Concept
Reasonable Efforts Standard
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Reasonable Efforts Standard
A plaintiff cannot recover for loss that reasonable effort would have prevented, and nearly every mitigation dispute asks how much effort that is. Section 350(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts withholds damages for loss the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.1 Subsection (2) protects the plaintiff who tries: the injured party is not precluded from recovery to the extent of reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to avoid loss.2 Together the subsections hold the plaintiff to reasonable effort, and the qualifiers in (1) mark where that demand ends.
Reasonableness is the measure because the law must answer two competing claims. The breacher can fairly object to paying for waste that the plaintiff could have prevented. The plaintiff, who did not choose the predicament, should not have to spend money, take risks, or surrender dignity to spare the wrongdoer. The law resolves the tension by giving the breach victim some leeway: the breach left the victim to salvage the benefit of the bargain, and the breacher escapes the increased loss only when it is clear, under all the circumstances, that the victim’s reaction was improper.3 Some element of fault must lie with the victim.4 A standard of perfection would charge the victim for every imperfect choice made under pressure; a standard of no effort would let losses mount at the breacher’s expense.
Three questions follow. How does a court measure reasonableness? What do the qualifiers in § 350(1) add? And must the plaintiff accept a substitute that the breacher itself proposes? Each subsection below takes one in turn.
Reasonableness, Not Perfection
The test of a plaintiff’s effort is reasonableness, judged from where the plaintiff stood when the breach occurred. The question is not whether the response turned out, with hindsight, to be a wrong judgment, or whether a different response would have been preferable; the plaintiff need only act reasonably from the perspective of the time of the breach.5 Section 350(2) supplies the corollary: reasonable but unsuccessful efforts do not reduce recovery.6
A hindsight test would turn every post-breach decision into a wager the plaintiff had to win, so the law asks less. The victim need not explore every conceivable possibility of avoiding loss, take unduly burdensome or risky action, or try methods that reasonably appear to be futile.7 Courts distrust hindsight in the other direction too. Plaintiffs generally cannot recover for the lost opportunity to invest money that was not paid on time, because testimony shaped by 20–20 hindsight risks exposing defendants to large and sometimes imaginary losses.8 A defendant that wants to control how the loss is minimized should negotiate with the plaintiff before breaching; one that simply breaches leaves the plaintiff to deal with the loss.9
Where several reasonable ways of cutting the loss are open, the plaintiff may take any of them. As S.J. Groves & Sons v. Warner Co. illustrates, a plaintiff that made a reasonable choice recovers the damages it actually suffered, even though hindsight shows that a different choice would have been better.10
One formulation of the rule treats the plaintiff’s diligence as evidence only. The ultimate issue is whether the damages could have been minimized by effort, so a plaintiff who did little still recovers in full if no reasonable step would have reduced the loss.11
Courts sometimes shade the standard toward good faith. In Small v. Combustion Engineering, the plaintiff refused simple, safe surgery that was almost certain to prevent disability, yet received full compensation, because her mental disorder led her to focus on the risks and underestimate the benefits. By taking her own makeup into account and finding the refusal reasonable for her, the court in effect applied a good faith standard.12
Most mitigation takes the form of buying or hiring a substitute, and the same latitude governs it. In Drennan v. Star Paving Co., a general contractor sued a paving subcontractor that had refused to perform according to its bid.13 A contractor in that position can mitigate by finding a substitute, and the law judges the cover by the same reasonableness standard rather than by whether a cheaper price existed in hindsight.14 The leeway also protects an employer whose employee resigns in breach. In Handicapped Children’s Education Board v. Lukaszewski, the only applicant for the vacated position was more senior and had to be paid more, and the employer recovered the added cost. An employer with no other substitute is not at fault for hiring the one it has.15
The standard still has bite where a plaintiff ignores a small, obvious step that would have prevented a large loss. In Tedd Bish Farm v. Southwest Fencing Services, a fencing company damaged a farmer’s irrigation pipe. The farmer told the company and the State that the pipe had to be repaired before a specific date to save the crop, could afford the repair, and declined to make it while waiting for the company to admit liability. The court awarded the cost of repairing the pipe but excluded the lost crop, because a modest sum would have avoided the much greater loss.16 The farmer weighed no alternatives. The Groves plaintiff chose among reasonable options; the farmer let the deadline pass. Breaking the award into components shows the result: the avoidable component comes off, and the rest of the recovery stays.17
