Concept
Limits on Mitigation
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Limits on Mitigation
Section 350(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts denies recovery for loss the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation,1 and § 350(2) preserves recovery to the extent the party made reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.2 The earlier sections of this chapter worked inside that frame. They asked how hard the plaintiff must try, who must prove a shortfall, when the duty begins, and how the answers shift from employment to construction to sales to leases.
Each answer rested on an assumption the Restatement text leaves unstated: the plaintiff's substitute transaction replaces the one the breach destroyed, so the money it produces stands in for the money the breach took. The assumption holds in the ordinary case. A discharged employee who takes a comparable job fills the position the discharge emptied, and a buyer who purchases replacement goods ends up with what the seller failed to deliver. Subtracting the new earnings or the avoided cost then leaves an accurate measure of loss.
Three situations break the link between substitute and loss, and each has its own reason. When the plaintiff could have made both the broken deal and the later one, the later deal replaces nothing, and crediting its profit to the breacher would overstate what the plaintiff saved. When the breacher had the same opportunity as the plaintiff to reduce the loss, some courts decline to leave the whole burden of acting on the victim, although other courts reject that argument. When the parties fixed damages in advance by a valid clause, a mitigation reduction would reopen a measure of loss they had already settled.
Each limit is taken in turn below. The question stays the one the rule always asks, whether the plaintiff avoided the loss or could have avoided it by reasonable effort. In each setting, though, the answer departs from the result of simply subtracting the plaintiff's later income from the claim.
Lost-Volume Sellers
A second deal ordinarily reduces the plaintiff's damages because it takes the place of the first. Section 350(1) says as much by withholding recovery for loss the injured party could have avoided,3 and the most familiar way to avoid a loss is to replace the broken deal with another. A discharged employee's new salary replaces the old one; a stranded seller's resale proceeds replace the buyer's payment. The subtraction stays accurate only while the second deal does the replacing. A plaintiff who could have made both deals gains nothing from the second that the breach took from the first. Such a plaintiff is a lost-volume seller: the second transaction does not offset the harm of the first, because but for the breach the plaintiff would have had the benefit of both.4 A contract made after the breach therefore does not always count as mitigation.5 The earlier sections assumed a substitute existed and asked how hard the plaintiff had to look for it. This limit asks the prior question: whether the later deal is a substitute at all.
Car dealers show the idea in its plainest form. A dealer with virtually unlimited access to new cars who loses a buyer and sells that car to someone else has not offset the loss, because but for the breach the dealer could have sold two cars, not one. The dealer recovers the profit lost on the first sale, plus any incidental costs the breach caused.6 Suppose the dealer nets $2,000 on each car. Performance would have produced two $2,000 profits; after the breach and the resale, the dealer has one. The award is the missing $2,000.
The result follows from what § 350(1) can subtract, which is only loss that could have been avoided. The dealer's second sale avoided nothing, because the dealer could have served that customer in any event. Crediting the sale to the breacher would charge the dealer for a gain the breach did not produce, and it would reward the wrong party, since any buyer could cancel at no cost against a seller busy enough to resell at once. A frequent exam error is to subtract the later sale automatically, which skips the question whether the sale replaced anything.
The second question is where disputes arise. Capacity can usually be read off the plaintiff's business. Intention takes more proof, because a plaintiff that could have handled both deals may still have declined the second had the breach not occurred. The employment cases below state that distinction most cleanly.
