Concept
Election of Remedies
Rescission
Election of Remedies
A buyer who was defrauded into buying a car returns it to the dealer. Under the traditional doctrine of election of remedies, that act may be treated as a choice to disaffirm the purchase, which would preclude an action for damages. Had the buyer instead written to the dealer demanding damages for the fraud, the doctrine might have treated the letter as an affirmance of the sale. Either buyer could be bound by that first act even though the dealer suffered no prejudice and no double recovery occurred, and the election might be deemed irrevocable before the buyer filed suit or consulted a lawyer.1
The problem exists because a defrauded party has two paths. A party induced by fraud to enter a contract may rescind and recover what it paid, or may affirm the contract and sue for damages in deceit.2 The paths lead in opposite directions, since rescission undoes the bargain and damages enforce it. This section asks how firmly an early step down one path commits a party who later learns that the other path was better.
The modern answer comes from Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378: a manifestation of a choice among remedies, by bringing suit or otherwise, is no bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on the manifestation.3 The traditional doctrine asked only what the claimant had done; § 378 adds a question about what the other side did in response. The subsections below follow that shift, sort the remedies that truly conflict from those that do not, and end with the Uniform Commercial Code, which goes further for sales of goods.
Traditional Election Doctrine
The traditional doctrine holds that when an injured party has two available but inconsistent remedies for one harm, choosing one is a binding election that forecloses the other. Courts developed it to serve equitable principles against double recovery and undue prejudice to a defendant. Some applied it so rigidly, however, that it extinguished a cause of action before suit was filed, even where the plaintiff never intended to make a true election.4
Inconsistency has a technical meaning here. A remedy affirms a transaction when it treats the contract as valid and measures relief by it, as damages do, and it disaffirms a transaction when it treats the contract as undone, as rescission does. Remedies are traditionally called inconsistent when one comes from affirming and the other from disaffirming. The typical conflict is between rescission and damages, but the rule applies to any such pair, such as replevin, an action to recover specific property, and damages.5
Courts often say the doctrine avoids duplicated relief, and many cases do avoid duplication by invoking election. Many others force an election when duplication is no problem, on the ground that the remedies are logically inconsistent: a plaintiff cannot say in one breath that the contract bound the parties and in the next that it did not.6
The doctrine works through two rules that differ in timing. The either/or rule says the plaintiff cannot actually recover both kinds of remedy. Standing alone it demands no choice before judgment, because both claims may go to the factfinder and a verdict may even favor the plaintiff on both, so long as both are not enforced by judgment.7 The second rule imposes an election before trial. Some courts required the plaintiff to announce an election at or before trial and then held the forced election binding, and potentially any act that could be seen as a ratification of the transaction was treated as an affirmance that precludes rescission.8 Some courts went further and held that commencing the action is itself an election that bars a later amendment asking for a different remedy, although other courts rejected that view.9
The rule could bite in either direction. A plaintiff who had sued for damages could not change course and ask for replevin instead, and more commonly could not switch to rescission.10 The same logic led some courts to deny punitive damages to a plaintiff who rescinded for fraud, because every damages remedy was considered to affirm the contract while rescission disaffirms it.11
The judge's order tracks the practice of courts that required an announced election at or before trial and then held it binding.12 The structural flaw is plain: the plaintiff must choose when it knows least, and a wrong guess costs the plaintiff its claim even though the defendant was harmed by nothing.
