Concept
Shared Mistake Requirement
Reformation
Shared Mistake Requirement
Section 155 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts lets a court reform a writing that fails to express the parties’ agreement “because of a mistake of both parties as to the contents or effect of the writing.”1 The earlier elements concerned the deal and the document: an agreement existed, the parties meant to record it, and the writing departs from it. This element concerns the people who signed. It asks whose mistake the law recognizes, and for the ordinary case the Restatement’s answer is both parties’.
The answer follows from what reformation does. A court that reforms a writing conforms it to an agreement the parties already made. If both parties signed believing the document recorded that agreement, the correction gives each side the bargain it thought it had. If only one party was mistaken, the other may have signed a document that matches its own understanding of the deal, and a rewrite in the mistaken party’s favor would hand that party a term the other never accepted. A court of equity may revise a writing to make it conform to the real agreement, but it has no power to make a new contract for the parties, whether the mistake is mutual or unilateral.2
The requirement bends in one direction. A mistake held by one party can still support reformation when the other party knew of it, suspected it, or brought it about. The first subsection below covers the core case, mutual mistake. The second covers that extension and where it stops.
Mutual Mistake
The court in Shrum v. Zeltwanger defined a mutual mistake as one that is “reciprocal and common to both parties, each alike laboring under the same misconception in respect to the terms of the written instrument.”3 The word “mistake” covers more ground in general contract usage: the parties may have meant different things, or at least one party may have held a belief that did not match the facts or the law.4 Reformation’s mutual mistake is narrower. It is the same misconception, held on both sides, about the writing.
When the writing fails to express the parties’ intention through the inadvertence of both, the California Supreme Court said in Lemoge Electric v. San Mateo County, the mistake is mutual and the contract may be revised on the application of the aggrieved party.5 Another court puts the point this way: a mutual mistake occurs when the written instrument fails to set forth the parties’ “true” agreement.6
New Jersey law shows where the requirement stops. It requires that the minds of the parties have met on a prior existing agreement that the writing fails to express, and it describes mutual mistake as requiring that both parties be in agreement at the time they try to reduce their understanding to writing.7 In Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein, the Epsteins signed an option agreement they believed contained no credit provision, while Bonnco knew the credit was in the document and intended it. Because the two sides were not in agreement about the credit when the understanding was put in writing, no shared misconception existed for a court to correct.
Courts that speak of “mutuality” usually mean that one party’s belief, held alone, that the record will contain a given provision is no ground for reformation. That idea is already contained in the requirement of a prior agreement that the provision be included in the record.8 If the other party never agreed to the term, the claim fails at the prior-agreement element and never reaches mutuality. The labels “mutual” and “unilateral” therefore make a poor starting point. The questions about the prior agreement and the agreement to record it do the sorting, and the extension for a counterparty who knew of the error is the subject of the next subsection.
The phrase “mistake of both parties” also appears in § 152, which governs avoidance, but what the parties must share differs. Under § 152(1), both parties share a mistake about a basic assumption on which the contract was made; if the mistake materially affects the agreed exchange, the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party unless that party bears the risk of the mistake.9 Under § 155, the shared mistake concerns the contents or effect of the writing, and the remedy is to correct the writing.10 If two parties both wrongly assume that a well on the land they are trading produces water, the mistake concerns a basic assumption. If both wrongly believe that a signed contract says $2,000 when it says $2,200, the mistake concerns the writing.
Proof of the shared mistake often decides the case. Compare United Bank v. Ashland Development Corp. (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990), which reformed property line descriptions in deeds for mutual mistake, with R & B Farms, Inc. v. Cedar Valley Acres, Inc. (Neb. 2011), which denied reformation because the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the description in the agreement resulted from mutual mistake.11 The standard of proof is taken up in a later section.
Unilateral Mistake and Misconduct
The words “mistake of both parties” describe the ordinary case, but reformation reaches further. The California Supreme Court explained in Lemoge Electric v. San Mateo County that when only one party is mistaken about the contract’s provisions and the other knows or suspects the mistake, the contract may be reformed to express a single intention that both parties entertained.13 The extension keeps the central idea intact. The writing still misstates an agreement the parties reached, and the knowing party shares that agreement even though it does not share the mistake about the document.
The shared-mistake rule protects the party who made no error, because a rewrite in the mistaken party’s favor would take away a bargain the other side actually struck. That protection fails when the party knew or suspected the error. It agreed to the earlier deal, understood that the writing misrecorded it, and let the other side sign anyway; reformation takes from it only the advantage the error would otherwise confer. Silence counts as conduct here. Non-disclosure is treated as the equivalent of misrepresentation where one party knows that the record does not express the other’s intention and knows what that intention is.14 Courts also state the extension in terms of misconduct: reformation is available where a unilateral mistake is coupled with fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.15 One formulation lists three elements: a valid agreement that sufficiently expresses the parties’ real intention, a written contract that failed to express it, and a failure due to mutual mistake, or to unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud or inequitable conduct by the other party.16
Where a record is wrong because of mistake alone, reformation is usually the exclusive remedy. Where it is wrong because of misrepresentation, reformation and avoidance are alternatives.17
Duress follows the same pattern in a narrow setting. It is normally a ground only for setting a transaction aside, but where a lender forces a borrower to assent to a mortgage on terms different from those earlier agreed, reformation of the mortgage to conform to the prior contract is an appropriate alternative.18
The limit depends on what the misrepresentation is about. A misrepresentation supports reformation only when it relates to the content or legal effect of the record.19 Misrepresentations about the qualities of the subject matter, or about other factors that affect the desirability of the bargain or the economic equivalence of the exchange, do not, because such relief would require the court to remake the agreement itself.20 A lie about quality persuades the victim to accept the terms in the document, so the document records the deal the victim actually made. No earlier agreement says anything different for the writing to be conformed to. The victim’s remedy lies outside reformation, in avoidance of the contract or in damages.21
A one-sided mistake with no knowledge, suspicion, or misconduct on the other side falls outside the rule. The other party meant the writing as it stands, so no single intention differs from the text. The facts of Lemoge show the point: the plaintiff sought more than the sum designated in its bid, but the complaint never alleged that the defendant had agreed to pay more, so it stated no facts entitling the plaintiff to reformation.22 Equity conforms a writing to a real agreement; it does not supply one.
When one party alone is mistaken, then, ask two questions. Did the other side know or suspect the error, or cause it? And did any misrepresentation concern what the record says or does, as opposed to the quality or value of what is exchanged? An insured who simply failed to read the policy is generally not entitled to reformation,23 a point the section on negligence develops.