Sellers of goods supplied the first cases, and lessors and licensors followed. In Seaboard Music Co. v. Germano, a lessor of a juke box and a pool table kept a warehouse of similar equipment and could serve any additional customer, so it recovered its lost profit without a credit for later leases. In Wired Music, Inc. v. Clark, a distributor of music over telephone wires was limited only by the number of contracts it could win, and it recovered lost profits on a cancelled contract even though it had signed a new tenant at the same location.7 Jetz Service Co. v. Salina Properties carried the idea from goods to services. The defendant argued that the theory applies only where UCC § 2-708(2) does and that Jetz provided services. The Kansas court agreed that Jetz sold no goods but held that the concept is analogous and extends to volume providers of services.8
Contractors fit the pattern because they can buy capacity as needed. A construction company that can hire and lay off workers and rent machinery can take every job the market offers. If an owner repudiates and the company then nets $20,000 on another job, that profit does not reduce the owner's liability. Without the breach the company would have earned $30,000 on the first job and $20,000 on the second, so the second job is simply additional.9 The reasoning applies only when the injured party can take on as many jobs as people request. Where capacity is limited, a new job may well be a substitute.10
A discharged employee presents the same question on different facts. A person ordinarily cannot fill two full-time jobs, so the new job is usually taken to replace the old one, and it must be a true replacement. The “other employment” must be comparable and not “of a different or inferior kind.” In Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., a silly part in a cowboy movie could not “by any stretch of the imagination” equal the lead in a major song-and-dance production, so the court needed no testimony on comparability.11 Once the offered role was different or inferior, nothing remained to ask about the reasonableness of the employee's refusal.12 Employees can also be lost-volume sellers. If the employee would have worked both jobs but for the breach, the new wages are not subtracted, because she would have earned two salaries instead of one. If she could have worked both but would have worked only one, the new job is a substitute, and its wages come off the award.13 Employment disputes therefore turn on the intention step, since the real fight is whether the employee would have kept both jobs.
The exception removes one credit and leaves the rest of the doctrine in place. A painting company with crews to spare is a lost-volume seller, so the next house it paints does not offset the profit lost on the cancelled one.14 The company must still avoid any loss it could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.15
The Equal-Opportunity Argument
Section 350(1) asks one question about avoidable loss: could the injured party have avoided it without undue risk, burden or humiliation?17 It does not ask whether the breacher could have avoided it too. Some courts nonetheless excuse a plaintiff from mitigating when the defendant had an equal opportunity to reduce the loss. The theory is estoppel (a bar that keeps a party from taking a position at odds with its own conduct): a defendant that refused to help limit the loss cannot fault the plaintiff for not limiting it.18 Other courts reject the theory, so it must be treated as contested.
In Wartzman, the defendants argued that the plaintiff, Hightower, should have mitigated by employing a securities specialist. The court answered that avoidable consequences does not apply where both parties have an equal opportunity to mitigate. The defendants could have employed and paid a specialist as easily as they said Hightower should have, and they had rejected Hightower's request that they assume the cost of an additional attorney. Having refused, they were estopped from asserting that Hightower failed to reduce its loss.19
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Huntington National Bank reached a similar result in a different setting. After a title company breached, the bank did not bid on a foreclosed home to prevent a sale below market value, and the court held that this failure to mitigate did not limit the bank's damages, because the title company had the same opportunity to bid.20 Shea-S & M Ball v. Massman-Kiewit-Early points the same way. In that construction dispute over groundwater and a sewer overflow, the court held that mitigation does not require a plaintiff to take unduly burdensome steps, to incur additional expense, or to do what is equally the defendant's duty under its own contract.21
Cates v. Morgan Portable Building Corp. went the other way. The defendant there argued that it had an equal opportunity to complete the installation of buildings for the plaintiff's motel facility. The court refused to let that argument offset the plaintiff's duty to mitigate: the defendant could reduce the loss only by performing as promised, while the plaintiff had a variety of other options. It called the equal-opportunity rule “questionable” because applying it would remove the plaintiff's incentive to act reasonably in mitigation.22
That reasoning generalizes. A breacher can almost always cut the loss in one way, by doing what it promised and refused to do, so a rule excusing the plaintiff whenever the defendant could also have acted would excuse almost every plaintiff. The plaintiff, left to cope, can usually choose among substitutes, repairs, and other responses, and the mitigation doctrine exists to make the plaintiff weigh them.
