Concept
Recoverable Reliance Expenditures
Reliance interest
Recoverable Reliance Expenditures
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 gives the injured party damages based on the reliance interest, “including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance.”1 The word “including” marks those expenditures as one example, not the whole category. The reliance interest itself is the promisee’s interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract, by being put in as good a position as if the contract had never been made, so any loss traceable to that reliance can belong to it.2 The practical question is which losses trace to reliance and how a court decides.
Four kinds of loss can be sorted by how closely each ties to the contract. Costs of carrying out the promisee’s own side of the bargain sit closest. Next come outlays that form no part of the promisee’s performance but that the contract prompted and the breach wasted. Beyond those lie forgone gains that involve no outlay at all, such as a job the promisee gave up to take on the deal. At the far edge sit costs paid before the contract existed, which raise the puzzle of how anyone can rely on a promise not yet made.
Each step outward loosens the link between promise and loss, and with it the case for charging the defendant. Near the center the link is almost automatic, because the contract called for the spending. Farther out, the court asks harder questions: whether the promise really induced the loss, whether the defendant could foresee it, and whether the plaintiff can prove it. Those questions are the ordinary limits on reliance, treated in a later section. Here the task is classification: for each claimed loss, identify its kind and its distance from the contract.
Preparation and Performance Costs
Section 349 names the core reliance loss in its own text: the injured party recovers expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss the breaching party proves with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.3 The phrase reaches whatever the plaintiff spends to carry out the plaintiff’s own side of the bargain: equipment bought to make the goods, wages paid to the crew, advertising placed to reach the customers the contract contemplates. A Maryland court states the rule in the same terms. Where the non-defaulting party has incurred expenses in preparation for, or part performance of, the contract, those expenses may be recovered.4
Fuller and Perdue labeled the costs of performing the contract essential reliance and set them against the costs of collateral transactions related to the contract, which they called incidental reliance.5 Because the contract itself calls for essential outlays, they would normally be within the parties’ contemplation, so the rule limiting consequential damages does not forbid their recovery.6
Three features make these outlays the clearest reliance losses. The contract induced them, since the plaintiff would not have bought the equipment or hired the crew without the promise. The breach leaves each dollar without the performance that would have repaid it. And because profit on a new venture is often hard to prove while outlays are not, they serve as the natural fallback when profit cannot be established.7 In Hollywood Fantasy Corp. v. Gabor, a promoter of “fantasy vacations” for movie fans recovered out-of-pocket expenses from a breaching celebrity although it could not prove lost profits for the new venture. In World of Boxing LLC v. King, Russian boxing promoters could not prove with certainty the profits lost to an American promoter’s breach, yet recovered their out-of-pocket expenses as reliance damages.8
Older authority points the same way. Hill v. Anderson states the older rule: if the problematical nature of the plaintiff’s profits brings the case within the rule of remoteness and bars recovery of the value of the contract, the plaintiff “would then be entitled to reimbursement for all of the expense he has been put to in preparing his own side for the execution of the contract.”9 The passage is followed by three limits: the expenditures may not exceed the full contract price the defendant promised; preparatory expenditures count only if they can fairly be regarded as part of the cost of performance in estimating profit and loss; and installments of the price already received, together with the value of materials on hand that would have been consumed in completion, must be deducted.10 The second limit doubles as a working test for essential reliance: a party figuring profit on the deal would have entered the outlay on the cost side. The first limit returns in the later section on the contract price ceiling.
A plaintiff who can prove profit raises a different problem: may the outlays be added to it? When they are essential, they may not. The plaintiff’s net gain depends on how much the plaintiff must spend to perform, so essential outlays are an input into the expectancy, and a court that awards the full expectancy has already counted them.11 The general standard explains why. Damages place the aggrieved party in the same economic position performance would have produced, awarding the losses caused and the gains prevented, less savings made possible.12 A full expectancy award already does that, so adding essential outlays would pay for the same cost twice, and the market-measured expectancy marks the ceiling on reliance recovery in that setting.13 The following illustration shows the arithmetic.
