Concept
Grounds for Rescission
Rescission
Grounds for Rescission
A party who wants out of a contract needs a reason the law recognizes, and this section gathers four families of reasons. If the other side agrees, the rescission is accomplished by agreement. If it does not, the rescission is still accomplished, but the party who wants her money back must bring suit, and she may sue at law to recover what she paid.1 The grounds below are the reasons that justify the rescission in the first place.
Each ground gives the injured party a choice instead of ending the contract of its own force. A contract induced by fraud, for example, is voidable, not void: the victim may elect either to rescind it or to keep it in force.2 Mistake, misrepresentation, and duress are defects in the making of the contract, so they must exist when the parties agree. Material breach is the exception, because it arises from conduct after formation.
Rescission undoes the entire exchange, so each ground demands something serious: a mistake about a basic assumption, a material misstatement, an improper threat, or a breach of a vital term. Mere regret does not qualify. The grounds are substantive defenses with elements of their own, and this unit treats them only far enough to decide whether the door to rescission is open. What happens once a party walks through it belongs to the sections that follow.
Mistake
Mutual mistake supports rescission when both parties are wrong about a basic assumption of the deal, and Renner v. Kehl supplies the paradigm. Two couples held leases on more than two thousand acres of unimproved land near Yuma, Arizona, and agreed to sell their interest to a group of purchasers at about $100 an acre. The purchasers had made clear that they wanted the property only to grow jojoba and needed adequate water to do it. The land looked ideal, and both sides believed that enough water lay beneath it to sustain jojoba production.3
The Arizona court held that this shared belief was “a basic assumption on which both parties made the contract,” and that the mistake had “such a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances as to upset the very bases of the contract.” The contract was therefore voidable, and the respondents were entitled to rescission.4
The two requirements do different work. The basic-assumption requirement asks what the deal was built on, and in Renner the purchasers’ announced purpose and the shared belief about water answered that question. The material-effect requirement asks how badly the false belief distorts the exchange, and it is met only when the error changes what each side is actually getting. Together they reserve rescission for errors that reach the footing of the bargain. Contracts students usually meet mutual mistake first in Sherwood v. Walker, the sale of a cow both sides believed barren, but the Restatement test applied in Renner is the working standard here.
A significant mistake does not guarantee relief, as Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly shows. The court there reversed the Court of Appeals despite the significance of the parties’ mistake, because equity did not justify the remedy Mr. and Mrs. Pickles sought. Rescission is an equitable remedy, and it is not available to relieve a party who has assumed the risk of loss in connection with the mistake.5
The risk rule follows from what a contract does. Allocating risk is one of the main things bargaining accomplishes, and a party who accepted the chance that a fact would turn out badly has usually received something for accepting it, such as a lower price. Letting that party rescind when the chance materializes would shift to the other side a loss it never agreed to carry.
The contrast with Renner lies in the parties’ state of mind. There, both sides simply believed that water lay beneath the land, and nothing in the account suggests that either undertook the risk that it did not. The buyer in the hypothetical knew the question was open and accepted the answer in advance.
A seller facing a rescission claim may point out that the purchasers could have checked the water before signing. The point does not defeat the claim by itself. The Arizona court described rescission for mutual mistake as implying freedom from fault on the part of both parties,6 which directs attention to the shared error and to who bore its risk. Almost any mistake could have been avoided by someone who looked harder, so a rule denying relief to everyone who failed to investigate would swallow the doctrine. Investigation matters when it shows that a party knowingly went ahead despite doubt, because then it bears on who took the risk.
All of this concerns an error that both parties share. A mistake by only one party is governed by narrower rules that this unit does not develop.
Passing these steps opens the door and no more. Whether a court will actually unwind the deal remains a question of equity, and the restitution that follows rescission is a separate matter taken up in the sections on limits and on restitution.
Misrepresentation
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1) makes a contract voidable for either a fraudulent or a material misrepresentation, so a party may rescind for a material misrepresentation even if it was not made with fraudulent intent.8 The recipient must also have been justified in relying on the statement.9 The rule separates rescission from the tort of deceit. Deceit requires some degree of culpability, and the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the statements were false and intended to deceive. Rescission requires neither.10 A speaker who made a false statement in good faith may therefore face rescission even where tort law offers no remedy or a narrower one.11
Halpert v. Rosenthal states the rule in the setting of an innocent misrepresentation. The court found that the trial judge’s action had the support of the overwhelming weight of decision and textual authority, which holds that when one party induces another to contract by a material misrepresentation, the latter may rescind, and that it does not matter whether the representation was “innocent” or fraudulent.12 Its reason was fairness: it would be unjust and inequitable to let a person who made false representations, even innocently, keep the fruits of a bargain those representations induced.
