Concept
Adequacy of Damages
Specific performance and injunction
Adequacy of Damages
A court will not order specific performance or an injunction if damages would adequately protect the injured party’s expectation interest.1 That rule, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359(1), is the gateway to every request for these remedies, and it asks one question about money: if the court merely awards damages, will the promisee end up where performance would have left her? When the answer is yes, a coercive order has nothing left to repair.
Money damages are the preferred remedy for breach, and the cases that depart from that preference share a theme. Money cannot adequately right the wrong, either because the amount of the damages is uncertain or because money is not an adequate substitute for having the bargain carried out.2 Two breaching sellers mark the range. A dealer who refuses to sell a car leaves the buyer free to buy the same car at another dealership, so damages can make the buyer whole.3 A seller who refuses to deliver a unique Monet leaves a buyer who cannot buy that painting from anyone else, because the joy of owning it cannot be measured in money, and a court would likely order delivery against payment of the price.4
The rule’s wording carries its history. The chancellor first granted equitable relief to supply the deficiencies of the common law, so equitable remedies came to be called “extraordinary.” During the long jurisdictional struggle between the two systems of courts, an “adequacy” test developed to keep the chancellor from encroaching on the common law judges: equity would stay its hand if the remedy at law was adequate. Courts then added the gloss that money damages were ordinarily adequate, a gloss encouraged by the philosophy of free enterprise, since in a market economy money ought to let an aggrieved promisee arrange a substitute transaction.5
Courts still recite the test, but its importance has declined. Many cases never mention it, others invoke it and then find plenty of grounds for calling the legal remedy inadequate, and adequacy is often judged liberally in favor of equitable relief. When relief is denied, the ground is often one entirely distinct from adequacy, such as practicality or policy.6 The rule’s second name, the irreparable-injury rule, carries the same warning: courts continue to cite it but do not usually follow it literally.7 Treat adequacy, then, as the first screen in a longer inquiry. The later screens are the practical limits on relief and the equitable defenses.
Section 360 turns the abstract question into three concrete ones. In judging adequacy, it treats three circumstances as significant:8 the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable certainty,9 the difficulty of procuring a suitable substitute performance by means of money awarded as damages,10 and the likelihood that an award of damages could not be collected.11 Each names a different way for money to fail: the number cannot be fixed, the thing cannot be bought, or the money never arrives. The list is not exhaustive. Inadequacy can also appear when the plaintiff would have to bring multiple proceedings to vindicate his rights, or when damages are substitutionary and ineffective.12 The next three subsections take the § 360 circumstances in order, and the fourth covers two refinements to the gateway rule.
Difficulty Proving Damages
The first circumstance in § 360 is the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable certainty.14 A damages award is only as good as the evidence behind it. The factfinder must turn the loss into a number, and when the evidence is thin the number is a guess that will probably land above or below the true loss. A promisee whose award lands low receives less than the contract promised, and that shortfall is what the adequacy test exists to catch.
Equitable relief sidesteps the problem rather than solving it. An order that compels the performance, or forbids the breach, gives the promisee the thing bargained for, so no one has to price it. That is why the traditional idea of uniqueness reduces, in Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enterprises, to a question of information. Breach becomes redressable by specific performance not because the property is physically unique but because its value is uncertain: “What matters, in measuring money damages, is the volume, refinement, and reliability of the available information about substitutes for the subject matter of the breached contract.” When that information is thin and unreliable, the risk of a mistaken award is substantial.15
Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co. shows the proof problem at its sharpest. Walgreen held a lease with an exclusivity right, and Sara Creek, which controlled the mall, planned a deal to bring in Phar-Mor, a competing pharmacy. The trial court held that damages would not adequately compensate Walgreen for its exclusivity right and enjoined the Phar-Mor deal until the Walgreen lease expired, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.16 The injunction was the most appropriate remedy because the lease ran for many years and Walgreen would have great difficulty accurately proving its lost profits and goodwill over that term.17 Those losses depend on how a nearby competitor would wear down sales and customer loyalty over years, and no market posts a price for that erosion.