The survey and loan fees were costs the buyer had to bear to obtain the parcel, so the $40,000 spread is a gain that performance would have delivered only after those costs. Closing would have required the buyer to pay them out of that gain, and an expectation award leaves the buyer to absorb them the same way. Reimbursing them too would put the buyer $2,000 ahead of performance. The option money differs in kind. It was no part of what the buyer had to spend to obtain the parcel, so it is a collateral outlay, the subject of the next subsection.
The bar on double counting applies when expectation is the measure. Where profit cannot be proved, as in Sam’s case, the outlays are the award, and no second measure exists to count them again.
Courts sometimes list the categories together. A later Maryland opinion states that money spent in part performance, in preparation for, or in reliance on the contract is recoverable, citing Corbin and the first Restatement, both of which Dialist Co. v. Pulford cited with approval.14 The last item on that list marks a separate category, taken up next: outlays made in reliance on the contract that are not part of performing it.
Collateral Expenditures
A second group of reliance losses falls outside the phrase “in preparation for performance or in performance.” These are outlays that form no part of the plaintiff’s own performance, yet that the plaintiff made because the contract existed and that the breach left wasted. They are called incidental or collateral reliance, and they can include any collateral outlay except the expense of performing the plaintiff’s own promises.16 The reliance interest can reach them, because it reimburses loss caused by reliance on the contract;17 the open question is which of them the defendant must answer for.
Dialist shows the category in operation. The Maryland court upheld an award of development costs that included out-of-pocket expenses, telephone installation, and office furniture (together with forfeited salary and lost insurance, taken up below), and it determined that the expenditures were made in reliance on the contract rather than in preparation for it or part performance of it.18
The reason the distinction matters appears in a Maryland opinion quoting a treatise passage on these outlays. They form no part of the agreed exchange, so the defendant’s promised performance is not expected to repay them directly. The net loss may nevertheless be included in damages if, at the time of contracting, the defendant had reason to foresee that the expenditure would be made and that its own breach would prevent reimbursement.19 The condition has two parts because collateral losses can readily be regarded as too remote from contemplation, and too likely to result from other factors, to justify charging them to the party in breach.20
When a court does include the loss, the amount is an addition to the full contract price unpaid, meaning the full value of the performance the defendant promised and did not render.21 The addition is needed because the promised performance was never going to repay these outlays directly, as a contract price repays the cost of making the goods. The passage explains their inclusion this way: the breach has prevented probable future gains and made their amount impossible to determine.22 The outlay thus stands in for a gain the plaintiff cannot prove, which is the reasoning that supports reliance damages generally when a breach has prevented an anticipated gain and made proof of loss difficult.23
A buyer who relies on a seller’s promise of special machinery and spends money removing part of a factory wall so the machine can be installed shows the category at work. When the seller breaches and no comparable machine can be purchased, the buyer recovers the cost of removing and rebuilding the wall.24 The expense is incidental because it is no part of the price the buyer pays for the seller’s performance.25 The qualifier about comparable machines carries weight: where a substitute could be bought, the opening would still serve and the loss would shrink.
The first Restatement excluded collateral expenditures of this kind, while the Restatement (Second) permits reliance damages for them. Whether a particular collateral outlay is recoverable depends on the facts, not on a categorical rule, because such outlays may or may not have been within the parties’ contemplation and so may or may not be barred under the rule limiting consequential damages.26
The contract price limits essential reliance but not collateral reliance. Fuller and Perdue reasoned that when essential reliance exceeds the contract price, the contract was a losing one, and an award above the price would leave the injured party better off than full performance would have. That logic does not reach collateral outlays, so the price should not limit them.27 Maine Rubber International v. Environmental Management Group, Inc. shows how large collateral losses can run. The plaintiff paid $1,900 for an environmental assessment of a prospective business site, the defendant falsely reported the property free of problems, and the plaintiff lost more than $211,000 in wasted expenditures when hazards surfaced and its planned move was aborted. The court allowed recovery as reasonably foreseeable reliance damages even though the total far exceeded the contract price.28 In this subsection’s vocabulary, the plaintiff’s own side of the bargain was paying $1,900, and the wasted move was a collateral outlay the price was never meant to repay. What stood between the plaintiff and an unlimited claim was foreseeability. The later section on the contract price ceiling returns to how the price relates to reliance more generally.
