Concept
Willful Breach Is Not Enough
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
Willful Breach Is Not Enough
A breach does not become punishable because the breacher meant to commit it. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts lifts the bar on punitive damages in one circumstance only: the conduct constituting the breach must also be a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.1 That condition says nothing about the breacher’s state of mind, so courts apply the bar to intentional breaches as firmly as to careless ones. A California opinion, quoting Myers Building Industries, Ltd. v. Interface Technology, Inc., states the consequence: without an independent tort, punitive damages may not be awarded for breach of contract “even where the defendant’s conduct in breaching the contract was wilful, fraudulent, or malicious.”2 The general statement of the rule is the same. It holds even if the breach is willful or malicious, so long as the breach does not amount to an independent tort, and the Uniform Commercial Code calls for the same result except where punitive damages are specifically authorized.3 Intent can make a breach worse, but intent alone does not change the kind of claim.
White v. Benkowski applies the rule to a breach the court itself called wilful. The court noted that persuasive authority from other jurisdictions denies punitive damages in contract actions without exception, and that this holds even when the breach is wilful, as it was there.4 It conceded that breach of a contractual duty may be a tort when the contract creates the relation out of which grows a duty to use care in performing what the contract prescribes. The concession did the plaintiffs no good: “Not so here. No tort was pleaded or proved.”5 The court reinstated the jury’s verdict on compensatory damages and otherwise affirmed, so the plaintiffs recovered compensation and no more. The decision also shows where the missing element must appear. The independent tort has to be pleaded and proved, and the wilfulness of the breach cannot stand in for it.
Wilfulness cannot do this work because it describes the wrong thing. Conduct amounting to a breach of contract becomes tortious only when it also violates an independent duty arising from principles of tort law.6 That duty is the one the law imposes on everyone without any contract: to abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon his rights.7 Motive tells us how the defendant came to break its promise. The independent duty asks what the defendant was forbidden to do whether or not it had promised anything. A deliberate breach violates only the promise, and the promise carries its own remedy, contract damages.
The dissent in Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. states the settled rule in terms of motive. As a matter of both statute and common law, a breach of a commercial contract cannot be the basis for punitive damages. “The law eschews inquiry into a breaching party’s motives; whether acting in good faith or bad faith, a party that breaches a commercial contract must pay only contract damages.”8 Calling a breach bad faith therefore describes a worse breach without turning it into a different kind of claim. The same passage opens with an objection, “Until today, we have rejected the notion that such conduct could give rise to punitive damages,” which makes it good evidence of the traditional rule and a sign that the rule’s edges are contested. The sections on independent torts take up that contested ground.
Courts have been reluctant to widen the remedy even when invited to. One court, told that some commentators argue for greater availability of punitive damages for breach of contract, granted that the arguments “have some force” but said it was “reluctant to depart markedly from the well-established body of law.”9 Commentary on the conventional rule points both ways. The plaintiff cannot recover the full cost of litigating the breach, so even a fully compensatory award leaves her worse off than performance would have. In other cases, awarding the excluded damages might lift the plaintiff above the net-expectation level, as a sizeable punitive award is particularly likely to do. Recent developments suggest that these conventional rules of nonliability are not beyond question.10 Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co. shows how culpable a breach can be and still remain a contract claim. A baker accepted goods and refused to pay. The court allowed that the refusal may well have been culpable, but it required proof of tortious misconduct before punitive damages could be awarded.
The mill behaved the same way toward both bakeries, and only the second bakery proved an independent wrong. When a fact pattern is thick with words like intentional, malicious, vindictive, or bad faith, look for the independent duty; those words answer nothing by themselves.