The doctrine governs inconsistent remedies, not inconsistent theories, and an answer that blurs the two misstates it. Modern procedure permits alternative and even factually inconsistent claims and defenses, so a plaintiff may plead common-law fraud together with statutory misrepresentation, or fraud together with breach of contract, and will simply be entitled to one satisfaction.13 That is why a forced election at the pleading stage, when a plaintiff has sued for both rescission and damages in one complaint, in effect subverts the liberal joinder and alternative pleading rules now common in most procedural systems.14
The doctrine has fallen out of favor. A standard legal dictionary says it has largely fallen into disrepute and is now rarely applied, and it lists a narrower sense in which election is an affirmative defense against a litigant who pursues a remedy inconsistent with one already pursued, where that earlier remedy gave the litigant an advantage over, or damaged, the opposing party.15 The objection to the older rules is that a change of course threatens a defendant only when it creates a real problem, and a whole catalog of doctrines already protects against that: laches and estoppel, the court's discretion to deny rescission to prevent hardship, and procedural rules.16
A Washington decision, Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., took the same view. It called for liberal treatment of the doctrine for two reasons: the doctrine was created solely to prevent double recovery, so a harsh application is often unnecessary, and the doctrine as sometimes applied conflicts with modern pleading rules that allow alternative demands for relief and amendments to conform to the evidence. The court added that the doctrine should not be ignored when the defendant has relied to its detriment on the plaintiff's prayer for relief or has been otherwise prejudiced.17 That qualification carries the central idea of the modern law, and § 378 turns it into a rule.
Section 378 Reliance Rule
Section 378 reverses the traditional default. It provides: “If a party has more than one remedy under the rules stated in this Chapter, his manifestation of a choice of one of them by bringing suit or otherwise is not a bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes his position in reliance on the manifestation.”21 A claimant who has filed a complaint, written a demand letter, or announced a preference therefore stays free to pursue another remedy until both conditions are present, and proof of only one is not enough.
Illinois decisions show the reliance condition at work. In Gironda v. Paulsen, the court said the election doctrine applies in cases of alternative pleading only where the opposing party has substantially altered his position in reliance on the plaintiff's choice. In Finke v. Woodard, a plaintiff who first claimed damages was allowed to add a claim for rescission because the defendant had not substantially changed position in reliance on the initial claim, and it was proper to submit both the legal and the equitable claims to the jury. In Altom v. Rouse Co., a letter terminating a contract to repair a roof was not an election of remedies, because the contractor had not yet started work and took no affirmative action in reliance on the letter.22
A change of position is material, according to the Restatement comment, when in all the circumstances a shift in remedies would be unjust.23 The test measures the harm to the party who relied, and it explains Altom: a contractor who has not started work loses nothing when the other side reverses course.
Inconsistency is the other condition, and it never completes a bar by itself. The comment adds that preclusion arises only where the remedies in fact exist and are inconsistent with one another. A party cannot, for example, obtain specific performance, which affirms the bargain, and also seek damages for total breach.24 The next subsection sorts the remedies that conflict from those that do not.
The two homeowners differ in one respect: the first contractor did something the reversal cannot undo, and the second did not. That difference echoes the caution in Melby that the doctrine should not be ignored when the defendant has relied to its detriment on the plaintiff's prayer for relief or has been otherwise prejudiced.25
The bar still operates on some facts. In the Illinois decisions that treat a plaintiff as bound by an election, the plaintiff has typically done more than file a pleading. In Lombard v. Elmore, one of the plaintiff's inconsistent claims was prosecuted to judgment. In SJS Investments, Ltd. v. 450 East Partnership, the plaintiff obtained one of his remedies, the return of his earnest money. In Cala v. Gerami and Bruno Benedetti & Sons, Inc. v. O'Malley, the plaintiff declared a forfeiture of the contract.26 A plaintiff who has been paid on one remedy has received what that remedy promised, and a declared forfeiture tells the other side the contract is over; a suit left unprosecuted does neither.
Nothing in § 378 permits double recovery. The rule decides only when a claimant may shift from one remedy to another. Preventing double recovery was the doctrine's original purpose, and it still does its work when judgment is entered.27
Inconsistent Remedies
Section 378 bars another remedy only when two conditions are both met. The previous subsection covered reliance; the other condition is inconsistency. The comment adds that preclusion arises only where the remedies in fact exist and are inconsistent with one another, so a court first confirms that both remedies are really available and then asks whether they collide.30 When the remedies sit side by side without conflict, no election is required and the reliance inquiry never begins.