Because courts disagree, a plaintiff should not rest on the theory. Section 350(1)'s own qualifiers can often reach the same result, since a step the plaintiff could not afford can be framed as an undue burden. An exam answer should raise equal opportunity only when the facts fit it: a protective step the defendant could take as easily as the plaintiff, a plaintiff who asked for help, and a defendant who refused, as in Wartzman. Even then, the point belongs after the undue-burden argument, as support.
Liquidated Damages Clauses
Section 350(1) works by subtraction: the court measures the loss the breach caused and then removes the part that reasonable effort would have prevented.24 That procedure assumes a court is assessing damages after the breach. A liquidated damages clause changes the assumption, because the parties agreed when they made the contract on a specific sum payable if one of them broke it. Courts therefore do not apply the mitigation doctrine where a valid clause of that kind governs. The liquidated sum is fixed, so the plaintiff's conduct after the breach leaves the measure of recovery unchanged.25
A valid clause exists to spare both sides from proving actual loss, and that purpose explains why mitigation gives way. The party who benefits from the clause gives up the chance to collect more if the real loss proves larger. The party who breaks receives a figure it can count on in advance. Both gain that certainty only if the sum is paid without a later trial over what the loss was, and a mitigation reduction would require exactly such a trial. The defendant would offer evidence of what the plaintiff could have done after the breach, the plaintiff would answer with what it did, and the court would compute the avoidable loss in dollars. A fixed sum that shrinks whenever the defendant proves some avoidable loss has become a variable sum, no longer the figure the parties negotiated. The clause is policed at the front end instead. Its validity depends on whether the sum was a reasonable forecast of harm when the contract was made, and a clause that passes that test has already answered the question mitigation would ask later.26
The leading illustration is Barrie School v. Patch, a Maryland dispute over a private school's enrollment agreement, which fixed a sum payable if the family broke it. The trial court found a valid contract, a valid liquidated damages clause, no fraud in the inducement, and no adhesion, and it denied the Patches' counterclaim.27 The remaining question was whether the school still had to mitigate. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that it did not. It first tested the clause as of formation: the sum was a reasonable forecast of compensation for potential harm, was not grossly excessive or out of proportion to what could have been expected when the parties contracted, and covered a loss that was hard to estimate when they signed. It then placed mitigation in the law of court-assessed damages, since mitigation helps fix the proper amount of damages resulting from a breach, and a stipulated sum is one the court does not assess.28 That the school ended up with more students than it had budgeted therefore had no bearing on what it could collect.
A dissenting judge would have ruled for the Patches, and the dissent states the competing view in its best form. Liquidating damages and mitigating damages are distinct concepts, so a fixed sum creates no exception to the general duty to mitigate. Whether mitigation applies should be decided after the breach, when the court asks whether actual damages were incurred at all. The dissent also looked backward at the clause: if the recovery proves excessive when considered retrospectively, the clause is invalid, and the school must prove actual damages and mitigate them.29 The two opinions differ about when to look. The majority judges the clause by what the parties could foresee at formation and then treats the sum as fixed. The dissent keeps the post-breach facts in play, so that a plaintiff who avoided its loss shows the sum to be excessive. The majority position is the general rule, and the dissent's approach is the minority one.
Statutes can move the timing. For sales of goods, UCC § 2-718(1) permits liquidation only at an amount that is “reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach.” Because actual harm enters the validity test there, the dissent's concern that a fixed sum may far exceed the real loss finds a place in the statute's own reasonableness inquiry, without a separate duty to mitigate.
An exam stem that combines a stipulated-damages clause with facts about the plaintiff's later efforts is testing sequence. The clause comes first, and mitigation second. If the clause is a valid forecast, the majority rule awards the stipulated sum and the later efforts do not reduce it. If the clause is a penalty, meaning a sum out of proportion to the harm the parties could have expected, the court will not enforce it, and the plaintiff loses the shortcut the clause offered. The plaintiff must then prove actual damages as in any breach action, and loss it could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation is not recoverable.30 The sequence matters because the exemption from mitigation is a benefit conferred only on clauses that honestly forecast loss. Without that condition, a party could write an inflated figure into the contract, skip proof of loss, and escape § 350(1) at the same time.