Foreseeability is the gate through which collateral outlays pass, and the defendant’s side of the bargaining table shows why. A defendant who knew at signing that the buyer would open a wall or relocate a business could price that exposure, bargain for a disclaimer, or decline the deal. A defendant without that knowledge could do none of those things, and charging it would turn every post-signing choice of the plaintiff into the defendant’s burden. Essential outlays pass the gate almost automatically, since the contract itself calls for them, whereas a collateral outlay may or may not have been within the defendant’s contemplation.29
Questions on collateral outlays usually turn on what the defendant knew at signing.
Step three decides most close cases. The later section on ordinary limits on reliance treats foreseeability, along with the causation question in step four, as limits that apply to every reliance claim.
Forgone Opportunities
The reliance baseline is the world in which the contract was never made, and that world includes everything the promisee held before the promise: a job, a salary, a business opportunity.31 A promisee who surrendered one of those things to take up the deal is worse off than at the starting point even though no money changed hands. Outlays are one form of reliance loss; gains given up are another.
Two promisees who trusted the same kind of promise show why the baseline must reach forgone gains. One spends $5,000 on supplies, and the other resigns from a salaried position. Each acted because of the promise, and each is left with a loss when it fails. A rule confined to cash outlays would reimburse the first and ignore the second, who may have given up more.
The value of an opportunity forgone because of the contract is an opportunity cost, and an opportunity cost is a reliance cost. An example is rejecting an offer of full-time employment because one has accepted a different full-time position.32 The label matters because expectation asks what performance would have delivered, and a passed-up alternative forms no part of what performance would have delivered. The old salary exists only in the world before the promise, which is the world the reliance baseline restores.
Dialist illustrates the point. Besides out-of-pocket development costs, the award it upheld included two months of forfeited salary and the value of lost medical insurance, all treated as costs incurred in reliance on the contract.33
The harder task is keeping two wage figures apart: the wages given up at the old job and the wages the promised job would have paid. A court applying Indiana law drew that line for a promise of at-will employment. Future wages are only an expectation of income, and promissory estoppel will not support their recovery in an at-will setting. Wages forgone in preparing to move are different, as are moving expenses themselves: in each, the employee gave up a presently determinate sum in order to relocate.34 Both were the hopeful employee’s costs of positioning himself for the new job; moving expenses are out-of-pocket losses, forgone wages are opportunity costs, and both are reliance costs, not expectancy damages.35
The same analysis reaches a business opportunity. General was in lively negotiations with National and repeatedly told Bacardi so, and Bacardi’s promise left General with an opportunity that all the parties knew would lose value once Bacardi announced it would go elsewhere. The court treated the extent of that devaluation as a reliance injury, not an injury to General’s expectation of future profit, and compared it to the moving expenses incurred because of promised employment in Eby v. York-Division, Borg-Warner and Pepsi-Cola.36
The principle is not confined to employees. In Bouton v. Byers, a daughter who gave up teaching work on her father’s promise to leave her the ranch property if she came to help him work it recovered reliance damages measured by the salary she would have earned from teaching. The ranch itself, the thing promised, would measure expectation; the teaching salary sits on the reliance side.
The $32,000 sits in the world before the promise, so it belongs to reliance. The $120,000 describes the world performance would have created, so a claim for it is an expectation claim, and where the promise was terminable at will, a court following Indiana’s approach would refuse it as that court refused future wages.37 The engineer also cannot collect both figures, because the new salary and the old salary cover the same months, and paying each would compensate the same lost income twice.