Judge Posner’s opinion adds a second reason an injunction handles the proof problem well: it leaves the valuation to the parties. Once enjoined, Sara Creek would presumably bargain with Walgreen for a release of the restriction. Walgreen will not take less than its lost profit expectation, and Sara Creek will not pay more than the value to it of getting Phar-Mor into the mall, so the parties will or should agree on a price that leaves both better off, very much as with the purchase and sale of any other property right.18 The injunction also had features that kept it easy to enforce. It was a simple prohibition that needed no court supervision, and neither Sara Creek nor the competing pharmacy would be unduly harmed by it.19
Walgreen and the warehouse lease differ not in size or duration but in the reliability of the data. Walgreen’s loss turned on future competition and goodwill, which no market prices; the manufacturer’s loss turns on rents that a market posts. A large loss that can be computed from reliable data leaves damages adequate, and an answer that treats size alone as inadequacy skips the question the rule asks.
A loss that reduces to a formula is the clearest case. In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., the loss to Carbon County was the contract price (as escalated over the life of the contract) times quantity, less the cost of mining the coal over that life. Carbon County did not even argue that $181 million was an unreasonable estimate of the present value of that difference. Its complaint was that the money would do nothing for the miners who had lost their jobs or for the satellite businesses that had closed.20 The argument about third parties raises a different issue, taken up in the unit on hardship and third parties. On the question of proof, nothing was left to dispute.
Long duration does not by itself make damages inadequate, but it magnifies the proof problem when the future turns on markets or regulation that no one can forecast. In Colorado-Ute Electric Ass’n v. Envirotech Corp., damages built on the cost of a chemical additive for a precipitator that had to meet state pollution-control levels were speculative, because the state might stop allowing the additive and because of deregulation and market fluctuation.21 In the dispute between Oglebay Norton and Armco over iron-ore shipping under a contract running through 2010, the court upheld specific performance because swings in Great Lakes shipping rates and the length of the contract would have made accurate damages impossible.22 Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, a five-year scrap-steel output contract broken in its first year, belongs on the same list: the court ordered performance in part because any estimate of damages would be speculative.
Difficulty Finding Substitutes
The second § 360 circumstance asks whether money awarded as damages can procure a suitable substitute for the promised performance.24 This is the traditional uniqueness idea in modern dress. If the promisee can take the money and buy what was promised, the award restores the expectation that § 359(1) protects. If she cannot, she holds money in place of the thing she bargained for, and the injury is only partly repaired. The last subsection asked whether a judge can put a number on the loss; this one asks whether that number, once paid, can buy the performance back.
A functioning market usually supplies the answer. When a replacement is for sale, damages equal the extra cost of getting it, and a buyer who pays the higher price ends up with the same goods the seller promised. Fortner v. Wilson, the car-dealer case, stands for that reasoning. A buyer who can be satisfactorily compensated through damages and can buy the same car from another dealership is better served by damages, and parties already at odds are likely to quarrel again if ordered to keep dealing with each other, while a fresh purchase carries no such animosity.25 The Fortner rule later found its way into UCC § 2-716, though in relaxed form.26
At the other end of the range sit things that no market supplies. The buyer of the unique Monet wants that painting, and no award of money buys it from anyone else.27 Land is the classic example. The common law treated each parcel, however ordinary, as unique, so a vendor’s default left the purchaser unable to find a substitute for any amount of money, and a decree of specific performance would ordinarily issue. Equity extended relief to vendors as well when purchasers defaulted, although the case for doing so was less compelling.28 Uniqueness in this sense does not require that the thing be literally one of a kind. An entitlement is legally unique if it cannot be assuredly replaced with an equivalent, which is why a share of stock in a closely held corporation, or an heirloom or painting that holds a unique place in the plaintiff’s affections, can qualify.29 Cumbest v. Harris extends the same logic to personal property of peculiar or sentimental value.
