Concept
Proving the Mistake
Reformation
Proving the Mistake
Contract law seeks to enforce the contract the parties intended to make, not the one that results from a failure to record the terms correctly on paper.1 Suppose you and Alice agreed on a price of 127 dollars, you made an arithmetical error when you wrote the contract, and she now insists on holding you to the 37 dollars on the page. You can ask the court to reform the contract to reflect the true price.2 Section 155 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the general rule: when a writing fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to its contents or effect, the court “may at the request of a party reform the writing to express the agreement.”3 The rule does not say how a party proves that the writing is wrong, and that question decides most reformation cases.
The proof is hard because it runs against the signed document. A court looks first to the writing to learn what the parties agreed, and the plaintiff’s claim is that the writing is wrong on the very point in dispute. Whatever shows the variance must therefore come from outside the document: an earlier draft, a term sheet both sides initialed, a surveyor’s notes, the testimony of the people who negotiated the deal. Two problems follow. Rules that ordinarily keep outside evidence away from a finished writing, or that require certain contracts to be in writing, appear to stand in the plaintiff’s way. And outside evidence of what was said before a deal went sour is easy to invent.
The law answers with a trade: it admits the evidence and demands that the evidence be strong. If the exclusionary rules applied in full, no mistaken writing could ever be corrected, because the only proof of the true agreement would be barred. If the evidence came in under the ordinary civil burden, any party unhappy with a signed contract could unsettle it with testimony about an earlier conversation. Lifting the bars while raising the burden lets a genuine slip be corrected and keeps a change of heart from passing for one. This section takes up the burden first, then the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds, the two doctrines that yield.
Clear and Convincing Evidence
A party who seeks reformation must do more than prove the mistake by a preponderance of the evidence; the evidence of mistake must be clear and convincing.4 Tennessee courts have said so repeatedly, citing the Restatement’s commentary to § 155, and they ground the rule in the law’s strong favor toward the validity of written instruments.5 The standard is higher than the one that is normal in civil cases.6 In a mutual-mistake case, what must be established to that degree is the agreement the parties actually intended.7 Where the claim rests on fraud, the claimant must instead offer clear evidence of what the agreement would have been but for the fraud.8
The gap between the two standards is the practical point. An ordinary civil claimant wins by showing that the claim is more likely true than not, so a slight edge in credibility is enough. A reformation claimant needs more than an edge, and needs it for the right target. The goal of reformation is to correct the contract so that it reflects what was actually agreed, not to adjust or rewrite its terms.9 In one dispute, a buyer sued the seller on the ground that the contract misstated presale earnings. Both parties had intended the agreement to reflect the earnings in an existing report, and both had overlooked the error in the agreement, so the court found a mutual mistake in expression and reformed the agreement, which defeated the buyer’s claim.10 The report gave the court a fixed point against which to measure the writing.
The heightened burden does not change what evidence may be heard. The extrinsic evidence comes in, and the standard then tests it. In Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. v. Porro, a federal court in Massachusetts held that the parol evidence rule allowed extrinsic evidence that the parties did not intend the terms of a settlement agreement to release a claim against former attorneys, but it required the mutual drafting mistake to be shown by clear and convincing evidence.11 The same source shows the standard’s bite with another case, in which a defendant might have asked to reform an agreement to add a warranty of quality on the ground that it was accidentally omitted. He probably could not have met the higher standard, and the court’s opinion suggests he did not even try.12
Mistaken land descriptions are a familiar setting for reformation. In United Bank v. Ashland Development Corp., an Arizona court reformed property-line descriptions in deeds for mutual mistake, and the source sets R & B Farms, Inc. v. Cedar Valley Acres, Inc. beside it for comparison.13 Morton v. Morton is a further decision on correcting a mistaken instrument.
Test a reformation claim by asking what the claimant has for each of three things: the agreement, the variance between the agreement and the writing, and, where possible, how the wrong term got in. Documents made before the dispute fix what was agreed, and the person who prepared the writing can explain the slip. Testimony from the parties is admissible, but a single recollection set against a denial and a signed writing seldom leaves a fact-finder with a firm conviction. A claim backed on all three counts can meet the standard; a claim backed only by one side’s account of what was meant usually cannot.
