Concept
Prior Agreement and Writing
Reformation
Prior Agreement and Writing
Section 155 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets two conditions before it mentions any mistake. The writing must be one “that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole or in part,” and it must “fail[] to express the agreement.”1 Each condition points to a fact outside the document: an agreement the parties reached, and their decision to record it in a writing. The words “in whole or in part” mean the writing need not capture the entire deal, so the inquiry narrows to the term in dispute.
A record can fail only if something existed to record. The earlier agreement supplies the standard against which the court measures the document. Without it, the court would have to decide what the parties should have agreed to, and that would be making a new contract. The agreement to record ties the document to that earlier understanding. Where the parties meant to leave a term for later bargaining, a document that omits it has misrecorded nothing.
Illinois courts turn these conditions into elements of proof. In addition to mistake, the party seeking reformation must show an agreement between the parties, an agreement to put it in writing, and a variance between the agreement and the writing.2 Mutuality of mistake, which courts often discuss separately, adds no fourth element, because the requirement of a prior agreement that the provision be included in the record already encompasses it.3 Later sections treat mutual mistake and the variance. This section takes the first two elements, because the variance cannot be measured without them.
The Prior Agreement
Section 155 permits reformation only where the writing “fails to express the agreement,” and the definite article matters, because it points to an agreement that existed before the document and apart from it.4 That agreement is the benchmark. The court lays the writing beside it and, if the two differ through mistake, conforms the writing to the agreement. A plaintiff who cannot say what the parties agreed about the disputed term gives the court nothing to conform the writing to.
The California Supreme Court treated the requirement as a standard in Lemoge Electric v. County of San Mateo. Reformation corrects a writing to carry out the common intention of both parties, so the plaintiff must show an understanding on all essential terms. Otherwise, the court said, no standard exists to which the writing could be reformed.5 The court read California’s reformation statute the same way, as referring to a single intention entertained by both parties, and one party’s private expectation that the writing would contain a term is not that intention.6
The facts of Lemoge show the requirement failing. The plaintiff sought more than the sum designated in its bid, but its complaint never alleged that the defendant had agreed to pay more than that sum. The complaint therefore stated no facts entitling the plaintiff to reformation.7 The writing matched the only agreement alleged, so no variance existed to correct, and inserting the higher figure would have created an agreement instead of recording one.
Two other decisions reach the same limit by different routes. In Goodwine State Bank v. Mullins, a bank argued that the parties’ written agreement obliged the grantor to convey his contingent remainder, and that the deed should be reformed to the extent it conveyed less. The Illinois appellate court held that reformation would have been proper only if the prior agreement, as reduced to writing, required that conveyance. It did not, so the bank had not proved its right to reformation.8 In New York Central Iron Works Co. v. United States Radiator Co., the seller argued that a limit on the quantity of goods was necessarily part of the contract. The facts were found against it at trial, and the court rejected the contention because the parties had left the contract open and indefinite as to the quantity the buyer might order.9 In Goodwine the earlier agreement was in hand and lacked the term. In New York Central the seller had to prove by evidence that the parties had agreed to a limit, and the proof failed.
The earlier agreement need not be an enforceable contract. It may be only an understanding that, if a contract is made and recorded, it will contain a particular provision. It may also be a term in a tentative agreement that binds no one until a final writing is signed.10 Reformation asks whether the record is accurate, and it does not ask whether the earlier understanding could have been sued upon. A rule demanding a binding earlier contract would exclude the usual case, in which parties settle terms informally and one of them then prepares the document. Where the parties made no formal prior agreement, Illinois courts will hear evidence of what the parties intended when they executed the writing.11
Error is a second limit on the benchmark. If the record varies from the prior agreement by error, and not by subsequent modification, it may be reformed.12 A party whose writing departs from the earlier agreement because the parties later changed their terms has shown a modification, which is not a recording mistake. On any claim that a writing misstates a deal, then, ask first what the parties had settled about the disputed term before the document was prepared, and then whether the document departs from that settlement by accident.
Agreement to Record It
The second requirement appears in the text of § 155, which reaches “a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement” and so assumes that the document is the parties’ chosen record of a deal already struck.14 The middle element of the Illinois list joins the other two: the parties must have agreed to put their agreement in writing.15 If they agreed that the writing would embody the deal, a court can hold the document against the deal and treat any difference as a recording error. If the document was only one more stage of bargaining, it stands for nothing earlier, and the gap between it and what one side hoped for is simply the result of the negotiation.
Bradshaw v. Provident Trust Co. illustrates a plaintiff who can show both halves. The buyer and seller orally agreed on every term, including that the buyer would take the property subject to a mortgage without assuming it, and they agreed to sign a formal contract recording those terms. The seller’s draft inserted an assumption clause, and the buyer signed without noticing. The parties had settled the term and had agreed that the formal contract would carry it, so the clause in the draft misrecords what they agreed. The plaintiff’s task follows from this: to show that the parties meant the final writing to contain the term in dispute. Showing that the term was discussed, or that the plaintiff wanted it, does not carry that burden.
A belief held by one party alone that the final writing would contain a clause falls short. A mistaken belief by one party that the record will contain a given provision is no ground for reformation, and the requirement of a prior agreement that the provision be included already covers the point, so the mutual-unilateral distinction adds nothing to the analysis.16 Each side enters a negotiation with hopes, and most go unmet by the time of signing. If a private hope were enough, every party who lost a clause could call its absence a mistake and ask a court to supply what the negotiation withheld. The other side never agreed that the clause would appear, so the writing misrecords nothing about their shared deal.
A clause that came up in negotiations and is missing from the signed writing raises a further question: why is it missing? Terms intentionally omitted may not be added by a decree of reformation.17 A deliberate omission is an edit the parties made to their own record, so the final writing says what they chose it to say. Adding the term would override that choice and give the party who traded the clause away to close the deal a second chance to win it.
On an exam, a missing clause begins the analysis. Put two questions to the facts: did both parties agree that the writing would contain the term, and is the term absent by accident or by choice? How the plaintiff must prove the answers, including the clear and convincing standard, is the subject of a later section.18