Concept
Purpose of Reformation
Reformation
Reformation of Written Contracts
Purpose of Reformation
A landlord and tenant shake hands on rent of $1,500 a month. When the lease is typed, the figure comes out as $1,800, and both of them sign without noticing. A year later the landlord sues for the higher amount. The lease says one thing, the parties agreed to another, and the court must decide which controls.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 155 gives the tenant a way to ask for the agreed figure. It provides: “Where a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in whole or in part fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to the contents or effect of the writing, the court may at the request of a party reform the writing to express the agreement, except to the extent that rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for value will be unfairly affected.”1 That correction is reformation, and each later section of this chapter develops one piece of the sentence.
Courts do not reach for the remedy lightly. The law has a strong policy favoring enforcement of contracts as written, and one court acknowledged that this policy “must occasionally give way” when both parties were operating under a mutual mistake at the time they signed.2 The exception stays narrow because courts give effect to the expressed wills of the parties and will not second-guess what the parties would have agreed to had they known the facts.3 A writing that no longer expresses the parties’ will is the one case in which enforcing the text would defeat that principle.
One idea runs through all five parts: reformation corrects the record and leaves the bargain alone. To conform a writing to an earlier agreement, a court needs an agreement to conform it to. Where the parties never reached an understanding on a term, no standard exists against which to correct the writing. To remake the bargain, by contrast, a court would have to guess what the parties would have agreed to had they known facts they did not know, and every contract would then stand open to a judge’s second-guessing.4 Lemoge Electric v. San Mateo County states the limit directly: a court of equity may revise a written instrument to make it conform to the real agreement, but it has no power to make a new contract for the parties, “whether the mistake be mutual or unilateral.” The plaintiff there sought reformation, but its complaint never alleged that the defendant had agreed to pay more than the sum designated in the bid, so it stated no facts entitling the plaintiff to reformation.5
Two decisions show where the line falls. In Sikora v. Vanderploeg, a buyer claimed that the agreement falsely recited presale earnings. Both parties had intended the agreement to reflect the earnings in a report, and both had overlooked the error in the agreement. The court found a mutual mistake in expression and reformed the agreement, which defeated the buyer’s claim.6 In Silsbe v. Houston Levee Industrial Park, LLC, an option holder asked for reformation because the parties had mistakenly selected a public holiday as the deadline for exercising the option. The court refused. The parties may not have realized that the deadline fell on a holiday, but it was the date they intended, so the option correctly reflected their intent, and reformation would have changed the contract rather than corrected an error in expression.7 In the first case the writing departed from what the parties intended; in the second it matched their intent, and the disappointment came from an unexamined assumption about the calendar.
Reformation takes more than one procedural form. A court can physically rewrite the document, or it can simply recognize the corrected agreement as a defense. Some suits for damages also proceed at law as if the instrument had been reformed, so that the plaintiff recovers damages for breach of the original agreement even though it was improperly written down. Alternatively, the plaintiff can obtain a constructive trust or specific performance in accord with the original agreement.8 In every form the court enforces the agreement the parties made and not the one the document mistakenly records.
Not every judicial adjustment fits that description. If the parties contract to buy and sell Blackacre at $1,000 per acre for a total price of $100,000, but the land turns out to contain only 90 acres, some courts might require the seller to accept $90,000. This is likely to go under the name of specific performance with abatement, but it is a method of reforming the parties’ contract, quite possibly not to their intentions. Insurance policies are likewise “reformed” to meet the insured’s expectations rather than necessarily what the parties agreed upon, and judicial adjustment of long-term contracts for unexpected conditions is not unheard of. All these forms of nontraditional reformation have generated controversy.9 This chapter returns to them near its end, after it has set out the traditional remedy.