Concept
Ordinary Limits on Reliance
Reliance interest
Ordinary Limits on Reliance
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 writes one limit into its own text: reliance damages are reduced by any loss the breaching party proves with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.1 The offset is not the only check on a reliance award. Section 349 offers reliance as an alternative to the measure stated in § 347, so the doctrines that confine expectation damages keep operating when the measure changes. Four of them apply: causation, foreseeability, reasonable certainty, and mitigation.2
These limits ask different questions from the offset. The offset looks at a performance that never took place and asks what it would have yielded. The ordinary limits look at the losses the plaintiff actually claims and ask four things: did the breach cause them, could the defendant have anticipated them, can the plaintiff prove them, and could the plaintiff reasonably have avoided them. The definition of the reliance interest already raises the first question, since it speaks of loss caused by reliance on the contract.3
Reliance claims need all four checks because of their shape. Outlays are usually easy to prove, since the money has already gone out, and that ease is why reliance serves as a fallback when lost profit cannot be shown.4 But the plaintiff also decides what to spend and when. A reliance claim can therefore swell to include outlays the breach did not strand, outlays the defendant had no reason to expect, and spending the plaintiff could have stopped once the other side repudiated. Each limit answers one of those risks.
Causation comes first because it asks the threshold question: did the breach cost the plaintiff the value of the money spent? The other three then ask whether the defendant should answer for that loss, whether the plaintiff has proved its amount, and whether the plaintiff could have avoided it.
Causation
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(b) defines the reliance interest as reimbursement for loss caused by reliance on the contract, and § 349 turns that interest into a remedy for expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance.5 A reliance claim therefore contains two causal links. The first runs from promise to spending: the plaintiff must have spent the money because of the contract. The second runs from breach to waste: the outlay must have lost its value because the defendant failed to perform, and not for some unrelated reason. Courts state the second link directly: the value of the expenditures must have been lost as a result of the breach.6
The defendant's burden to prove a losing contract does not supply that second link, because the burden concerns a performance that never occurred, while the link concerns what actually happened to the plaintiff's money. The requirement also reflects who controls the size of a reliance claim. The plaintiff chooses what to spend and when, and ventures fail for many reasons unrelated to any breach, from weak demand to poor timing. If proof of a breach alone entitled the plaintiff to everything it spent, the defendant would guarantee the whole venture and pay for market risks the contract never placed on it. Causation confines the award to the loss the defendant's wrong produced.
In the typical reliance case the link is easy to see, because the defendant has repudiated and left the plaintiff with its outlays and nothing to show for them. No performance ever arrived to repay the spending, so the plaintiff may claim its expenditures in preparation for performance, and the loss of the investment is readily traced to the breach.7 The only reduction left is the § 349 offset, which the defendant must prove.8
The link weakens when the defendant performed and the complaint concerns how well. In Merry Gentleman, LLC v. George and Leona Productions, Inc. a film producer sought reliance damages from the actor-director Michael Keaton for breaches of his directing contract, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of recovery.9 The producer claimed the entire $5.5 million it had spent making the movie. Keaton had in fact made it, and it showed well at Sundance and won some critical praise; the alleged breaches were a late first cut and inadequate publicity.10 The court reasoned that a plaintiff cannot claim all of its expenditures as caused by such breaches without some reason to think the breach destroyed the entire value of the defendant's performance, and no reasonable trier of fact could find that the producer lost its whole investment because a first cut came in late or publicity fell short.11 A film can fail commercially for many reasons, and the two alleged lapses were only two of the candidates.
The decision does not bar reliance recovery for those lapses; it sorts the claim by cause. The court gave examples of what the producer might have recovered on a proper showing: extra pay owed to film editors for a longer period if the late first cut forced it, or the loss that would follow if Keaton had so harshly criticized the released film in public that no one bought tickets.12 It added that had Keaton prevented completion of the movie, the producer might have been entitled to all expenditures made in preparation for his performance, subject to the losing-contract limitation in § 349.13 The claim shrinks from the whole investment to the specific costs the breach produced.
The contrast between the two versions is the contrast between repudiation and substantial performance. A breach that removed the very performance the spending was meant to serve accounts for the waste of that spending. A breach that left most of the performance in place accounts only for the shortfall it created.
