Concept
Failed Remedies and Damage Exclusions
Limitation of Remedies
Failed Remedies and Damage Exclusions
A seller's standard form often protects the seller twice: one clause confines the buyer to repair or replacement, and another excludes consequential damages.1 Section 2-719 treats the two terms in separate subsections. Subsection (2) provides that where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in the Act.2 Subsection (3) provides that consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable.3 The earlier sections taught each rule alone. This section asks what happens when the repair remedy fails and the exclusion sentence is still on the page.
The question has teeth because the repair clause already does part of the exclusion's work. A buyer limited to repair or replacement cannot recover consequential damages even if the contract contains no disclaimer, because a valid remedy limitation effectively eliminates that right.4 When the repair remedy fails, that barrier falls and the Act's remedies return, and those remedies include incidental and consequential damages “in a proper case.”5 The seller then falls back on its second barrier, the exclusion sentence. Subsection (2) does not say whether that sentence survives. It says only that remedy “may be had as provided in this Act.”6
Both sides draw on policies the Code recognizes. Comment 1 to § 2-719 says that parties are free to shape their remedies and that reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given effect. It adds that it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available, so a clause that limits the Article's remedies in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion.7 The buyer's side has a mechanism behind it. A promise to repair or replace rests on assumptions that, if unfounded, fundamentally change the parties' intended allocation of risk: that the seller will try diligently and in good faith to repair, that repairs will succeed within a reasonable time, and that consequential loss during the repair period will be minimal.8 The seller's side has a mechanism too. Remedies are part of the cost of administering a contract, and the price reflects the remedies the parties agreed on, so a buyer who accepts fewer effective remedies pays a lower price.9 A tractor dealer, for example, may be glad to repair defective goods yet wary of liability for a farmer's lost crop, and an exclusion of consequential damages lets the dealer promise the first without the second.10
Courts have resolved the tension in three ways, and they remain divided. In International Financial Services, Inc. v. Franz, the Minnesota Supreme Court observed that courts are deeply divided on the question and that about the same number of cases can be marshaled on either side.11 The dependent approach treats the exclusion as part of the same package as the repair remedy, so it falls when the remedy fails. The independent approach treats the exclusion as a separate term, valid unless unconscionable. The case-by-case approach asks what the parties' bargain actually allocated. The answer on any problem therefore depends on the approach the governing jurisdiction follows.
Dependent Provisions Approach
The dependent approach treats the repair clause and the exclusion as one package, so the exclusion falls when the repair remedy fails of its essential purpose. The argument begins with the text. Subsection (2) returns the buyer to the remedies the Act provides, and those include consequential damages in a proper case.12 A buyer who proves that the repair remedy failed has therefore reached a remedy the exclusion sentence was written to block, and on this view the exclusion's validity under subsection (3) never has to be tested.
The seller answers that subsection (3) permits an exclusion of consequential damages unless it is unconscionable.13 The dependent approach replies that the exclusion cannot be read apart from the repair promise it accompanied. Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Systems, Inc. described the reasoning. Confining a buyer to repair or replacement rests on assumptions that, if unfounded, fundamentally change the parties' intended allocation of risk: that the seller will diligently and in good faith attempt to repair, that it will repair within a reasonable time, and that any consequential loss during the repair period will be minimal.14 A loss caused by the failure of the repair remedy itself, the reasoning runs, could not have been within the parties' contemplation, and a buyer who reasonably expected effective repair to avoid significant consequential loss should not have to absorb that loss when the remedy fails.15
Fairness supplies a second argument. In Smith v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., a federal court in Illinois recounted reasoning associated with Adams v. J.I. Case Co.: repudiation of the obligations of a warranty “destroys its benefits.” In the opinion's words, “It should be obvious that they cannot at once repudiate their obligation under the warranty and assert its provisions beneficial to them.”16 A seller that promised to cure and did not has defaulted on the very obligation the exclusion was written to accompany, and it should not keep the protective half of its warranty while ignoring the half that served the buyer.
