Concept
Extraordinary Equitable Remedies
Specific performance and injunction
Specific Performance and Injunctions
Extraordinary Equitable Remedies
Every valid contract entitles each party to expect that the other will perform, and a breach disappoints that expectation.1 Money is the usual cure, but the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also lists, among the judicial remedies for breach, a judgment or order requiring specific performance of a contract or enjoining its nonperformance.2 Specific performance is a court order directing the party who has broken, or threatens to break, a promise to carry it out as agreed. An injunction commands a party to act or to refrain from acting, and in a contract case it can hold a promisor to a promise to refrain. Courts treat both orders very differently from damages, and the difference begins with enforcement.
An injunction is a personal command to the defendant to act or to avoid acting in a certain way, and a defendant who willfully disobeys may be jailed, fined, or otherwise sanctioned for contempt.3 Courts ordinarily have no comparable contempt power for enforcing a damages award. A specific-performance decree works the same way, because it too is an order directed at the defendant. That exposure to contempt is what makes the coercive remedies especially threatening, and it is why courts call them 'extraordinary': a court hesitates to bind a party personally when disobedience could bring a contempt sanction.4
Courts answered that hesitation by ranking remedies. Legal remedies are preferred unless the remedy at law is inadequate to address the claim.5 History explains the ranking. The chancellor first granted equitable relief to supply the deficiencies of the common law, so equitable remedies were readily characterized as extraordinary. During the long jurisdictional struggle between the two court systems, an 'adequacy' test developed to keep the chancellor from encroaching on the common law judges, and equity would stay its hand if the remedy at law was adequate. Courts then added the gloss that money damages ordinarily were adequate, a gloss encouraged by the philosophy of free enterprise, since in a market economy money should let an aggrieved promisee arrange a substitute transaction.6
The rule survives for reasons beyond tradition. When damages are an adequate remedy, a monetary award is often a simpler, fairer, and less intrusive way to give relief to the victim of breach.7 Specific performance is therefore not the norm. It is reserved for unusual cases where damages are shown to be incapable of adequately compensating the victim.8
Two contrasting situations show where the line falls. In the first, money buys exactly what the contract promised.
Damages are the better remedy here for two reasons. Rosa can buy the same car elsewhere, so a damages award fully compensates her. And the parties are already at odds, so ordering them to keep dealing with each other would invite further disputes that a fresh purchase from another dealer avoids.9
In the second situation, no market can supply the promised thing.
A damages award, however carefully computed, would leave Marcus without the thing he bargained for. That is the unusual case in which specific relief is justified because damages cannot adequately compensate the victim.10 The question that separates the sculpture from the sedan is whether money can buy the promised performance elsewhere, and a later section develops that question under the heading of adequacy of damages.
Inadequate damages do not make a coercive order automatic. Specific performance of a contract duty is granted in the court's discretion against a party who has committed or threatens to commit a breach, subject to the rules the Restatement states in §§ 359 to 369.11 In Lucy v. Zehmer, the court conceded that specific performance is not a matter of absolute or arbitrary right but is addressed to the court's reasonable and sound discretion. It then held that this discretion is not arbitrary or capricious, because established doctrines and settled principles of equity control it. Where a contract is unobjectionable in its nature and circumstances, the court said, a decree of performance is as much a matter of course in equity as an award of damages is at law. The court therefore reversed and remanded for a decree requiring the defendants to perform.12
Those settled principles tell a court what to look for before it decrees performance: a valid contract with definite and certain terms, a claimant who is ready and able to perform its own duties and has satisfied the conditions of the agreement, a breaching party able to perform, no adequate remedy at law, and a balance of interests and hardships that favors the claimant. The court also weighs the difficulties of fashioning, supervising, and enforcing the order.13 The traditional grounds for denying a decree mirror those requirements: the legal remedy is adequate, the hardship to the defendant outweighs the plaintiff's legitimate interest, the equities favor the defendant, or the order would demand too much judicial supervision.14 A contract that is too one-sided falls within the third ground, and so do unclean hands and undue delay. Unconscionability, a doctrine rooted in both law and equity and closely related to unclean hands, is decided by the court as a matter of law as of the time the contract was made.15 A court that refuses a decree on one of these equitable grounds leaves the claimant free to seek the legal remedies that remain, usually damages.16 The sections that follow take up adequacy, practical limits, and these defenses in turn.
The coercive remedies can also be combined with damages. The Restatement's list of remedies is not exhaustive, since replevin of a chattel, reformation, and cancellation supplement it, and the listed remedies are not mutually exclusive, because a court may in the same action both require specific performance of a promise and award damages for its nonperformance.17 The reason is that a decree sometimes fails to undo the whole loss. When the breach has caused a loss that performance will not avert or recoup, the court may award damages for that irretrievable loss in addition to the decree. If a seller refuses to convey business premises, the court may decree conveyance and also award the buyer the profits lost between the contractual delivery date and the date the order is finally obeyed.18 The overlap has a limit. A decree is generally inconsistent with a judgment for damages for total breach, because a plaintiff who receives the very performance bargained for should not also be paid for the value of the defendant's promise.19 Damages alongside a decree therefore cover only the residual loss. Treatises on land sale contracts accordingly treat specific performance as one entry in a longer list of remedies for breach, alongside damages, liquidated damages, a vendor's lien, restitution, and a vendee's lien.20 For specific performance in a litigated dispute, see Godwin v. Godwin.
The last remedy on the Restatement's list, a judgment declaring the rights of the parties,21 belongs in a different category from the coercive pair. A declaratory remedy furnishes an authoritative and reliable statement of what the parties' rights are. By itself it makes no award of damages, restitution, or injunction, although other remedies may be added if necessary.22 A judgment that a lease clause lets the tenant renew for five years declares the tenant's right and commands no one, so it carries no contempt exposure. When a fact pattern asks what remedy a court has granted, ask whether the judgment orders anyone to do or refrain from something.