Concept
Negligence and Failure to Read
Reformation
Negligence and Failure to Read
A careful reading would have exposed almost every error that reformation corrects, so the claimant's carelessness is the obvious defense for a resisting party to raise. Take the simplest case. The parties agree on a price of $127, and one of them, through an arithmetical slip, writes $37 into the contract. The error is entirely the writer's own, and a second look at the sum would have caught it. Even so, the writer can ask the court to reform the contract to state the true price, because contract law seeks to enforce the contract the parties intended to make and not the one that results from a failure to record the terms correctly on paper.1
Section 155 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lets a court reform a writing that fails to express the agreement because of both parties' mistake as to its contents or effect. It conditions relief on that mistake and says nothing about how carefully either party read.2 If a careless reading defeated the claim, reformation would help only against errors that no one could have caught, and few errors are so well hidden. The question is how much the claimant's carelessness weighs once the other requirements are met, and the answer is very little.
Section 157 states the general rule. A mistaken party's fault in failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract does not bar avoidance or reformation, unless the fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.3 The test measures fair dealing, not diligence. Courts often express the same idea in older terms: simple negligence does not bar relief, but gross negligence or the violation of a positive legal duty does. No workable definition separates the two kinds of negligence, and the labels tend to patch over the uncertainty instead of resolving it.4 A California appellate decision, White v. Berrenda Mesa Water District, states the point for rescission and reformation together: lack of care defeats relief only when it amounts to gross negligence or neglect of a legal duty. For reformation in particular, the weight of authority holds that, if the requisites of reformation are met, negligence is no bar unless it has in some way harmed the other, non-negligent, party.5 The three formulations point the same way. Ordinary inattention is no defense, and bad faith or injury to the other side is.
The rule follows from what reformation enforces. The court enforces the agreement the parties reached, not the signature on the page, so the claimant's failure to catch the error changes nothing about what was agreed. The party resisting reformation loses only the windfall the error would have produced and ends up where an accurate writing would have left it. Carelessness begins to matter when that last statement stops being true, and it can stop being true in two ways. A claimant who suspected the error and looked away has moved from carelessness toward bad faith, which is the exception § 157 recognizes. A claimant whose inattention led the other side to change position has caused a loss that correction would now place on someone who did nothing wrong.
In Sikora v. Vanderploeg, both parties intended the agreement to reflect the earnings shown in a report, and both overlooked the error in the agreement. The court found a mutual mistake in expression and reformed the agreement, which defeated the buyer's claim that the agreement falsely recited presale earnings.6 Neither side read closely enough to catch the error, and the inattention did not matter, because the court asked only whether the writing matched what both parties had intended. Excusing carelessness does not relax the proof required. The claimant must still establish the mistake by clear and convincing evidence.7
The negligence defense has force when the other side has acted on the writing. Suppose a party who never read a deed seeks reformation after the other side, relying on the deed as signed, has resold the property. Correcting the writing now burdens the non-negligent party with a loss that the claimant's inattention helped cause, and a resale of that kind can make the negligence a bar. The court may also stop short of denying relief and attach whatever conditions to its decree it considers equitable.8 A third party who relied on the record has rights of its own, which § 155 protects directly and which are treated below as a separate limit on reformation.9
This rule seems to collide with the familiar duty to read, under which a signer is ordinarily held to what a reading would have revealed. The two doctrines answer different questions. Reformation applies when the parties have already reached an agreement and the writing fails to state it accurately, and in that case reforming the writing to express their mutual intent is the normal remedy.10 The writing is then only evidence of the earlier deal, and it yields to better evidence of that deal. The duty to read controls where no earlier agreement exists against which to test the writing. The signed document is then the only manifestation of assent, and a signer who could disown its terms by saying the document went unread would leave the other side with nothing to rely on. A party who alone is mistaken stands differently again, because a unilateral mistake supports reformation only when it is coupled with fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.11
The insurance setting shows the duty to read still at work. An insured who has failed to read the policy is generally not entitled to reformation, because reformation corrects a policy only to state accurately the terms the parties agreed on.12 Carelessness taken alone does not explain the result. When a claimant carelessly believes that a record contains a certain clause, and the other party neither shared nor induced that belief, the temptation is to deny relief on the ground of the claimant's negligence. The sounder ground is that the record does not misstate any prior agreement.13 That returns the analysis to the prior-agreement requirement. Neither party in Sikora read closely enough to catch the error, so what separates that case from the insured's is the existence of an earlier agreement, not the degree of care.
The first step does most of the work in practice. A problem that presents an unread document signals that the duty to read and the right to reformation are both in play, and the presence or absence of an earlier agreement decides which one governs. Carelessness comes in only at the end, as a limited defense against the claimant who dealt unfairly or whose inattention cost the other side something.