Scarcity can make an ordinary thing as hard to replace as a rarity. UCC § 2-716(1) permits specific performance where the goods are unique “or in other proper circumstances,”30 and the provision has been read to reach goods that are not unique in the strict sense but are very scarce or cannot be replaced by alternative sources, as in Copylease Corp. of America v. Memorex Corp.31 In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, the buyer used Chantenay carrots in large quantities and furnished the seed to the growers, and it was virtually impossible to obtain them on the open market. The carrots were not claimed to be more nutritious, but their blunt shape made them easier to handle in processing, and the court held on the adequacy question that the case was appropriate for specific performance.32 Boeving v. Vandover reasoned similarly about a new car that could not be had elsewhere without great expense and trouble.
A promisee’s inability to fund a substitute can have the same effect even when substitutes exist. In Stephan’s Machine & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Machinery Consultants, Inc., the plaintiff borrowed $96,000 to buy a machine that failed to function. The defendant agreed to replace it but did not. Such machines were available elsewhere, but the plaintiff could not raise the money to buy one, and the court granted specific performance of the replacement agreement because of the plaintiff’s financial position.33 The case shows the independent significance of the “other proper circumstances” language, a point the later unit on sales of goods develops.
A steep price rise is not the same as scarcity, and the difference is a frequent exam trap. Cotton buyers who sued farmers for specific performance met an obvious objection: buying substitute cotton on a risen market would simply cost more money, and damages can cover that difference.34 Weathersby v. Gore and Duval & Co. v. Malcom are among the cases that denied specific performance of cotton contracts. Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep went the other way. It declared that a buyer in the business of buying cotton from producers and selling it to textile mills was entitled to specific performance, and it enjoined the farmers from breaching, because the cotton was “unique and irreplaceable because of the scarcity of cotton.”35 The split shows that the line is one of degree. Once the argument shifts from uniqueness to difficulty, the chancellor’s judgment, attitude, and discretion become the significant determinants of adequacy. Some chancellors will find difficulty in getting substitute performance enough, others will not be so readily convinced, and plaintiffs must lean more on persuasion about the facts than on legal rules.36
Physical distinctiveness is not the test. In Van Wagner, an advertising company sought specific performance of a lease of a wall used for billboard advertising and argued that the wall’s exposure made it unique. The court refused. The point at which a breach becomes redressable by specific performance lies not in any inherent physical uniqueness of the property but in the uncertainty of valuing it, so the question is how reliably a court can measure the cost of a substitute.37 Where an established market prices comparable billboard space, a wall that is unique in the physical sense can still be adequately compensated in money.
Land keeps its special treatment even when the parcel is ordinary. Courts still follow the traditional rule without asking whether the particular property is in fact unique, so a buyer can compel specific performance of a contract to purchase unit 10C even though unit 10D is available at the same price.38 A court deciding adequacy may also look to the purposes and expectations of the parties. A buyer who is a dealer with a primary interest in reselling for a profit may be adequately served by a money judgment, while a buyer who planned to occupy and farm the tract can readily show that it was irreplaceable.39 In one case, buyers who would have bought property for $21,000 and sold it for $22,000 recovered a $1,000 judgment, and the court said that judgment gave them all the relief a deed would have given.40
Step two does the work. Two errors recur: treating a steep rise in market price as proof of inadequacy, when a buyer who can still buy at the higher price is made whole by the difference, and treating physical distinctiveness as uniqueness, which Van Wagner rejects.
Collecting a Damages Award
The third § 360 circumstance is the likelihood that an award of damages could not be collected.42 The first two circumstances asked whether a court can put a number on the loss and whether the money can buy a replacement. This one assumes favorable answers to both and asks whether the money will ever reach the promisee. A judgment delivers value only to the extent it can be collected, and a promisee who holds an uncollectable judgment holds paper in place of the performance she bargained for.
Insolvency is the usual way collection fails. A legal remedy can be inadequate when the defendant is insolvent or when it is otherwise impossible to collect a monetary judgment.43 A buyer who has prepaid a seller of doubtful solvency has every reason to want the goods rather than a claim for their value.