Causation does not disappear when the defendant fails to prove a losing contract. Section 349 reduces recovery by a loss the breaching party proves, and the Merry Gentleman court treated that limitation as a separate screen that applies even when the defendant prevented performance altogether.14 In Agam v. Gavra, the court rejected the suggestion that putting that burden on the breaching party eliminates the requirement that the breach caused the plaintiff's damages. The value of the expenditures must have been lost as a result of the breach, and the federal authority the court cited requires evidence that the breach is a substantial causal factor in the damages.15 The two inquiries ask different questions. The offset looks to a performance that never happened; causation looks to events that did happen and asks whether the breach stranded the money. A defendant who offers no evidence of a losing contract therefore leaves the offset at zero without conceding that the breach caused every claimed dollar.
L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co. shows the same limit in a different setting. A buyer of rubber-reconditioning machines sought damages for its investment in a rubber reclaiming department and for the cost of scrap rubber, and the Second Circuit denied those items because the showing was that the seller's delay in delivery was only one of several possible causes of the loss.16 The two cases fail for different reasons. In Merry Gentleman the character of the breach, a late draft and thin publicity from a director who delivered a finished film, made a total loss implausible. In L. Albert a breach that may well have contributed to the loss had to compete with other explanations for it. What the cases share is the rule that proof of a breach is not proof that the breach wasted the investment, and a plaintiff who cannot separate the breach from the other causes cannot recover the outlay it claims.
Exam stems on reliance should begin with what the defendant actually did. If the defendant repudiated and stranded the plaintiff's outlays, the spending follows the breach, subject to the offset. If the defendant substantially performed, ask what the particular breach plausibly cost. The common error is to treat reliance as a refund of everything the plaintiff spent once any breach is shown.
Foreseeability
A reliance expenditure is recoverable only if it is of a kind the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract was made. Section 349 offers reliance “as an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347,” so shifting the measure does not switch off the ordinary doctrines that confine an expectation award.18 The Restatement applies foreseeability to reliance along with causation, certainty, and mitigation,19 and in Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp. the Oklahoma Supreme Court described the aim of reliance damages as undoing harm that was foreseeable and can be measured with reasonable certainty.20
How demanding the limit is depends on the kind of outlay. The costs of performing the plaintiff's own promises are called for by the contract itself, so both parties contemplate them, and they clear the Hadley v. Baxendale screen on consequential damages without special proof.21 Collateral outlays, those outside the plaintiff's own performance, are incidental or consequential losses because they form no part of the price the plaintiff pays for the defendant's performance. They may or may not have been within the parties' contemplation, and whether a given one is barred depends on the facts.22 A seller who knows the buyer will remove part of a factory wall to install the machine being sold has reason at signing to foresee that expense, so when the seller breaches and no comparable machine can be bought, the cost of removing and rebuilding the wall is recoverable.23
The Maryland court in Dialist Co. v. Pulford stated the condition in terms that show its structure. A collateral loss may be included in damages if, when the contract was made, the defendant “had reason to foresee that such expenditures would be made and that his own breach would prevent their reimbursement.”24 The first half asks about knowledge of the outlay, since a defendant cannot anticipate what nothing in the bargain suggested. The second half asks whether the defendant could see that the outlay would pay off only if the defendant performed, so that a failure to perform would strand the money. The court gave the reason for requiring both: losses of this kind can easily be too remote from what the parties had in mind and too likely to flow from other causes to be charged to the party in breach.25 Foreseeability answers the first worry, and the causation requirement answers the second.
The moment of contracting is the test date because of what a defendant can do at that moment. When it makes its promise, the defendant sets a price, decides how much risk to accept, and may bargain for a disclaimer or refuse the deal. A defendant told at signing that the plaintiff will build plans around the contract can do all of these things, and the price it quotes can reflect the exposure. A defendant who learns nothing until later has already lost that choice. If reliance could grow with whatever the plaintiff decided to spend after the contract was formed, the defendant would be insuring the plaintiff's private plans without ever having been asked to price the risk. The general rule on consequential damages follows the same logic: losses outside the general kind the parties contemplated, or not communicated so that the defendant was on notice when the contract was made, are not recoverable even when clearly proved.26 Information that reaches the defendant after the contract is made cannot enlarge what the defendant agreed to answer for.
The second customer acted because of the contract, so inducement is satisfied; what is missing is foresight on the defendant's side. A plaintiff does not meet the limit by showing that the spending followed the deal, because an outlay the defendant had no reason to anticipate is too remote to charge to it, however directly the plaintiff responded to the promise. Even the first customer's recovery is not automatic, since causation, reasonable certainty, and mitigation still apply to the booth fee.