The Seventh Circuit has refused to adopt this categorical approach, undertaking instead a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry that the third approach below develops.17
Independent Provisions Approach
The independent approach treats the repair clause and the exclusion as two terms, each tested by its own standard, so the failure of the first does not decide the fate of the second. Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp. gave the position its classic statement: the better reasoned approach is to treat the consequential damage disclaimer as an independent provision, valid unless unconscionable, and that approach “poses no logical difficulties.”22
Three features of the Code and the cases support the reading. First, the two terms can exist apart. A contract may contain no limitation on warranty damages yet exclude consequential damages, and a contract may limit warranty damages while expressly permitting consequential ones.23 Second, the Code tests the terms differently. A limited remedy survives unless it fails of its essential purpose, while an exclusion is valid unless it is unconscionable.24 Cooley's survey of the cases states the same point: a remedy may fail because it deprives a party of the substantial value of a bargained-for benefit, yet a clearly expressed exclusion of consequential damages remains enforceable if it is not unconscionable.25 Third, each term has its own statutory footing. In Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., an aircraft contract limited the buyer's remedy for non-delivery to cancellation and refund of the deposit. The court held that § 2-719(1)(a) authorized that clause, and § 2-719(3), which expressly lets parties limit or exclude consequential damages, also supported the decision when the buyer sued for consequential damages.26
The dependent approach points to the words “remedy may be had as provided in this Act” and argues that consequential damages return with every other Code remedy.27 The independent answer is that the same Act permits the parties to exclude consequential damages, so the remedies that return when a repair clause fails remain subject to that permission unless the exclusion is unconscionable.28
Franz applied the independent view on commercial facts. The court acknowledged the deep division among courts, but it concluded that the line of cases introduced by American Electric Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. is the better reasoned and adheres most closely to the Code's general purpose of permitting the parties to make their own agreement. It saw “no reason to hold, as a general proposition, that the failure of the limited remedy provided in the contract, without more, invalidates a wholly distinct term in the agreement excluding consequential damages.”29 It was also persuaded that many routine business transactions would be dislocated by a rule invalidating every exclusion whenever the prescribed remedy fails to operate as intended. Because both parties were merchants with no great disparity in bargaining strength and the claim was for commercial loss, nothing made enforcement unconscionable, and the exclusion was valid and enforceable.30
Kearney & Trecker v. Master Engraving shows the approach applied to a machine tool. The jury had been told it could award consequential damages “despite the language of the contract” if the seller failed to make the machine as warranted, and the Appellate Division had treated the exclusion as “inextricably tied to the limitation of remedies.”31 The Kearney opinion disagreed. It found no justification in the record for invalidating a risk allocation both parties had agreed to, and it concluded that § 2-719 does not require invalidating an exclusion of consequential damages whenever limited remedies fail of their essential purpose.32 The testimony showed a complex machine whose operation could be affected by many factors, including maintenance and programming deficiencies for which the buyer's own employees were responsible. The buyer also remained free to prove that the machine was worth less than the contract price and so obtain the warranty measure under § 2-714(2).33
The same opinion marks where the rule gives way. Invalidation is appropriate only when the circumstances of the transaction, including the seller's breach, make the exclusion inconsistent with the intent and reasonable commercial expectations of the parties. A seller's wrongful repudiation of a repair warranty, for instance, may expose the buyer to consequential damages the contract never contemplated while the Code's other remedies prove inadequate, and a court might then decline to enforce the exclusion.34
Three considerations explain why courts choose this approach for commercial sales. The first is respect for the parties' allocation of risk, which Franz treated as the Code's purpose.35 The second is pricing. The contract price reflects the remedies the parties agreed on,36 and a seller who will repair defective goods but does not wish to answer for, say, a farmer's lost crop can say so by excluding consequential damages.37 The third is that the buyer keeps other remedies. The warranty measure of § 2-714(2), the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had as warranted, remains available,38 and on remand in Chatlos the buyer received an award on that measure.39
Courts also resist the argument that a business's exclusion of lost profits is unconscionable merely because profit is why businesses contract. In a dispute between Suzy Phillips and its seller Coville over form clauses barring consequential damages, including lost profits,40 the court rejected that argument. The Code specifically provides for such exclusions, it reasoned, and the argument would leave § 2-719(3) without effect by invalidating all such limitations between businessmen.41 The court added, quoting another decision, that “a limitation on incidental or consequential damages remains valid even if an exclusive remedy fails.”42