Forgone salary is the easiest of these gains to prove, because the plaintiff gave up a determinate sum.38 Whether other forgone opportunities, for which no payroll record fixes the value, should be recoverable as reliance damages is harder, because they may be too speculative.39 A defendant may also argue that a plaintiff with the right experience could find other reasonable work, which reduces the award by what reasonable mitigation would have earned.40
Precontract Expenditures
Section 349 speaks of “expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance,” and that wording assumes a contract already exists, since a performance must be there to prepare for.42 The harder question is whether money spent before the contract was made belongs in the award. A plaintiff who spent heavily while courting the deal can fairly call the spending preparation in the plainest sense, while the defendant can answer that it had promised nothing when the money went out. Courts may refuse reliance recovery for costs incurred before the contract was made, although some decisions go the other way, and the split turns on whether the court asks what prompted the spending or what the breach wasted.43
The usual reason for denial lies in the baseline defined earlier: the reliance interest reimburses loss caused by reliance on the contract, measured from a world in which the contract was never made.44 Money that left the plaintiff’s hands before the promise existed was not moved by the promise; the plaintiff would be out the same sum had the deal never been struck. Such spending fails the first half of the description of a reliance outlay, that the contract induced it, even when it satisfies the second, that the breach wasted it. In Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, a fight promoter was refused recovery of expenses it incurred before the boxer signed the contract.45 No promise existed when that money was spent, so the outlays reflected the promoter’s own wager on landing the contract.
A second consideration concerns the defendant’s ability to protect itself. A party not yet bound has had no chance to price, limit, or decline a risk it may not know about, and allowing recovery of costs the other side ran up beforehand would let a plaintiff enlarge the defendant’s exposure just by spending earlier.
The contrary result appears in Security Stove & Manufacturing Co. v. American Railway Express Co., where a shipper recovered precontract expenses from a carrier that failed to deliver goods to an exhibition and thereby caused those expenses to be wasted.46 The shipper’s exhibition spending came before the carriage contract, so the carrier’s promise could not have induced it; what linked the carrier to the loss was the breach, which left the money without any return. Security Stove thus treats waste caused by the breach as sufficient where Dempsey treated the absence of inducement as decisive. The two decisions answer different questions, one asking what prompted the spending and the other asking what ruined it.
Anglia Television Ltd. v. Reed presents the timing problem in sharp form. The producer of a television film arranged a place to film and engaged a director, a designer, and a stage manager before it had a leading man. Only then did it secure Robert Reed, whose agent later repudiated; the producer could find no substitute, accepted the repudiation, abandoned the film, and gave notice to the people it had engaged.
Every arrangement predated Reed’s promise, so the answer depends on the inquiry the court adopts. If the question is whether the contract induced the spending, none of it qualifies, because the promise came after the money was gone. If the question is whether Reed’s repudiation wasted the outlays, and whether a performer engaged to carry a production would reasonably have contemplated that preparations built around his role would be lost if he failed to appear, the answer may differ. The producer’s failed search for a substitute matters under the second inquiry, because it ties the repudiation to the loss of the arrangements already made.
The second inquiry has support as a rule. A more permissive position allows recovery of precontract expenditures when the parties would reasonably have contemplated at the time of contracting that the expenses would be wasted if the defendant breached, and when the other limits on recovery do not bar the claim.47 That position applies foreseeability to the timing problem, and it meets the defendant’s complaint about being unable to price the risk, because the question becomes what the defendant could anticipate at signing and not when the plaintiff opened its wallet. A defendant that knew the other side had been preparing, and that promised knowing a breach would strand that preparation, could charge for the exposure or refuse. Recovery would still face causation, reasonable certainty, and mitigation, and the § 349 offset for any loss the defendant proves the plaintiff would have suffered on full performance.48
A stem that gives both the date of an expenditure and the date of the contract calls for sorting the expenses by time. Outlays made after the contract fall under § 349 directly, as the earlier subsections explained. Outlays made before it carry the tendency toward denial and its reason, that the contract did not induce them, followed by the contrary view that asks whether the parties would reasonably have contemplated the waste at the time of contracting. The usual error is to read “preparation for performance” as covering any preparation, whatever its date.