Concept
Mitigation by Contract Type
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Mitigation by Contract Type
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) states one rule for every kind of agreement: damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.1 Subsection (2) protects the injured party to the extent of reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.2 The words stay the same whether the promise was to employ, to build, to deliver goods, or to lease space. The question they pose changes, because the injured party is expected to substitute other arrangements for those the contract provided (another job, another seller, another buyer) and cannot recover the value of lost benefits to the extent that such opportunities existed.3
What counts as avoidable therefore depends on the market for the promised performance. A broken promise of labor sends the injured party to look for other work, and the dispute is whether suitable work existed and how closely it had to resemble the lost position. A broken promise to build or manufacture raises a different problem: whether to keep spending on a project the other side has abandoned. A broken promise to buy or sell goods usually occurs where substitutes can be bought or sold, so the damages formulas often assume the substitute transaction already. A broken promise to lease concerns property that can be put to another use, and it asks whether the owner may leave the space empty and send the bill to the departed tenant. Where no reasonable substitute existed, nothing was avoidable, and the injured party recovers in full however little it tried. Where a good substitute lay close at hand, the avoidable share can be most of the loss. The reasonableness standard and the burden-of-proof rules developed earlier apply in every setting; the sections below show how they play out in each.
Employment Contracts
A wrongful discharge claim starts with the pay the contract would have delivered for the rest of its term, and the court subtracts the wages the employee did earn in other work and the wages the employee reasonably could have earned.4 When the employee found no other job, the court decides whether the employee could reasonably have found, or should reasonably have accepted, another position.5 The arithmetic mirrors a seller's remedy after a buyer breaks. Employees sell services and employers buy them, so the replacement job plays the part of a resale, and damages are the contract price minus the replacement price, counting fringe benefits along with wages.6 The measure is largely the same whether the wrong is a breach of contract, a tortious discharge, or a statutory violation. Some wrongs may support punitive damages or damages for distress, but the direct loss is measured in much the same way regardless of the wrong.7
Earnings from a replacement job reduce the award because, for most employees, the new job takes the time the old one would have filled. The exception follows from the same logic. If the employee would have worked both jobs but for the breach, the new job does not substitute for the old, and the new wages are not subtracted; the employee is a lost-volume seller who would have earned two salaries instead of one.8 If she could have worked both but would have worked only one, the new job is a substitute for the old.9 The lost-volume section later in this chapter develops the idea from the seller's side.
The second step credits money actually received, so it applies even to a job the employee could reasonably have refused.13 It stops at work consistent with the original job, such as part-time work done at home. That income leaves the award untouched, because it cannot be traced back to the loss of the old job.14 The test underneath is whether the employee would have taken the new work but for the breach.
The third step turns on proof and comparability. As the Burden of Proof section explained, the employer must show what reasonable effort would have found, so an employee who made no search at all still recovers in full unless the employer proves that suitable work was available. Comparability keeps the step from pushing the employee into worse work. A discharged employee must look for a substitute and may have to adapt within reason, but need not accept substantially different employment, a much lower salary, or a humiliating or demeaning position.15 In one well-known decision, the court held that the “other employment” must be comparable and not “of a different or inferior kind.” By no stretch of the imagination, it said, could a silly part in a cowboy movie equal the lead in a major song-and-dance production, so comparability raised no factual issue and needed no testimony or expert opinion.16
Long contract terms put real money behind these questions. In one Tennessee appeal, a business owner sold his company and agreed to stay on as a manager under a three-year employment agreement and a non-competition agreement. The new owners fired him a few months later for failing to perform his duties, and he sued for breach.17 With most of the term unexpired, the size of the claim depends on what comparable work existed and what a reasonable search would have found.
The fourth step protects the employee who looks and finds nothing. The reasonable costs of searching are recoverable even when the search fails and even when the costs outrun the savings, because the key requirement is reasonableness.18 The expense of finding a new job is an incidental loss that supplements the recovery.19 Section 350(2) explains why a failed search costs the employee nothing: the injured party is not precluded from recovery to the extent of reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.20 An employee who searches diligently and finds no comparable work recovers the full contract wages plus the cost of searching, because the failure shows that reasonable effort could not have reduced the loss.