Two formulations of inconsistency appear in the cases, and they describe the same conflict. The traditional one looks at how a remedy treats the contract: a remedy that affirms the transaction, such as damages measured by the bargain, conflicts with one that disaffirms it, such as rescission.31 The Delaware Supreme Court, quoting an earlier decision, described an election of remedies as the voluntary choice of one of several co-existing but necessarily inconsistent and repugnant remedial rights growing out of the same known facts.32 Both describe a logical conflict. A plaintiff who rescinds asserts that on the known facts no contract bound the parties, and a plaintiff who sues for the bargain asserts that one did. Remedies that merely differ in form or amount are not inconsistent for that reason.
The clearest conflict lies between rescission and enforcing the contract. Rescission is inconsistent with an effort to enforce a contract, such as a claim for expectation damages, and a party cannot obtain specific performance, which affirms the bargain, while also seeking damages for total breach.33 The tension also appears in restitution for services. In one appeal the defendant argued that quantum meruit recovery was unavailable for a period in which the services were provided under an express contract, and that the trial court erred in applying quantum meruit law when it rescinded an express contract.34 The arithmetic shows why courts insist on a choice.
Each remedy alone makes the buyer whole, one by restoring the starting position and the other by delivering the bargain as promised, so receiving both pays twice for one harm. The same reasoning explains why rescission for fraud is often held inconsistent with a claim for tort damages, possibly because rescission should accomplish the same restoration of position that a tort claim would.35
Claims in contract and in tort for the same wrong stand differently. They are not inconsistent with one another, so they usually may be advanced together at trial without an election, so long as the plaintiff can recover under one theory or the other but not both.36 A tort count must still be a genuine tort: a party to a contract cannot be liable in tort for interfering with its own contract, and the interfering conduct must constitute an independent tort, such as fraud.37
Two decisions show what separates the pairs. In Kaste v. Land O'Lakes Purina Feed, LLC, dairy farmers whose cows were harmed by purchased feed sued the seller for breach of warranty and on tort theories, and the court held that they did not have to elect between the contract and tort remedies, because those remedies served different purposes.38 Teutscher v. Woodson came out the other way on a different pairing. A jury awarded a wrongfully discharged employee front pay, and the court held that the election doctrine then precluded the equitable claim for reinstatement, because both are alternative remedies for wrongful discharge and the employee waived reinstatement by affirmatively electing front pay.39 The question is whether the remedies do different jobs. Contract and tort remedies protect different interests, so a single satisfaction can be policed at judgment. Front pay and reinstatement both redress the loss of future employment, so the choice of one leaves nothing for the other to do.
Restitution combined with damages is the area where the law has moved most, and the answer depends on what the damages measure. The decisions sort into three groups:
- Restitution plus consequential or out-of-pocket damages is increasingly allowed, and the Uniform Commercial Code expressly permits both kinds of recovery.40
- Restitution plus loss-of-bargain damages is rejected, including by courts that allow the consequential combination.41
- Restitution plus punitive damages is unsettled, and courts divide on it.42
Consequential and out-of-pocket damages cover collateral losses that returning the price does not reach, so they fill a gap and duplicate nothing. Loss-of-bargain damages measure the value of the promise, and a plaintiff who has rescinded has declared that no contract existed to supply that value, so adding them to the refund recreates the double payment in the bakery example. The punitive question is harder because the older reasoning has a logic of its own: a claim for restitution is an election to disaffirm, and every damages remedy was treated as affirming the contract.43 Some courts that have abolished the either/or rule for special damages keep it for punitive damages, while others, concerned chiefly with avoiding duplication, allow restitution and punitive damages together.44
Remedies that rest on different rights and alternative facts need not be elected between. The Cinerama–Technicolor litigation shows how. Cinerama sought statutory appraisal. After deposing a former Technicolor director, it learned that he had not voted with the other directors to waive the 95 percent supermajority shareholder-vote requirement in Technicolor's charter and had voted against the merger, and it brought a fraud action alleging that the shareholder vote was legally insufficient and the merger therefore void ab initio.45 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the appraisal action enforces a statutory right different and distinct from the wrong the fraud action redresses. The remedies, though very different, were not inconsistent or repugnant, because one rests on a state of facts that is the alternative to, rather than the converse of, the facts behind the other.46
Cinerama could therefore proceed on both claims at once. It could not recover duplicative judgments or obtain a double recovery, and the Court of Chancery erred in denying consolidation of the two actions.47 Where the facts are alternative, a forced early election would have required Cinerama to bet on which version the court would find. A buyer who rescinds and sues for expectation damages on one fixed set of facts is in a different position, because the two claims then contradict a single account.