A plaintiff who spends money on a reasonable search for substitute work may recover those costs, provided they distinctly result from the harm and are not mere inconvenience or annoyance; a later section develops the point.18
Undue Risk, Burden, or Humiliation
The words “undue risk, burden or humiliation” in § 350(1) mark where the demand for effort ends.21 Each names a cost the plaintiff need not bear to spare the breacher: exposure to danger or financial loss, hardship in taking the avoiding step, and injury to dignity. The breach, not the plaintiff’s choice, forced the mitigation question, and a rule that demanded large outlays, serious danger, or degrading work would push the cost of the breach back onto its victim. The qualifiers add no second test. They help identify ways to argue that an effort was unreasonable, since saying that a step would have involved an undue burden amounts to saying it was reasonable not to take it.22
Undue risk covers danger to the plaintiff’s money, rights, or body. In one case, the defendant’s offer to arrange an appointment with a securities expert at Hightower’s own expense could hardly count as a mitigating step Hightower had to accept: he lacked the $10,000 or $15,000 a specialist would cost, and a party in default may not reduce damages by showing that the other side could have done so by spending large sums or incurring substantial obligations.23 Surgery supplies the bodily form. Whether an operation may reasonably be required depends on its cost, its risk, and its pain, weighed together.24 Risk becomes undue when it is out of proportion to the loss it would prevent. The farmer in Tedd Bish could afford a modest repair that would have saved a much larger crop, so the cost lay within what reasonable effort required.25
Undue burden covers the hardship of the avoiding step itself. A discharged employee might find a new job by moving to another town or state, by retraining in a different field, or by accepting work that affronts her dignity, and where minimizing the loss requires undue risk, burden, or humiliation, no reduction of damages results.26 The employee must still seek a substitute job and may have to adapt with reason, but she need not accept substantially different employment.27
Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. shows the kind and quality of the work deciding the question when the pay is identical. The studio had guaranteed Shirley MacLaine $750,000 for fourteen weeks’ work on Bloomer Girl, then cancelled the film before production began. It offered her in writing the lead in a western, Big Country, Big Man, at the same fee, and gave her one week to say yes or no.28 She declined. The court ruled as a matter of law that the substitute employment was both “different” and “inferior.”29 The western was a poorer vehicle for her talents, and the substitute contract eliminated her rights to approve personnel and screenplay.30 Once the court reached that conclusion, no separate question remained whether she acted reasonably in refusing; the only issue was whether her refusal could be used in mitigation.31
Pay alone does not make a substitute inferior. Inferiority is judged by the quality of the substitute work, and a damages award can make up the earnings gap.32 A much lower salary, by contrast, is among the things a discharged employee need not accept.33
The same limit protects a plaintiff from assembling a pile of lesser deals. In Michael Jordan’s case, as in MacLaine’s, the court found a duty to mitigate. An equivalent substitute would have been a $2 million fee for the same four-day, four-hour commitment, and the commentary doubts that MCI could have found evidence of one.34 It adds that piecing together a large number of smaller endorsements to make up the $2 million would likely have been an unreasonable effort, given the dilution effect of so many deals.35
Undue humiliation covers work that would demean the plaintiff. A discharged employee need not take a humiliating or demeaning position.36 Courts applying the rule to employment look closely at how an offered substitute would affect the victim’s career goals, professional development, and dignity. A voice coach whose student cancels at the last minute could arguably decline a part-time job in a music store, since that work would not advance a teaching career and might hurt her standing as a teacher, although the question is closer than the one in Parker.37
Humiliation protects personal dignity, and a corporation has none to lose. In S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, the Seventh Circuit observed that a corporate contractor on a sewer contract could not lose honor and respect by taking steps to reduce its loss. A corporate plaintiff must therefore rely on undue risk or undue burden, meaning cost and hardship.