The same machinery runs in the opposite direction when the employee breaches. An employer that loses a worker may need to hire a substitute, in good faith and reasonably. If the substitute costs more than the contract with the employee did, the employee owes the difference, the cover price minus the contract price, and price includes both wages and fringe benefits.21 Benefits can cut the other way: an employer that covers by paying overtime to existing staff may save on benefits, and that saving offsets the damages. Incidental and ensuing losses fill out the remedy, including the cost of finding the new employee and any harm the vacancy caused in the interim.22
Reasonableness limits the employer as the search limits the employee. An employer that overpays a replacement in bad faith or without reason has enlarged its own loss, so recovery stops at what a reasonable substitute would have cost, while reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to hire a replacement may justify awarding the full loss.23 An employer that never replaces the employee stands differently. The profit it lost by operating without the worker is an ensuing loss that seems likely to compensate it fully, whatever a hypothetical replacement would have cost, and where no such profit was lost, the decision not to replace suggests that the employer saved money through the breach.24
Both directions use one test. The injured party's substitute must be real, reasonable, and a replacement for what was lost, and damages are the gap between what the contract promised and what the substitute provides, plus the reasonable cost of arranging it.
Construction and Manufacturing
Restatement § 350(1) governs builders and manufacturers as it governs everyone else, but their cases add a feature the employment cases lack: performance is a stream of spending that continues after the breach, so each added dollar of work can enlarge the claim.27 Once the other side calls a halt, the question is whether to keep spending, and Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. supplies the leading answer. Luten, a bridge contractor, received a notice from the county in February that the court treated as a repudiation of the contract. Believing the notice invalid because the county board was illegally constituted, Luten disregarded it and kept building as the contract required. By November it had spent more than $18,000, and when the county refused payment it sued for that amount.28
The Fourth Circuit reversed a judgment for Luten. The February notice, it said, had a kind of de facto legality and should have been taken as a repudiation, and from that point Luten should have stopped rather than piling up damages by “proceeding with the erection of a useless bridge.” Luten could recover $1,900, its outlays up to the date of the notice, plus its anticipated profit.29 Once the county made its position clear, the contractor's remedy was to treat the contract as broken when it received the notice and to sue for damages, including the profit it would have earned on performance and any other losses.30 The county had decided not to build the road the bridge was to serve, and it never built it.31
The cutoff follows from what the work does for each side once the countermand is clear. For the owner the work may be useless, and continuing would let the builder run up the price of something the owner has said it does not want. For the builder, the profit the contract would have produced is already protected by damages, so stopping costs it nothing that damages do not repay, and its crews can turn to other work. Continuing adds a cost that only the builder controls, and that cost traces to the builder's own choice, so the builder absorbs it. The same logic explains why modern courts hold that the duty to mitigate overrides the older idea that a promisee may elect to keep performing, as the section on the end of the election theory explained.32
The rule assumes a countermand the builder has reason to treat as final. One commentator argues that the real question in Luten was whether the contractor faced an honest dilemma about the notice and whether its decision to continue was reasonable or capricious, a factual question the court never addressed.33
The award is $80,000, which lifts Ajax from a $50,000 loss after the repudiation to the $30,000 gain that performance would have produced.36 The same figure comes from the $150,000 price less the $70,000 of cost Ajax saves by stopping. If Ajax ignores the repudiation, spends the extra $70,000, and sues for the whole $150,000, it still recovers only $80,000. Contract law does not reward Ajax's stubbornness, because Ajax must act reasonably after a breach to minimize its loss.37 Had the repudiation come before any work began, Ajax would recover only the $30,000 profit, since there would be no outlays to reimburse.
