Concept
Efficiency and Remedy Choice
Specific performance and injunction
Efficiency and Remedy Choice
The damages-first rule is a judgment about cost. A court may order specific performance against a party who has breached or threatens to breach, but only in its discretion and subject to the limits in §§ 359–69.1 The first limit is adequacy: like other equitable remedies, specific performance is available only if damages are not an adequate remedy.2 The economics behind that limit explain when it holds and when it gives way.
The economics begin with the efficient breach, a breach after which the promisor, having paid damages, is still better off than if it had performed. The idea is old and contested. The rules governing contract remedies have often been called "amoral," sometimes in praise and sometimes in blame, and the passage most often quoted for that view comes from Holmes's 1897 address dedicating a new hall at the Boston University School of Law.3 A hypothetical shows the argument at its strongest. A manufacturer agrees to sell a machine for $100,000 that is worth $120,000 to the buyer. Before delivery, a third party offers $150,000. Assume a court can measure the buyer's loss exactly. If the manufacturer sells to the third party and pays the buyer $20,000, the buyer ends up where performance would have left it, the manufacturer nets $30,000 more than the contract promised, and the machine goes to the person who values it most. On those facts damages do the whole job, and an order to deliver would only make the manufacturer buy its release from the buyer. The argument rests on one assumption, that damages can be measured and collected, and the three circumstances of inadequacy studied earlier in this chapter (a loss that cannot be proved, a substitute that cannot be bought, an award that cannot be collected) are the places where that assumption fails.
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co. is a case in which the assumption held. After a six-week trial, a jury found for the mine and awarded it $181 million. The trial judge entered judgment on the verdict, rejected the mine's argument that it should receive an order requiring NIPSCO to comply with the contract in place of damages, and dissolved the preliminary injunction. The mine, whose only customer was NIPSCO, shut down shortly afterward.4
The Seventh Circuit began with the contract. A fixed-price contract is an explicit assignment of the risk of market price increases to the seller and of market price decreases to the buyer, and this contract, which placed a floor under the price but allowed escalation, made the assignment to the buyer even clearer. A buyer that forecasts the market wrongly and finds itself locked into a disadvantageous bargain has only itself to blame. The court then turned to remedy. Specific performance, like other equitable remedies, is available only if damages are not an adequate remedy, and the court saw no reason to suppose them inadequate.5 The jury's verdict had already shown that the mine's loss could be priced.
Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co. reaches the opposite result under the same analysis. Walgreen, a tenant in Sara Creek's mall, held a contractual right to keep a rival pharmacy out, and Sara Creek threatened to bring in Phar-Mor anyway. Judge Posner affirmed an injunction. An injunction, he observed, leaves the parties to work out their conflict themselves. Once enjoined, Sara Creek would bargain with Walgreen for release of the restriction. Walgreen would not take less than its lost-profit expectation, and Sara Creek would not pay more than the value to it of getting Phar-Mor into the mall, so the price they reached would leave both better off, much as in the sale of any other property right. The bargaining would take time and money, but its cost might well be less than that of a full-fledged court proceeding with its tedious and expensive parade of expert witnesses.6 A threatened breach of a promise to refrain fits the forbearance ground for an injunction.7
The court did not pretend the injunction was free. Bargaining may break down and end in an impasse, and the efficiency gains of private agreement are then lost and damages may be the only way to settle the dispute. An order that calls for performance by the breaching party also often requires judicial supervision and enforcement, which may be costly and burdensome, while a lump-sum judgment ends the court's involvement.8 The order Walgreen won asked only that Sara Creek refrain, so the second cost mattered little there.
The two cases, set side by side, show how the facts move the answer. In NIPSCO the contract had settled who bore the risk, a jury had priced the loss, and an order would have added nothing that damages could not supply. In Walgreen the loss was future profit that a court could reach only through a full proceeding with expert witnesses, and an order let the parties price their own release. The premise that damages are the default produced different remedies because damages could measure the loss in one case and not in the other.
The Uniform Commercial Code applies the same weighing to goods. A buyer may obtain specific performance or replevy the goods "in a proper case,"9 and "other proper circumstances" is a ground of its own, independent of uniqueness.10 Three cases show that ground tracking the places where damages fall short. In the cryolite case, the buyer, Kaiser, could have covered partly by buying uncommitted cryolite from other sellers and fully by contracting with buyers who already held long-term contracts, a course that would have been costly but feasible. Because cover was difficult though not impossible, the court held that these were other proper circumstances in which specific performance could issue, which means that costly cover can warrant the remedy.11 In Stephan's Machine & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery Consultants, Inc., a buyer had borrowed $96,000 for a machine that failed to function and could not raise the money to buy another, although replacements were on the market. The court granted specific performance of the seller's promise to replace the machine because of the buyer's financial position.12 In Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, a federal district court declared that a cotton merchant selling to textile mills was entitled to specific performance of its contracts with farmers and enjoined the farmers from breaching them, because cotton was "unique and irreplaceable" given its scarcity.13 Beneath each result lies the same premise. The common law and the Code proceed as if the costs of bargaining out of an order generally exceed the risk that damages will undercompensate, and these cases mark the points where that risk grows large.14
Remedy choice also presupposes a breach. In Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., a service station operator sought to enjoin Mobil from ending his franchise. The opinion suggested in dictum that a franchise resembles an output contract and so suits injunctive relief, yet the court denied the injunction because the contract allowed the franchisor to cancel, and cancelling therefore breached no obligation.15
Courts recite the adequacy rule far more faithfully than they follow it. The irreparable-injury rule, also called the adequacy test, is one that courts continue to cite but do not usually follow literally.16 Many cases never mention the test, others find plenty of grounds for calling the legal remedy inadequate, and denials of equitable relief often rest on practicality or policy, not adequacy.17 The weighing of costs described above, more than the adequacy formula, therefore tends to decide cases.
An essay on a seller who breaches to take a better offer calls for four steps. First, identify the breach, since Triple T shows that without one no remedy follows. Second, ask whether damages can make the buyer whole, as they could in NIPSCO. Third, if damages cannot, because the loss is hard to prove, a substitute is hard to find, or an award is hard to collect, say that an order is available in the court's discretion, as in Walgreen and the goods cases. Fourth, check the practical limits and equitable defenses covered earlier in the chapter.