Concept
Penalty Clauses Are Not a Workaround
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
Penalty Clauses Are Not a Workaround
Section 355 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts denies punitive damages for breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.1 That bar suggests a drafting trick. If a court will not add punishment after the breach, the parties might write the punishment into the contract beforehand and ask the court only to enforce what they agreed. Section 356(1) shuts that door. It lets parties liquidate damages in the agreement, that is, fix the amount payable on breach in advance, but only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty.2 The full test for telling a valid liquidated damages clause from a penalty belongs to the study of liquidated damages. The point here is that the penalty rule and the bar on punitive damages rest on a single principle.
That principle is compensation. Comment a to § 356 says that the central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive, and comment b adds that an agreement fixing damages in an amount vastly greater than what approximates actual loss would be unenforceable as imposing a penalty.3 Apply that objective to a stipulated sum and the result follows. A sum near a reasonable forecast of loss does in advance what a court would do afterward. A sum far above any plausible loss gives the promisee money the loss does not explain, and the only work left for the excess is to make breach costly enough that the promisor avoids it. Punishing or deterring breach is the office of a punitive award, and § 355 withholds that award absent an independent tort. The law therefore lets parties stipulate an amount or a formula for damages but never a punishment. When a stipulated remedy looks too one-sided or bears no reasonable relation to the actual harm, courts treat it as a penalty clause and refuse to enforce it.4
Courts test a challenged clause by asking whether it was a genuine attempt by the parties to settle damages in advance. If it was not, the court calls it a penalty, a provision whose purpose or effect is to punish or deter breach by imposing liability beyond reasonably anticipated loss, and declines to enforce it. In that inquiry courts tend to give greater weight to the compensation policy. Striking the clause leaves the victim with a remedy, because the victim then proves its actual damages in the usual way.5 The penalty question also runs separately from bargaining unfairness. Duress, fraud, or unconscionability would be independent grounds for invalidating a clause, and their absence does not rescue a penalty.6 Two well-advised businesses that freely agree to a punitive sum therefore meet the same rule as any other litigants.
Economic analysis supplies a second objection to penalty clauses, and a few numbers show how it works. Suppose a breach would cost the promisee $12,000 in actual damages and give the promisor $20,000 in added profit. If the promisor need only compensate fully, it breaches and keeps $8,000, and the promisee is no worse off than under performance. A clause requiring $25,000 on breach exceeds the $20,000 profit, so the promisor performs and the net gain is forgone. The general point is that compensatory damages already deter inefficient breaches, those that cost the victim more than they gain the breaker, so penal damages could do nothing except deter some efficient ones.7 This is the objection that Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. examines, and it matches the earlier analysis of efficient breach, with the penalty clause acting as a punitive award the parties write for themselves.
That discussion does not treat the objection as decisive. The objection overlooks that a promisor's willingness to accept a penalty clause can make the promisor and the promise credible, and that credibility may be essential to inducing some value-maximizing contracts. It also overlooks that fully competent parties will include a penalty clause only if its benefits exceed its costs, and those costs include the chance of discouraging an efficient breach down the road.8 The reply weakens the efficiency case against enforcing penalties, but it leaves the doctrine where it was. The doctrine rests on the compensation policy, and courts continue to give that policy the greater weight.9 A clause that is unreasonably large in light of the anticipated or actual loss remains an unenforceable penalty.10