The duty to minimize also asks a builder who stops to look for other work, and the effect depends on capacity. Suppose Ajax is large enough to satisfy all of the demand for construction in its area, hiring workers and renting machinery as needed, and it nets $20,000 on a second job after the breach. That profit does not reduce the $80,000. Ajax could have done both jobs, so the second is not a substitute for the first, and had the owner performed, Ajax would have earned $50,000 in all.38 If instead Ajax could take the second job only because the breach freed its crews, the second job would be a substitute, and its $20,000 would come off the award, leaving $60,000. A discharged employee, who ordinarily fills one position at a time, stands closer to that second case.
Stopping is the default because it usually minimizes loss, but § 350(1) asks only for reasonable minimization, so continuing can be proper where it reduces the loss.39 A manufacturer may act reasonably by finishing goods after a repudiation when a rapidly rising market lets it resell them above the contract price, and the same reasoning could apply to a developer who builds on and sells its own lots.40 A builder erecting a structure on the owner's land typically has no other buyer, so that route is usually closed to it.
For goods, UCC § 2-704(2) reflects the seller's duty to mitigate in deciding whether to complete the manufacture of specially ordered goods.41 The commentary adds three refinements. The burden is on the buyer to prove that the seller failed to use reasonable commercial judgment. The decision is measured by the facts as they appear when the seller learns of the breach, not by hindsight after the market has changed in an unforeseen way. And the comments offer the damages suffered as a preliminary test of which alternative reflects reasonable commercial judgment.42 A seller confronted with a repudiation after very little work would, if it sued then, recover a $2,000 profit under § 2-708(2). If it nevertheless completes the goods at a total cost of $10,000 when it knows they will bring less than $8,000, it acts unreasonably, because completion costs more than stopping would.43
Sales of Goods
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code carries the § 350 rule into sales without ever using the word mitigation. Its version sits in § 2-715(2)(a), which lets a buyer collect consequential damages (losses beyond the direct value of the bargain, such as profits on resales) only for losses “which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise,” where cover means buying substitute goods after the seller fails to perform.45 The Restatement formulation articulates the rules embodied in the adverb “reasonably” in that clause, so the standards developed earlier, including the limits on undue risk and the protection for reasonable but unsuccessful efforts, supply its content.46
In a sale, mitigation rarely touches the ordinary measures of damages. Avoidable-consequences rules generally require a plaintiff to minimize special or consequential damages, and they do not usually affect the measurement of general or market damages.47 The reason lies in how the general formulas are built. A buyer's market or cover damages and a seller's market or resale damages measure the loss against a market price or an actual replacement deal, so each already assumes that the injured party went into the market and made a fair substitute transaction. Subtracting a second substitute would count the replacement twice. A buyer's market-damages claim, the kind at issue in Oloffson v. Coomer, therefore does not shrink because the buyer never covered, and a seller's contract-market claim survives a failure to resell. A common mistake is to argue that a seller's failure to resell reduces a contract-market recovery, when that remedy assumes a resale at market and does not require one.
Consequential damages are different because their size depends on what the buyer does after the breach. A market difference is fixed by the market, and nothing the buyer does afterward changes it. Lost resale profits, production stoppages, and harm from using bad goods exist or not depending on the buyer's response, and the buyer is usually the party best placed to prevent them, since a prompt replacement purchase or a refusal to use suspect goods ends the loss. Section 2-715(2)(a) accordingly leaves those losses with the buyer to the extent that cover or other reasonable steps would have stopped them.48 Delay is the commonest way to lose this protection. A buyer that waits an unreasonable time to cover should not recover the profits on its resale contracts as consequential damages, which applies the limit on waiting after a repudiation to the buyer's own losses.49 Cover is meant to be a shield that lets the buyer obtain substitute goods without loss, and it is not a sword to punish the seller.50
Cover is not the only step the Code puts in a buyer's hands. A buyer that has paid some or all of the price of identified goods may have the right to recover those goods from the seller under certain circumstances. The right vests when the goods are identified to the contract, and a buyer that has not paid the whole price must be ready to tender the remainder.51 That route belongs in view whenever the question is what the buyer could have done after the seller defaulted.