When a problem pairs rescission with a second count, sorting the pair answers whether the plaintiff must choose. Rescission with expectation damages for the same contract conflicts, and § 378 then asks whether the defendant relied. A contract count beside a tort count, or a statutory claim beside a fraud claim resting on alternative facts, does not conflict, so no election is forced. That limit survives every relaxation of the doctrine. A plaintiff may allege several theories but cannot be compensated more than once, and may hold more than one remedy only so long as the total does not exceed one complete compensation or one complete restitution.48
UCC Approach
For sales of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code rejects election of remedies as a matter of policy. Melby involved a sale of goods and was therefore governed by the Code, and the court relied on the official comment to § 2-703. That comment says Article 2 “rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy,” that the remedies are “essentially cumulative in nature,” and that whether pursuit of one remedy bars another “depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.” The court added that § 2-711 allows the buyer to cancel, and whether or not the buyer has cancelled, to recover amounts paid and obtain damages.53
The Code's reason lies in its remedial aim. Section 1-305(a) directs that Code remedies be liberally administered so that the aggrieved party is put in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed.54 An election rule cuts against that aim, because it sorts a claimant's losses by whichever remedy the claimant named first, whether or not the claimant has been made whole.
The Code's own example makes the point. A buyer seeks to return defective goods and obtain a refund, and also seeks the expenses of handling and forwarding the goods and the profits the buyer would have made on the intended resale. Courts before the Code would often have said that by seeking rescission the buyer had elected a remedy and could not claim the expenses and lost profits. The Code rejects that result.55 The refund returns the price, but handling costs and lost resale profits are separate losses the refund never touches, so allowing them duplicates nothing, and consequential or special damages are among the remedies the Code includes.56
Fraud shows the contrast most sharply. At common law a defrauded party had to choose between rescinding and suing for the fraud.57 Under § 2-721, neither rescission of the contract for fraud nor rejection or return of the goods bars or is considered inconsistent with damages or any other remedy.58 The provision exists to prevent remedies for fraud from being unduly circumscribed when compared with the more modern and mercantile remedies for breach of warranty.59 Without it, a buyer who proved only a broken warranty would face no election, while a buyer who proved the seller lied, the worse wrong, would hold fewer remedies.
A third provision closes a vocabulary trap. Section 2-720 is designed to safeguard a person holding a right of action from any unintentional loss of rights through the ill-advised use of terms such as “cancellation” or “rescission.” Such expressions are not construed as a renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages for an antecedent breach.60 A buyer who tells a seller that the deal is rescinded usually means that the buyer is finished with the contract and wants the loss made good, and the Code does not turn that loose phrase into a forfeiture.
These cumulative rules belong to Article 2, so a problem that pairs a rescission letter with a later damages claim calls first for a question about what was sold. In Melby the Code governed because the transaction was a sale of goods.61 When the contract is for land, the Code's rule does not apply and the common-law rule of § 378 governs.
The two systems end closer together than their formal differences suggest. Section 378 keeps a possible bar, but only where the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance.62 The Code removes the formal bar and tells courts to look at the facts, and Melby itself cautioned that the doctrine should not be ignored when the defendant has relied to its detriment on the plaintiff's prayer for relief or has been otherwise prejudiced.63 Both reject the mechanical view in which the claimant's first step controls the outcome.
Cumulative does not mean unlimited. The Code aims at a position as good as full performance would have given, so a buyer who has been refunded the price cannot also collect the loss of bargain on the same goods, and a plaintiff may hold more than one remedy only so long as the total does not exceed one complete compensation or one complete restitution.64