Insolvency alone does not entitle the plaintiff to a decree. It helps only when the defendant is still capable of rendering the performance even though he could not pay money damages, and equity may be willing to order the performance in that case.44 The reason lies in what a decree is for. A court issues one only on a showing that it will serve a useful purpose, so if the defendant cannot comply, because she has already transferred the subject matter to a bona fide purchaser or substantially destroyed the property, the decree would be futile.45 Bankruptcy adds a second limit. If the defendant’s debt is discharged in bankruptcy, his obligation under an injunction may be discharged as well, at least where compliance with the order will require a financial outlay.46
The circumstance drops out when collection is not in doubt. A solvent seller can pay a judgment, and a buyer who prepaid nothing and can buy the same goods elsewhere is made whole by damages. Article 2 also gives a buyer a separate route to the goods themselves: if the goods have been identified, the buyer may recover them as provided in § 2-502,47 a right a later unit takes up. The two tools fit together. The equitable circumstance covers the promisee whose damages cannot be collected from a defendant who can still perform, and the Code supplies a statutory path to goods already identified to the contract.
Partial Adequacy and Other Remedies
Two refinements in § 359 keep the adequacy question from being applied too mechanically.49 The first concerns contracts with several parts. Under § 359(2), the adequacy of damages for failure to render one part of the performance due does not preclude specific performance or an injunction as to the contract as a whole.50 A contract is a single bargain at a single price, and the rule treats it that way, so one decree can resolve the entire bargain instead of splitting it between an order for the part that damages cannot protect and a damages claim for the rest.
The refinement removes an obstacle without creating a right. Some part of the performance must still fail the § 359(1) test before a decree becomes available, so a contract for ordinary, replaceable goods stays in the damages column however many items it lists. Even when one part fails, the rule says only that adequacy for another part does not preclude a decree. Specific performance is still granted in the discretion of the court, subject to the rules stated in §§ 359–69.51
The second refinement concerns remedies other than damages. Under § 359(3), specific performance or an injunction will not be refused merely because there is a remedy for breach other than damages, but the court may consider that remedy in exercising its discretion under § 357.52 The first half follows from the question § 359(1) asks, which tests whether damages protect the expectation interest. A different remedy that leaves the expectation unprotected does not satisfy that test. Other remedies are plentiful: a treatise on land contracts, for example, lists damages, liquidated damages, specific performance, vendor’s lien, restitution, and vendee’s lien among the remedies for breach.53
Restitution is the familiar example, and it has its own entry requirements. A claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment, including a remedy originating in equity, need not demonstrate the inadequacy of available remedies at law. The wrinkle is disgorgement of profits for opportunistic breach, where the plaintiff must show that the available damage remedy affords inadequate protection.54 A refund of a prepaid price returns what the buyer gave up but not the performance she bargained for, which is why the refund’s availability does not by itself bar a decree.
The second half of the rule keeps the court’s discretion intact. Because the decree remains discretionary, a court may take another available remedy into account when it weighs the considerations for and against an order. Neither half makes the decree a matter of right, since the claimant must still show under § 359(1) that damages fail to protect the performance itself. An answer that denies relief merely because restitution exists has applied the adequacy test to a remedy it does not cover, and an answer that says another remedy can never matter has overlooked the discretion § 359(3) preserves.
A decree and damages can also work together. When a breach has caused a loss that specific performance will not completely avert or recoup, the court may award damages for that irretrievable loss in addition to the decree. If a seller refuses to convey business premises, for example, the court could order conveyance and also award the buyer the profits lost during the delay between the contractual delivery date and compliance with the order.55 And when a court declines a decree on grounds other than adequacy, damages remain the fallback. In a case in which the sellers breached because Mrs. Vastola had a serious, progressive neurological condition, the court recognized that the Kilarjians were entitled to the benefit of their bargain but refused specific performance as heartless and unjust and remanded to determine their damages.56 That hardship ground is taken up in a later unit.