The remedy asks less of the defendant than deceit does. A damages judgment in deceit makes the speaker pay for a wrong, so the law asks whether the speaker was at fault. Rescission asks the speaker only to give back what it received and take back what it gave. The rule speaks of a material misrepresentation, and the qualifier matters, because rescission cancels the whole contract and a misstatement that would not have mattered to the bargain gives no ground for doing that.
Justified reliance is the element most often contested, and the written contract is where it is usually won or lost. The parol evidence rule generally allows proof of a fraudulent misrepresentation even when the written agreement is integrated, but a representation that appears nowhere in the writing, or that contradicts it, makes reasonable reliance hard to show.13 Some courts go further. In Pinnock v. Kings Carlyle Club Apartments, LLC, the court stated that it is axiomatic that a merger clause in an integrated contract operates as a disclaimer and makes reliance on a parol representation unjustifiable. Not every court takes so absolute a view, but Pinnock shows how hard it is to build a case of justifiable reliance on a spoken statement that the signed document ignores.14
Rescission does not depend on proof of economic loss. A victim may have no measurable loss and still be injured, because the victim was tricked into a contract he would not have made on the true facts, and a victim who does not want the contract because of the misrepresentation may avoid it. Upon rescission, a claim for restitution arises in favor of a party who has performed in whole or in part.15 That freedom has a cost. Rescission lets the plaintiff avoid losses as to which there was no misrepresentation at all, so a buyer misled about one risk of a stock investment could unwind the whole purchase after the price falls for reasons unrelated to the misstatement. Critics argue that if proximate cause rules are right in damages claims, the better course is to deny rescission and restitution and award out-of-pocket damages measured as of the transaction date, which puts the plaintiff where an immediate rescission would have.16
Because the contract is voidable, the victim holds a choice. One path is to rescind and recover what was paid; the other is to keep the contract and recover damages, measured by the difference between the value of the performance as represented and its actual value, including reduced market value or the cost of bringing the property to the condition represented.17 Rescission requires the victim to return whatever money or property it received, so a victim who does not want to do that will find rescission undesirable.18
Whether choosing one path forecloses the other is governed by Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378. A manifestation of a choice among remedies, by bringing suit or otherwise, is no bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on the manifestation.19 A buyer who first sues for deceit damages is therefore not shut out of rescission merely by having sued. Damages affirm the contract and rescission disaffirms it, so the remedies are inconsistent, but the bar arises only if the seller has materially changed position in reliance on the buyer’s choice. The election-of-remedies sections below develop the rule in full.
Duress and Other Grounds
An apparent manifestation of assent may be defeated, and the resulting contract avoided, if the assent was obtained by coercion amounting to duress. A finding of duress requires an improper threat of sufficient gravity to induce the other party to assent, and assent that was in fact induced by the threat.23 The threat may be express or implied from words or conduct, and it must communicate an intention to cause harm or loss to the victim.24 The first element exists because enforcement assumes each party chose its promise, and a promise extracted by a wrongful threat records the threatener’s pressure and not the promisor’s choice. The second element confines relief to a victim whose will the threat actually moved, so a party who would have signed on the same terms anyway cannot use a threat as an excuse for a change of heart.
Every negotiation involves some pressure, so the law asks whether the threat was improper. Many threats are quite proper, and an auctioneer’s call to bid quickly or lose the item is ordinary bargaining pressure and not duress.25 Historically the opinions required a threat to do something unlawful or tortious, and many current writers regard that test as too narrow because courts today find duress in a wider range of cases.26 Two recognized examples show the breadth. A threat to institute criminal action to compel conduct uses the criminal process for private gain and is itself criminal in most jurisdictions, a wrong often called extortion. A threat to terminate the victim’s at-will employment, or that of a relative or close acquaintance, unless the victim agrees to something unconnected with the job has been found to support duress, since an employer may not discharge an at-will employee for improper reasons in many jurisdictions, and a discharge threatened over an unrelated deal may be a wrongful breach and in some circumstances a tort.27
Undue influence appears next to duress and misrepresentation in the rule on third-party wrongdoing, which governs a further question: what if the wrongdoer is not the other party to the contract? If a party knows or has reason to know that the other was induced to contract by misrepresentation, duress, or undue influence committed by a third person, the victim may avoid the contract. There is also authority that, even if the other party had no reason to know of the improper conduct, the victim may still avoid the transaction unless that party has materially relied on it or partly performed.28 The victim’s assent is just as compromised whoever applied the pressure, so the real dispute is how to allocate the loss between the victim and a counterparty that may have done nothing wrong.