The decisions that deny recovery involve buyers who knew of a problem and held a preventive step in their own hands. The buyer of a defective infrared oven in Barry & Sewall Industrial Supply Co. v. Metal-Prep of Houston, Inc. chose not to replace it and could not recover lost profits for the year it went without a working oven.52 A consumer left a color television plugged in all night even though it had twice given off sparks and smoke and its “instant-on” device had turned the set on spontaneously. When the set burned the house down, the consumer could not hold the dealer for the $62,000 loss.53 A farmer's case shows the same reasoning at small scale. After a fencing company damaged his pipe, he was told the repairs had to be made before a specific date to avoid crop loss. He could afford the repairs but waited for the company to admit liability. The court awarded the cost of repair but excluded the lost crop, because a modest sum would have prevented the much greater loss.54
A buyer who could not have known of the problem stands on the other side of the line. In the Howat Concrete case, preliminary tests suggested that purchased concrete might be too weak, but nobody could tell whether it was defective until twenty-eight days after it was poured. The court held that the buyer, by using the concrete at once, did not fail to take action that would reasonably have prevented the loss, and the buyer recovered consequential damages.55 The oven buyer and the concrete buyer both held defective goods and both claimed consequential losses, and the difference between them is knowledge. The oven buyer knew the machine was defective and had an obvious replacement available. The concrete buyer held only a suspicion that no test could confirm, so no preventive step was identifiable when it decided. Judged from the buyer's position at the time of acting, a loss that could not be foreseen and prevented was never avoidable.
The Restatement's protection for failed efforts carries over into sales cases too. In the Massey-Ferguson tractor case, a farmer hired neighbors to plant soybeans after a defective tractor failed. The delay left the crop yield low, so the effort was not fully effective mitigation, but the court awarded consequential damages in recognition of the attempt.56
The Code also polices the substitute transaction itself. When an aggrieved seller resells or a buyer covers, damages are measured from the substitute deal actually made, and the Code requires the injured party to act reasonably, in good faith, and within a reasonable time in making it.57 The reason is easy to see. A market price comes from the market, which the injured party cannot inflate, but a cover or resale price comes from the party's own deal, so a buyer that paid a padded price or took months to shop could shift the cost of that choice to the seller. A seller that claims the price of the goods under § 2-709 faces a related condition: it must first make reasonable attempts at resale.58
Leases and Landlords
A landlord whose tenant abandons holds a vacant unit and a claim for rent, and the mitigation question is whether the landlord may leave the space empty and bill the tenant for the whole term.62 For decades the answer was yes. The common law rule that lessors need not mitigate was the majority view, and it has been replaced by the modern view, held by a majority of courts, that landlords must mitigate; many state statutes reflect that change.63 The shift tracks a change in how courts describe a lease.
The older rule treated a lease as a conveyance of an interest in land for a period of time, with the covenants, including the promise to pay rent, only incidentally attached.64 A landlord owed the tenant no more effort to find a replacement than a seller of land owes a buyer who fails to use or resell it.65 Under that view an abandonment gave the landlord three options:
- Leave the premises empty and collect, or sue for, the rent as it comes due, with interest and without any duty to relet.
- Accept the abandonment as a surrender of the lease, which ends all future obligations on both sides.
- Give the tenant proper notice, treat the abandonment as a breach, relet for the tenant's account, credit the tenant with the amounts received, and hold the tenant liable for any deficiency and appropriate reletting costs.66
A landlord who did relet had to credit the tenant with the rent received, but never had to look for a new tenant or accept one who appeared.67 The first option therefore let a landlord stand idle over a vacant apartment and collect the full rent, which is the result that mitigation forbids everywhere else in contract law.
