judgment for that sum would put the broker exactly where an enforceable commission contract would have put the broker, so the word restitution would be the only difference between the judgment and enforcement of the promise. A court that paid the withheld commission on a different theory would undo the legislature's choice. A student who remembers only that § 375 allows restitution despite the Statute will award the $5,000, and that is the answer the illustration rejects.
The discharged worker in the first illustration stands differently. After two months under an oral contract for services not to be performed within a year, the worker was discharged without pay and recovers the reasonable value of those two months.23 Both claimants delivered services and both ask for their value, so the difference lies in the statute each runs into. The one-year provision withholds enforcement of the promise and carries no special bar on restitution, so paying for services actually received undoes nothing it was written to accomplish. The commission provision is aimed at the payment itself, so an award of that payment defeats it.
Section 375 is also not an exclusive statement of restitution rights under Statute of Frauds provisions outside Chapter 5 of the Restatement. Its comment leaves undealt with the case of a statute requiring a writing for contracts not performable within a lifetime, where a party who has fully performed may be unable to enforce the contract and yet be barred from restitution by § 373(2).24