Concept
Statutes and Local Variation
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
Statutes and Local Variation
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 355 supplies the default: punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.1 A default governs only until something displaces it, and two things can. A legislature can authorize heavier remedies for a particular kind of transaction, and a court can word the rule differently from the Restatement. The § 355 analysis is not finished until both possibilities have been checked.
The statutory question asks whether the legislature has changed the remedy for this transaction. The jurisdictional question asks which court is deciding the case and what standard it applies. A student who recites § 355 as uniform national law may state the wrong test for the forum in the problem, and one who forgets statutes may miss the only route to punishment the facts offer.
Statutory Authorization
A legislature is not bound by a default that judges built, so a statute can open a route to enhanced recovery that § 355 alone would close. Exceptions to the contract bar tend to follow where the breach is combined with some other wrong, and that wrong may be a tort, a fraud, or a statutory violation that provides for a punitive award.2 Punitive damages are generally limited to tort liability and statutory violations, so the statutory route stands beside the tort route as a recognized source of punishment.3
The reasons for the bar also explain why a statute can override it. Courts withheld punitive damages for breach in part because excessive liability might discourage people from making mutually beneficial contracts. Torts and statutes, by contrast, usually leave no room for the parties to opt out of the obligations they create.4 A legislature that wants a heavier remedy for one kind of transaction can therefore impose it without leaving the parties to bargain around it, and statutes governing particular transactions do sometimes permit punitive damages, usually in limited amounts.5
The Uniform Commercial Code does not itself supply that authorization. It adheres to the traditional view that expectation damages are the standard remedy for breach, and although it imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing, punitive damages generally are not awarded for breach of that duty, as the Delaware Supreme Court explained in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman.6 The Code thus follows the common-law rule except where punitive damages are specifically authorized, and the rule holds even when the breach is willful or malicious, so long as the breach does not amount to an independent tort.7 The exception clause carries the weight. The good-faith duty is a contract duty enforced through the contract remedy, and nothing in it speaks to punishment, while a provision that authorizes punitive or multiple damages for the conduct at issue does. Without such a provision, a party to a sale of goods stands where every other contract plaintiff stands, limited to expectation damages however deliberate the breach.
Each statute fixes its own conditions, so the analysis follows the text of the statute in play. The antitrust laws, for example, allow treble damages as a matter of course: compensatory damages are multiplied by three to produce the award, without regard to the defendant’s state of mind.8 A statute that conditions enhancement on scienter works differently, because the plaintiff must first prove the culpable state of mind. An exam will normally supply the statute that matters. A statutory claim does not pass through § 355’s tort test, and the plaintiff must plead and prove the statutory violation itself.
A statute can also close a door it might have opened. A California decision quotes Civil Code § 3294(a), which speaks of an action “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,” and states the consequence: in the absence of an independent tort, punitive damages may not be awarded for breach of contract “even where the defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract was wilful, fraudulent, or malicious.”9 The statute thus draws in legislative text the line that § 355 draws at common law. A California plaintiff who seeks exemplary damages on a contract claim needs an obligation that arises outside the contract, and willfulness alone does not supply one.
Jurisdictional Variation
Section 355 states the prevailing rule, but prevailing does not mean uniform. Contract remedies are largely state common law, and a restatement reports what courts generally do without binding any of them, so a state may adopt the Restatement formulation, tighten it, or loosen it. The common statement remains the starting point: punitive damages are ordinarily not recoverable for breach of a contractual obligation unless the conduct also constitutes an independent tort that would support such an award.11 The variations below show where courts depart from it.
Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems, Inc. puts two state rules side by side. Under Arkansas law, the victim of a breach of contract cannot obtain punitive damages without proving that the breach was tortious. Indiana law has no such requirement, but the plaintiff there must demonstrate entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing evidence.12 The Arkansas rule takes § 355’s tort condition at its word: a plaintiff with no tort theory gets no punishment, however deliberate the breach. The Indiana rule shifts the inquiry from the label on the claim to the content of the proof, because punitive damages may be awarded in a suit for breach if, “mingled” with the breach, are “elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression.”13
The Seventh Circuit did not have to choose between the two rules. Mid-Continent acquiesced in the trial judge’s ruling that Indiana law applied, so the choice-of-law question was waived on appeal.14 The case still shows why identifying the governing law is the first analytic step, because the two states ask different questions and impose different burdens. Neither rule is simply friendlier to plaintiffs. The Indiana approach spares a plaintiff from proving a separate tort but demands clear and convincing proof of the mingled element.
The Indiana formulation should not be overread. The same opinion observes that even a deliberate breach is not necessarily blameworthy: the promisor may simply have discovered that its performance is worth more to someone else, and efficiency is promoted by letting it break the promise so long as it makes good the promisee’s actual losses.15 Deliberateness alone therefore fits poorly with an inquiry into fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression, and Indiana’s rule describes one state’s approach, not a national trend.
The two distributors suffered the same breach, and the divergence in the Indiana-style jurisdiction comes entirely from the evidence of a mingled element. The first distributor’s proof shows only that the manufacturer chose to break the contract and profit from it, which is the situation expectation damages already address. The Arkansas-style jurisdiction treats the two distributors alike because neither established a tort.
Other courts sit at different points along the spectrum. In recent years, some courts have shown an increased willingness to find sufficiently tortious conduct accompanying a breach to support punitive damages.16 That development works within the § 355 framework, because the plaintiff must still find a tort, which sets it apart from the Indiana formulation. A New Jersey court, in Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp., left room for an exceptional case. It said the right to punitive damages should not turn simply on whether an action is designated as tort or contract, and that a case with sufficiently aggravated facts might warrant punishment even outside the recognized exceptions, though the case before it was not one.17 Other courts stay cautious. Confronted with commentators’ arguments for broader availability of punitive damages, the Delaware Supreme Court in Pressman acknowledged that those arguments have “some force” but said it was “reluctant to depart markedly from the well-established body of law.”18
On an exam, the § 355 default is the answer to give unless the facts point to a governing statute or to a local variation such as the Indiana approach.