Concept
Reformation Versus Other Doctrines
Reformation
Reformation Versus Other Doctrines
Reformation fixes one specific problem: a writing that misstates a bargain the parties actually made. Section 155 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says so directly, letting a court reform a writing that "fails to express the agreement" because both parties were mistaken about its contents or effect.1 Two other doctrines respond when a deal and its document seem out of step, and each answers a different problem: rescission ends a contract whose premises were false, and interpretation reads the words the parties used. Two questions about the facts sort a case among the three. Does the trouble lie in the writing or in the premise behind the deal? And does the dispute concern what the words on the page mean, or whether they are the right words? The first question separates reformation from rescission, and the second separates it from interpretation.
Reformation Versus Rescission
Reformation keeps the contract in force and rectifies an inaccuracy in its written terms so that they match the parties' original understanding, while rescission unmakes the contract.2 The remedy a court chooses depends on where the mistake sits, and trust law names the two locations. A mistake of expression occurs when the instrument misstates what the parties intended, omits a term they meant to include, or includes one they meant to exclude. A mistake of inducement occurs when the instrument accurately records what they intended but the intention rested on a mistaken belief about fact or law.3 In a contract case the first kind of mistake calls for reformation, the normal remedy when the writing fails to state the parties' actual agreement accurately.4 The second calls for avoidance, the principal remedy for mistake.5
Each remedy fits its failure for a reason. When only the writing is wrong, the parties still made a good contract and it should be enforced; a mistake in writing the deed would not justify rescission.6 Rescission would also deny one party the benefit of a bargain actually made.7 When the parties instead made a mistake about the premises of their agreement, about some fact in the world outside the document, reformation is no solution, because a court cannot know what they would have agreed to but for the mistake.8 Fraud in inducing an agreement follows the same logic: it warrants rescission or damages, but reformation could only impose a contract to which the parties did not agree.9 Rescission with restitution suits a flawed premise, since avoidance ends the contract and each party restores any benefit it received.10 Courts reserve this drastic remedy for cases in which the basic assumptions of the contract are affected.11
In Renner v. Kehl, both parties believed that adequate water supplies existed beneath the property. That belief was "a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract," and the shared mistake had such a material effect on the exchange as to upset the very bases of the contract. The contract was therefore voidable, and the respondents were entitled to rescission.12 The error concerned a fact about the land, not the words of the contract, so there was no wrong term for a court to correct. A buyer who pays $500,000 for a lakefront lot that both sides believe can carry a luxury home, only to learn that the ground is too porous and unstable to support a building, stands in the same position. The shared understanding of the purpose of the sale makes the mistake the basis of the bargain.13
A mistake that lies in the document produces the opposite result. A deed may be reformed to correct a misdescription or to convey the kind of tenancy the parties agreed upon, and a contract may be reformed to state the goods or the payment the parties agreed upon, even when the writing is wholly unambiguous.14 In Scott v. Grow, the deed misstated the kind of tenancy the parties had agreed on, and the cure was to reform the deed and let the sale stand. What separates that case from Renner is whether any term of the writing departs from what the parties agreed before it was drafted. A transcription slip differs in kind from a mistake of fact: it did not motivate the transaction, and the manifestation rests on no faulty premise but simply records the agreement incorrectly.15
Either remedy under the mutual-mistake sections requires an error that both sides share. Sections 152 and 155 each provide that the parties must share the erroneous assumption, a point the court stressed in Bonnco Petrol, Inc. v. Epstein.16 A later section takes up the shared-mistake requirement in detail.
The fifth step is where courts divide. Parties often agree on a general formula at one stage and on a precise term at a later stage, as when "all my land" becomes "lots 1 and 2." A judge who treats the formula as the agreement will reform a deed conveying lots 1 and 2 if the grantor in fact owns more.17 A judge may instead treat the formula as an earlier stage and the precise term as the agreement, so that the deed states what was agreed. Courts have reached contradictory results on facts that straddle this line, some finding a mistake that induced the bargain and others a mistake in articulating it.18
The facts are identical in both outcomes. What changes is the court's view of which stage of the negotiation counts as the agreement, and evidence of what the parties bargained over, such as what fixed the price or what each side thought it was buying, decides the point. A student who asks only whether the parties were mistaken will find a mistake on both versions, and the credit lies in locating it.
Section 152(2) ties the two remedies together in one instruction. In deciding whether a shared mistake about a basic assumption has a material effect on the agreed exchange, account is taken of any relief by way of reformation, restitution, or otherwise.19 The reasoning follows from the purpose of avoidance. A mistake justifies calling off a contract because it unbalances the exchange, and a cure that restores the bargain reduces that imbalance.
Reformation Versus Interpretation
A court that interprets stays inside the writing and resolves what language already there means. A court that reforms may add language the instrument never contained, or delete language included by mistake, whenever the change is necessary to conform the writing to the parties' intent.23 Reformation may be granted even when the writing is wholly unambiguous.24 The two courts therefore ask different questions. Interpretation asks what these words convey. Reformation asks whether they are the words the parties agreed on at all.
That difference drives the proof. Because reformation may insert language found nowhere in the document, or strike language that looks clear on its face, evidence from outside the writing is essential to it.25 Such evidence is open to unreliable or contrived testimony, so trust law requires clear and convincing proof before it allows reformation, and a later section takes up the burden for contract claims.26 A dispute that a court can resolve by reading the words in context never needs that heavier machinery.
One sale shows where the line falls. The buyer sued the seller, claiming that the contract misstated the presale earnings. Both parties had intended the agreement to reflect the earnings in a report, and both had overlooked the error in the agreement. The court found a mutual mistake in expression and reformed the agreement, defeating the buyer's claim that it falsely recited presale earnings.27 No one needed to decide what the recital meant; the question was whether it recorded the deal. The court also did what reformation is for, which is to correct the contract so that it reflects what was actually agreed, not to adjust or rewrite its terms.28
The two versions differ in the one respect that decides the remedy: whether an agreement reached before the writing was prepared says something other than the words on the page. A dispute about the meaning of the words the parties used calls for reading them. An earlier agreement on different content calls for correcting them, because enforcing the writing as it stands would give one side a bargain nobody made.
A mistake may also concern legal effect. Sometimes the parties' agreement called for a particular legal result while the record, if enforced, produces a different one, and reformation is available.29 A party who owned property as trustee, for example, signed a contract of sale in her individual capacity.30 A mistaken belief about the law that was the reason for making the deal at all is different, because it falls on the inducement side of the line drawn above.31 The later section on errors in legal effect develops this territory.
A plaintiff who cannot know whether the court will see the dispute as one about meaning or one about word choice may plead both. The plaintiff asserts that its reading is the correct interpretation and, failing that, asks that the writing be reformed to state the earlier agreement. Modern practice generally permits pleading in the alternative.32 The positions do not contradict each other, because both begin from an earlier agreement and differ only on whether the writing already captures it. Parol evidence is freely admitted on the reformation count, but it must satisfy the rules on the admissibility of parol evidence for purposes of interpretation.33