The rule turns on the counterparty’s knowledge or reliance, and each half has a reason. A counterparty that knew or had reason to know of the pressure could have refused to exploit it, so it has no equity worth protecting against avoidance. A counterparty without that knowledge dealt in good faith and may have paid money or closed its file on the strength of the deal, which is why the second line of authority asks whether it has materially relied or partly performed.
A victim who avoids has also made a choice among remedies, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378 continues to govern whether that choice binds: it is no bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on it.30
Material Breach and Cancellation
Material breach is the one ground in this unit that arises after the contract is formed. A party whose counterpart has materially breached may rescind and thereby discharge all rights and duties under the contract, and a party who has conferred benefits may also have an action in restitution. The injured party may instead declare a total breach, which discharges its own duty to perform and any duty to accept further performance while preserving its right to damages for breach of the entire contract.33 Both options depend first on whether the breach was serious enough.
B & B Equipment Co. v. Bowen, a Missouri Court of Appeals decision, shows how a court decides. The company sued for a declaration of its right to terminate a contract under which Bowen was entitled to purchase 100 shares of its stock, and Bowen counterclaimed for a declaration that the contract remained valid and that he could still buy the shares.34 The company said Bowen had failed to perform as the bargain required, and the court asked whether the failure went to a vital provision, one reaching the very substance or root of the agreement, and not to a subordinate or incidental matter. It answered by asking what the company was actually buying. Most of the price was to come from the corporation itself as a bonus for Bowen’s services, and Bowen was to put up only a small sum of his own money, so the owners were not looking for capital. They wanted a working partner. The services were therefore the root of the bargain, and Bowen’s inadequate performance of them was a material breach that warranted rescission.35
The opinion reads the answer off the structure of the price, which is a useful habit. Cancellation takes from the breaching party the chance to earn what remains of the bargain and returns both sides to the start, so it is proportionate only when the breach has deprived the injured party of what it came for. When the injured party still receives substantially what it bargained for, damages for the shortfall make it whole while the contract continues, and a rule allowing cancellation for any default would let a party who regretted the deal comb the other side’s performance for a pretext.
Once a breach is material, the injured party must choose. It may continue performance and treat the breach as partial, or it may stop performing and treat the breach as total.36 The choice controls the remedies, because restitution is available only for a total breach and never for a partial one.37 Even after a total breach, restitution requires two elections. The injured party must first elect to cancel, and without that election the contract continues to bind both parties and the injured party recovers damages for partial breach but not restitution. This first election follows from what restitution does: it gives back what was exchanged on the footing that the exchange is over, and a party that still insists the other keep performing cannot also claim the exchange has ended. Once cancellation is effective, the injured party generally must choose between restitution (quantum meruit) and damages, and in some cases specific performance is also available.38
The decision to continue can be made by conduct, and it binds. A party indicates that it has chosen to continue by continuing to perform or by accepting the breaching party’s performance, and once it has done so it can never afterward terminate on that same breach.39 By taking more performance, the injured party tells the breaching party that the contract is alive, and the breaching party keeps working and spending on that understanding. If the injured party could still pull the cord on the old breach, it would hold a free option to keep or quit as circumstances later favored, and the breaching party would bear its cost.
A purchaser who wants to avoid a contract must also act promptly, a limit developed under delay and affirmance below.40 Courts often give the plaintiff a choice between rescission and damages, and a plaintiff may combine remedies so long as the total does not exceed one complete compensation or one complete restitution.41 How firmly an early choice binds is the question Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378 answers, and under it a manifestation of choice is no bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on the manifestation.42 The election-of-remedies sections below develop that rule.
The vocabulary in this area is a trap. Strictly, rescission discharges all rights and duties under the contract, so a party who answers a material breach by announcing that the contract is rescinded may lose the damages claim it meant to keep. A victim who wants damages should declare a total breach instead, and a victim who has conferred benefits may separately pursue restitution.43 The older law adds to the risk. A suit for damages was once deemed to enforce the contract and a suit for restitution to disaffirm it, and that view still shapes the rules for restitution even though both remedies are now understood to rest on the contract.44
The Uniform Commercial Code removes the trap for transactions in goods. Under sections 2-106(3) and (4) and 2-720, when the parties mutually terminate a contract, or when either party puts an end to a contract for breach by the other, remedies for breach are preserved unless a contrary intention clearly appears.45 The Code also uses the word cancel, in place of the traditional usage that called the notice of cancellation rescission.46 A goods case therefore treats the ending of the contract and the survival of damages as compatible. A common-law contract for services or land has no such protection, and the word chosen there carries real risk.