Foreseeability concerns the kind of loss and not its size. In Maine Rubber International v. Environmental Management Group, Inc. the plaintiff paid $1,900 for an environmental assessment of a prospective business site, and after the defendant falsely reported no problems, governments found environmental hazards and the plaintiff lost more than $211,000 in wasted expenditures when its move to the site was aborted.27 The court allowed recovery as reasonably foreseeable reliance damages even though the total greatly exceeded the price.28 A defendant paid to assess a site for a business's prospective move has an obvious reason to expect that a false all-clear will lead the client to commit money to that site, so the kind of loss was within the bargain even though its amount dwarfed the fee. That reading matches the general rule on consequential damages, which asks whether the loss is of the general kind the parties contemplated and does not require the defendant to have foreseen the figure.29
Exam stems that list several outlays call for two steps. First, ask whether each outlay was a cost of the plaintiff's own performance, which the contract itself contemplates, or a collateral expense in a related transaction. Second, for each collateral expense, ask what the defendant knew or had reason to know on the day the contract was made; a fact the stem places after that date supplies no foresight.
Reasonable Certainty
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 352 denies recovery for loss beyond the amount the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.31 The Restatement applies that requirement to reliance recovery as it does to expectation,32 and § 349 confirms the point from the defendant's side, because its reduction for a losing contract reaches only a loss the breaching party proves with reasonable certainty.33 Reasonable certainty thus governs both halves of a reliance computation: the losses the plaintiff claims and the offset the defendant claims. Causation and foreseeability decide whether the defendant answers for a kind of loss; certainty decides whether the evidence fixes its amount.
The limit matters in a particular way for reliance because of why reliance exists as a fallback. Lost profit is a forecast, and a plaintiff who cannot prove a forecast with reasonable certainty turns to outlays, which are past facts of a fixed amount.34 If a plaintiff could recover as reliance any loss whose amount depends on conjecture, the claim would bring back the guesswork the fallback was meant to avoid, and renaming the claim would bypass the certainty requirement that blocked the profit claim. Section 352 therefore caps recovery at what the evidence can establish. A plaintiff with one provable item and one speculative item recovers the first, and the second drops out of the award.
Documented outlays satisfy the standard with little effort. The court in Dialist Co. v. Pulford quoted the observation that profits are hard to estimate because contingencies are uncertain and the value of the promised performance is hard to fix, while what the plaintiff spent on preparation and part performance before the breach is usually easy to prove.35 Invoices, payment records, and payroll show an amount that depends on nothing that happened after the breach. That is why preparation and performance costs can be awarded without the plaintiff proving any profit at all.
The difficulty grows as the claimed loss moves away from money already paid. A forgone opportunity is a counterfactual: it asks what the plaintiff would have received had the promise never been made. To prove one, the plaintiff must show that a particular opportunity existed, that the plaintiff would have obtained it, and what it was worth, and each link depends on third parties and future events, the same contingencies that defeat a profit claim. Collateral outlays raise a different problem. Their amount can be documented, but they form no part of the agreed exchange, and the Dialist court warned that such losses can be too remote from what the parties contemplated and too likely to flow from other causes to be charged to the breaching party.36 The plaintiff needs evidence tying the particular loss to the breach, not only receipts showing what was spent.
In Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC a consultant began working for the defendant before the terms of an employment contract were settled, the parties never agreed on those terms, and the consultancy was eventually terminated; he then sued on promises to pay him various bonuses.37 The jury found that the promises were made and relied on, but the court declined expectation relief because the promises were somewhat vague, he had consulted for a short time, and the defendant had not acted unfairly. It confined him to reliance losses and gave him the chance to prove them.38 He tried to show that he had lost employment opportunities in reliance on the promises but could not prove that with sufficient certainty, and he received no award.39 The case arose under promissory estoppel, where § 90 lets a court limit the remedy as justice requires, a feature taken up in a later section of this chapter. Its lesson here is that permission to seek reliance damages guarantees nothing. The reliance label changed the measure from profits to losses, but the losses he described still had to be established by evidence that fixed their existence and value.
Each side carries the certainty burden for its own item. A plaintiff's speculative item drops out of the award because the plaintiff must prove it; a defendant's speculative offset fails to reduce the award because § 349 asks the breaching party to prove the loss with reasonable certainty.40 In a new venture the two failures can occur together, which is why such a plaintiff can often keep its outlays: the uncertainty that blocks proof of profit also blocks proof of a loss on performance.