Modern courts changed the characterization. A lease of real property is now commonly described as a blend of property and contract doctrines, and a growing number of courts apply contract doctrines such as mitigation of damages and anticipatory repudiation in landlord-tenant litigation. The trend is most visible in residential leases, but commercial leases have changed as well.68 The reasons given for the duty are specific to landlords. The landlord is in the business of leasing, even the wronged party should avoid damages it can avoid, and the landlord's own interest lies in keeping units occupied, productive, and free of the waste that vacancy invites.69
Sommer v. Kridel presents the classic picture of the unfairness the old rule produced. The landlord waited fifteen months before trying to relet and let $4,658.50 in damages accrue, even though a prospective tenant who was ready, willing and able to rent the apartment had been turned away.70 Because nothing showed that the prospect would have been unsuitable, the court found that the landlord could have avoided the damages and that the tenant was relieved of the duty to keep paying rent.71 The court also rejected the argument that reletting the abandoned unit costs a landlord the chance to rent some other empty apartment, because each apartment may have unique qualities that attract particular people.72
The doctrine behind the result is the one stated in Isbey v. Crews: mitigation rests on traditional contract principles, goes by the name of avoidable consequences, and bars a party injured by breach from recovering damages that reasonable effort could have avoided.73
The fifth step is § 350(2) at work in the lease setting. A landlord whose reasonable efforts fail has avoided nothing the law demanded, so the empty months stay with the tenant.77 Some states reject that last step and let the landlord recover the promised rent minus the fair rental value of the premises, which means proof of the market rate reduces the claim even where no replacement tenant could be found. In effect, they adopt contract price minus market price as the basic formula and reject the avoidable consequences doctrine.78 Where mitigation is required, a landlord's failure to mitigate gives the tenant a defense in an action for rent and reduces the landlord's damages accordingly.79
No formula defines reasonable diligence, but Sommer marks one boundary. A tenant is not excused merely because someone willing to rent exists. The court noted decisions in which a landlord did not have to accept a replacement who insisted on different lease terms or who was insolvent, and the landlord in Sommer lost because nothing suggested that the applicant it turned away was unsuitable.80
The harder practical question is who must prove diligence, and the answer differs from state to state.81 Sommer requires the landlord, as part of its own cause of action, to carry the burden of proving reasonable diligence in trying to relet, and the court acknowledged that other courts have divided over where that burden belongs.82 The allocation matters most when the evidence is thin. A landlord knows what it did to find a replacement, so a rule that makes it prove diligence draws on facts it already holds. Where the tenant bears the burden, a tenant who can say only that the unit sat vacant has shown nothing about what the landlord did, because a diligent landlord may also fail to relet. An answer should identify the jurisdiction's allocation and, if the facts do not name it, say that courts are divided.
Several smaller points round out the rule. A lease clause letting the tenant assign or sublet does not relieve the landlord of its independent duty. The reasons for the duty survive that clause, and a tenant can start searching for a replacement the day it leaves, which gives it some incentive of its own to do so.83 Mitigation also has nothing to work on when the tenant stops paying but stays. A landlord cannot lease the premises to someone else until the breaching tenant is removed, so the breach saves the landlord nothing and leaves no avoidable loss to subtract.84 Nor can the landlord clear the unit by its own efforts, since the growing modern view denies self-help to dispossess a tenant who remains in possession and has not abandoned or surrendered the premises, because of the potential for violent breach of the peace.85
Two questions remain open in many places. The first is whether the duty reaches commercial leases. Authority is unsettled on whether commercial lessors owe the same duty as residential lessors.86 Some jurisdictions require mitigation in commercial as well as residential leases, some confine the duty to residential leases as a matter of policy, and some read a residential-only statute as leaving commercial leases to the old rule. About half of all jurisdictions require mitigation in neither setting.87 An answer should flag the commercial question whenever the tenant is a business. The second question is statutory. One statute quoted in the case law lets the lessor recover damages for the balance of the term only if, among other routes, the lease provides that recoverable damages are reduced by the rental loss the lessee proves could reasonably be avoided.88