None of this excuses a plaintiff from looking for substitutes. An actor whose starring film role is cancelled and who turns down small television parts in the same field stands differently from Parker: such work is different from a major film role but not necessarily inferior, when nothing suggests it would hurt his career. Whether he was nonetheless reasonable to decline, so as to stay available for a more significant film role, is a separate question.38
Offers From the Breacher
A breaching party sometimes tries to shrink its liability by offering the injured party a way out: a return to the old job, or a substitute engagement in place of the cancelled one. In some cases the victim’s best prospect of mitigation is exactly that, a substitute transaction with the breaching party.40 The offer gets no special treatment. Courts evaluate it under the same standards as any other means of reducing the loss. If it is not unduly risky, burdensome, or humiliating, does not require the victim to waive any right to relief under the breached contract, and is the most reasonable way to reduce the loss, the victim must pursue it or risk losing the damages that acceptance would have prevented.41 Section 350(1) supplies the text.42
Two pulls run in opposite directions here. A victim who could ignore the offer could let wages or profits go uncollected for months and send the entire bill to the breacher, which the mitigation principle exists to prevent. Acceptance, on the other hand, forces the victim to deal again with a party that has already proved unreliable, and the victim may find that unpalatable. Unpalatability alone does not excuse refusal.43 Every breach damages trust, so a distrust excuse would be open to every victim and would swallow the rule for offers from the breacher. The victim must show more than a general apprehension that the breacher might fail again.44
The fourth question is where Fair v. Red Lion Inn operates. The employee there declined her former employer’s offer to take her back because she mistrusted it. The court conceded that the mistrust was natural, but she offered no evidence to support her concerns, so she could not claim the damages that acceptance would have avoided.45 The reduction reaches only the loss that acceptance would have prevented, so loss that accrued before the offer arrived stays with the breacher.
Where the facts supply what Fair lacked, refusal is excused, and the supplying fact is usually something the breacher had already done. In Pyramid Printing Co. v. Alaska State Commission, an employee forced out by a hostile work environment was not obliged to accept reinstatement that would have required substantial contact with the supervisor who created it.46 The burden there was concrete and grew out of the breacher’s past conduct, unlike Fair’s forward-looking fear of what her employer might do. Timing can have the same effect. In Voorhees v. Guyan Machinery Co., the offer of reemployment came after the employer had cost the employee a job with a new employer and after he had sued, and the court found that expecting him to return in those circumstances was unreasonable.
An offer that makes the plaintiff surrender rights under the breached contract fails the same test, because the avoiding step would cost the plaintiff the very claim the breach created.47 Courts that insist on re-employment do so where it does not impair the employee’s right to sue.48 Otherwise the breacher could buy silence about the loss it caused by pairing a job offer with a waiver, and a rule meant to trim avoidable loss would become a device for erasing the whole claim.
Comparability can defeat an offer even when nothing else is wrong with it. In Parker the studio itself proposed the western, and the case turned on comparability: the role was different and inferior, and the substitute contract stripped the actress’s approval rights.49 Fair was offered the job she had held, so comparability was never in doubt and her only objection was mistrust. Parker was offered a different job, so comparability was the whole case.
A refusal can also rest on a judgment about the market. The injured party’s judgment about mitigation need only be reasonable, even if it later appears wrong or a different decision would have been better. A plaintiff with a reasonable prospect of a better engagement may decline an offer and hold out for it, and the fact that no better offer came along does not defeat that judgment.50
Whether a victim outside employment must negotiate with the breacher is less settled. In employment cases courts often insist that the victim accept re-employment if that does not impair the right to sue, while in other kinds of cases courts often hold that the victim need not renegotiate with the breacher.51 A likely reason for the split is that reinstatement hands the employee back an arrangement already made, while a commercial renegotiation asks the victim to strike a fresh bargain with the party that just broke the first one. The reinstatement rule can be applied with confidence; the broader question of renegotiation depends on the jurisdiction and on whether the new terms would impair the plaintiff’s claim.