Parol Evidence Rule
The parol evidence rule keeps a party from using earlier or contemporaneous understandings to contradict a writing the parties adopted as the final statement of their deal, and a reformation plaintiff offers exactly that kind of evidence: proof of an agreement reached before the writing was prepared, offered to make the document say something other than what it says.
The collision is resolved in favor of the evidence. The rule does not apply to evidence offered to establish a right to an equitable remedy such as reformation (Restatement (Second) § 214(e)).15 Because courts of equity created the remedy, the parol evidence rule has no application in reformation cases.16 A merger clause does not change this: even in the face of one, parol evidence is admissible to show grounds for granting or denying reformation.17 The evidence comes in for a limited purpose, which is to explain and correct the terms of the contract and not to vary or contradict them.18
The rule yields for a practical reason. It protects a writing the parties adopted as the final expression of their agreement, but a reformation plaintiff claims that the writing does not record the agreement at all. That claim can be proved only with evidence from outside the writing, so applying the rule would exclude the only proof and defeat the claim before any court asked whether the writing was accurate.
Admission does not decide the case. The Restatement’s commentary says that prior or contemporaneous agreements and negotiations may be used to establish that the parties were mistaken, but because mistakes are the exception rather than the rule, the trier of fact should examine the evidence with particular care when a party tries to prove one.19 The Kimmel court took both steps in order: it admitted the extrinsic evidence, and it still required the mistake to be shown by clear and convincing evidence.20
The evidence comes in only through the mistake theory. In Goodwine State Bank v. Mullins, a bank asked a court to reform a deed and relied on parol evidence of the parties’ intentions and understandings about their written Agreement. The court held that this evidence could not properly be considered in deciding whether to reform the deed.21 Evidence of that kind is admitted only if the writing is ambiguous or if a mistake kept it from reflecting the parties’ actual agreement. The bank could not use the first route, because the trial court had already ruled the Agreement unambiguous, and it could not use the second, because it had abandoned its claim that a mistake kept the Agreement from reflecting the real deal.22
Goodwine does not retreat from the Lot 12 scene; both outcomes follow from one principle. The exception belongs to the mistake theory and not to the word reformation in the prayer for relief. When a party says the writing misrecords the deal, the evidence tests the accuracy of the writing, and the rule has no reason to keep it out. When a party drops that theory and the writing is clear, the same evidence only adds to or varies a document that stands as the parties’ final statement, which is the use the rule exists to stop. A contrary result would let any party escape a clear writing by captioning a request for different terms as reformation.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds raises a second obstacle. Assuming a contract is within the statute (the sale of land is the familiar example), it is enforceable if the contract itself is in a record or a memorandum of it exists.24 Reformation seems to run straight into that rule, because the plaintiff offers evidence of an unwritten earlier understanding in order to change what a written record says.
Most courts hold that the Statute of Frauds does not bar reformation or the evidence offered to prove it. They reason that the court is not enforcing an oral agreement but rectifying the record to conform it to what the parties thought they were recording: “The correction of erroneous instruments therefore does not rest necessarily upon any assumption that a prior completed oral contract is being enforced.”25 Another source puts the point flatly: the Statute of Frauds does not apply to actions for reformation.26
A minority of jurisdictions refuse to admit the evidence, on the ground that admitting it would fly in the face of the statutory ban against enforcing oral agreements.27 The minority’s worry has a real core. The proof a reformation plaintiff needs is the kind the statute distrusts, and reformation could become a back door through which an invented oral bargain enters a signed record. The majority answers that worry with three safeguards, each aimed at a different way the door could be abused.
Each step meets a separate concern. The first ensures that reformation leaves behind a writing that satisfies the statute. The second keeps reformation from becoming a tool for renegotiation: a term the parties chose to leave out is part of the record they made, and adding it by decree would hand one side what it gave up in order to close. The third meets the fabrication risk directly, because clear and convincing proof is much harder to assemble from one party’s recollection than a preponderance would be. With all three safeguards in mind, it would be incorrect to state that permitting reformation violates the policy of the Statute.29
New York has drawn a peculiar distinction: although a written contract may be reformed, a memorandum of a contract may not be. The rule apparently stems from confusion between the exclusionary rules of the Statute of Frauds and the parol evidence rule.30 On an exam, state the majority rule and its three safeguards, and mention the minority view and the New York distinction only if the facts invite them.