Exam stems that list several reliance items call for sorting them by what the evidence can fix. Receipts and payments are fixed facts. Chances the plaintiff says were lost, with no identified offer, no probability of success, and no price, are counterfactuals that must be proved to the same standard as profit. Reliance does not relax that standard, and treating the label as a substitute for proof is the common mistake.
Mitigation
A plaintiff may not recover for those injurious consequences of the defendant's breach that the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable action.42 The principle, called mitigation or avoidable consequences, applies to reliance claims as it does to expectation claims.43 Sections 344(b) and 349 picture a plaintiff who spent money on a promise still expected to be kept, and whose outlays the breach then stranded.44 That picture changes once the defendant repudiates, because a plaintiff who keeps spending afterward knows the performance meant to repay the outlay will not arrive.
The limit follows from what reliance damages repair. A reliance award reimburses outlays the breach made worthless, and an outlay made after the plaintiff learns of the breach does not fit that description, since the plaintiff could have declined to make it. Charging the defendant for it would reward the plaintiff for enlarging the loss. Mitigation is often called a duty, but it works as a limit on recovery: a plaintiff who could reasonably have reduced the loss and did not has committed no wrong the defendant can sue on, and simply absorbs the avoidable part.45
The principle also works in the plaintiff's favor. Losses the plaintiff actually avoided come out of the recovery, so a builder freed from the cost of finishing a job, or one who recoups part of its outlay by reselling materials or using them on another job, deducts those savings from its claim.46 Reasonable efforts to avoid loss cost money, however, and that cost becomes a recoverable item of damages in its own right.47 The rule asks the plaintiff to act sensibly and then repays the price of doing so.
The main application in reliance cases is the plaintiff who keeps spending after the defendant repudiates. In Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. a county commission repudiated a contract to build a bridge and notified the builder not to build, yet the builder went on with the work.48 The court held that a party notified of the other side's repudiation of an executory contract to erect a structure should stop performing, and had no right to pile up damages by proceeding, so a verdict for the builder's full claim was error.49 The measure the court adopted was the labor, materials, and expense the builder had put into part performance before the repudiation, plus the profit it would have earned.50
Luten is an expectation case, but its logic carries over to reliance without adjustment. The dividing line is the repudiation. Outlays made before the notice were made in reliance on a contract both sides still treated as alive, so they remain recoverable, subject to the § 349 reduction for a losing contract.51 Outlays made after the notice were chosen with full knowledge that the other side would not perform, so the plaintiff carries them. This limit differs from causation. Causation asks whether the breach destroyed the value of the money spent, while mitigation asks whether the plaintiff could reasonably have kept from spending it.
One qualification applies to the idea that a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to limit the loss. In Wartzman, the defendants argued that the corporation could have limited its loss by paying for a lawyer who specialized in securities law. The court held that the plaintiffs had no obligation to mitigate by paying what it would take to hire such an attorney, because the defendants had the same opportunity to take that step.52 The idea behind this equal opportunity exception is that mitigation puts the avoidable loss on the plaintiff because the plaintiff is the party positioned to avoid it. When the breaching party could have taken the same step at the same cost, that premise weakens, and requiring the injured party to pay to cure the breaching party's own lapse looks unfair.
Courts have not agreed on how far the exception reaches. Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Huntington National Bank applied it where a title company, having breached, had the same chance as the injured bank to bid on a foreclosed home and prevent a sale below market value.53 Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp. refused to let the defendant's equal opportunity to complete the installation excuse the plaintiff's mitigation. The defendant there could mitigate only by performing as promised, while the plaintiff had a variety of other options, and the court called the exception questionable because it would remove the plaintiff's incentive to act reasonably.54 What separates these decisions is the nature of the step the defendant could have taken. In Chicago Title it was an independent act that reduced the loss, whereas in Cates the defendant's only available step was to do what it had already promised and failed to do. An answer on this point should state the exception, attribute it to the courts that accept it, and note the doubts other courts have expressed.
When the defendant repudiates and the plaintiff keeps spending, sort the outlays by date: money spent before the notice stays in the claim, and money spent afterward drops out. The usual errors are to deny the whole claim because the plaintiff kept building, when only the post-notice spending is lost, or to treat mitigation as a duty whose breach gives the defendant a separate claim against the plaintiff. A third error is to present the equal opportunity exception as settled law, when it is a contested limit on the mitigation rule.