The approach has limits. Chatlos stressed that the claim was for commercial loss between substantial business concerns with no great disparity in bargaining power or sophistication. It noted that there was no surprise because the limitation was clearly expressed in a short, easily understandable sales contract, and that this was not an ordinary consumer misled by a disclaimer hidden in a “linguistic maze.”43 Franz likewise rested on the merchant status of both parties and the commercial nature of the claim.44 Those facts matter because subsection (3) treats consumer and commercial claims differently: limiting consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable, while limiting damages where the loss is commercial is not.45
Case-by-Case Approach
The case-by-case approach declines to choose between the other two rules and asks instead what this buyer and this seller actually agreed about the risk of a failed repair. The Seventh Circuit, as Smith reports, has refused to adopt the categorical approach and instead undertakes a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry, beginning with AES Technology Systems, Inc.50
The reason is that an exclusion of consequential damages allocates risk, and what risk it allocated depends on what the parties assumed. A repair promise rests on assumptions that the seller will repair diligently and in good faith, within a reasonable time, with little consequential loss during repair, and when those assumptions prove unfounded the parties' intended allocation of risk changes.51 A few courts reach a fact-specific inquiry by asking whether the buyer's remaining remedy, without consequential damages, is adequate. In one such decision, the bulk of the damages were consequential, so a remedy without them was no remedy at all.52
A tractor case discussed in Bishop Logging shows the interpretive version. The court read the contract from three perspectives: its language, its creative context (which party drafted the terms and so owed a duty to state the agreement precisely), and its commercial context, with emphasis on the nature and purpose of the contract and the type of goods. It concluded that the exclusion of consequential damages did not extend to the seller's failure to repair the tractor as the warranty required, because the contract showed that the parties contemplated repair would be possible and so did not anticipate a need to limit damages from its failure.53
Bishop Logging Co. v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co. applied the same reading. The court noted that the effect of a failed limited remedy on a clause excluding consequential damages was a major issue the state's appellate courts had not resolved.54 It then looked to what the parties assumed. John Deere's agent knew the equipment would be used in a swamp, assured the buyer that the units would function there, and promised factory support to make sure they did, so regular, certain repair was both promised and expected.55 The court therefore interpreted the exclusion in light of this premise of “certainty of repair.” The parties had agreed to exclude consequential damages if Deere performed its repair obligation, but the buyer could reasonably expect to recover them when the defects were never adequately corrected and the limited remedy proved ineffectual. The failure of the limited remedy had materially altered the balance of risk the parties set, so the court allowed the full array of Code remedies, including consequential and incidental damages under §§ 36-2-714 and 2-715.56 Even then, recovery stopped at proven loss. The court reduced the jury's award to $723,323, the maximum economic damages Bishop Logging claimed, because the award lacked relation to the testimony and apparently included impermissible noneconomic damages.57
The type of goods matters because it shapes what the buyer bargained for. Where goods are experimental, novel, or of uncertain capability, a buyer who accepts a repair limit receives only the seller's attempt at timely repair, and unsuccessful repair is not a failure of essential purpose. Where the goods' capabilities are predictable, timely and successful repair is required, and unsuccessful or tardy repair of logging equipment, for example, defeats the remedy's essential purpose.58 The case-by-case courts carry that logic to the exclusion: an exclusion written on the premise of working repair does not cover losses from repair that never worked.59
The independent approach contains its own version of this inquiry. Kearney would decline to enforce an exclusion where the seller's breach, such as wrongful repudiation of a repair warranty, makes enforcement inconsistent with the parties' intent and reasonable commercial expectations.60 The labels therefore overlap in practice, and the two approaches differ mainly in where they begin: the independent approach starts from enforcement and relents in unusual circumstances, while the case-by-case approach starts from the circumstances.
Set side by side, the three approaches differ on a single point: what the failure of the repair remedy does to the exclusion. The dependent approach says the exclusion falls with the remedy and returns the buyer to the Act's remedies.61 The independent approach says the exclusion is a distinct term, valid unless unconscionable.62 The case-by-case approach says the answer depends on whether the parties allocated the risk of failed repair to the buyer, which the court learns from the contract's language, its drafter, the type of goods, and what the parties assumed about repair.63
Step four does the most work, because the same facts can produce opposite results under different approaches. On an exam, name the approach the governing court follows. If the facts do not say, set out each position, apply it, and note that courts are divided.71